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Red sky at night, 
Sailor’s delight; 
Red sky at morning, 
Sailor’s warning.1 
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presentations in 2009 and 2010.  Roland Trope and Claudia Ray, The Real Realities 
of Cloud Computing: Ethical Issues for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges, Essay for CLE 
Program, ABA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 2010; Roland Trope and 
Claudia Ray, Head in the Cloud – Feet on the Ground: Understanding the Ethical 
Challenges of Web 2.0 for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges, ABA Annual Meeting, 
Chicago, August 2009.  Copies of both essays are on file with the authors.  The 
research for this article was current as of August 4, 2011. 
  The authors would like to thank Claudia Ray for her earlier work and 
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Association’s Cyberspace Law Committeethe committee which sponsored one of 
the two CLE programsfor her suggestion to the editors to invite us to contribute 
to this issue. 
  Three exceptional research assistants contributed to this article in 
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Lady Gaga has made herself a paragon of pop ambition and a spokeswoman 
for equal rights, but on Monday she became an unwitting symbol for 
something else: the pitfalls of cloud computing.2 
 
significant ways, Christina Clark, E. Sebastian Arduengo, and Peyman Yousefy, 
Maurer School of Law, Classes of 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.  Finally, the 
authors thank Marion Conaty and Max Exter of the Maurer School of Law whose 
timely assistance was instrumental when this manuscript (with exquisite irony) 
became corrupt.  Without the contributions of these five individuals, this article 
would never have been finished.  Regardless of their talents, any remaining errors 
are the authors’ responsibilities. 
  The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and have 
not been approved by, and should not be attributable to, the U. S. Military 
Academy at West Point, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, 
the Maurer School of Law, or the Trustees of Indiana University. 
 1. NURSERY RHYMESLYRICS, ORIGINS & HISTORY!, http://www.rhymes.org.uk 
/red_sky_at_night.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).  The website 
http://www.rhymes.org.uk/red_sky_at_night.htm attributes the rhyme’s origins to 
the Bible: 
He answered and said unto them, When it is evening, ye say, It will be fair 
weather; for the sky is red. And in the morning, It will be foul weather to-
day [sic]; for the sky is red and lowering. O ye hypocrites, ye can discern 
the face of the sky, but can ye not discern the signs of the times? 
Id. (quoting Matt. 16:2–3).  Shakespeare also paraphrased this old adage in Venus 
and Adonis (1593).  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE ARDEN SHAKESPEARE COMPLETE 
WORKS 55 (Richard Proudfoot et al. eds., 1998) (“Like a red morn, that ever yet 
betoken’d, Wreck to the seaman, tempest to the field, Sorrow to shepherds, woe 
unto the birds, Gusts and foul flaws to herdmen and to herds.”); see also EVERYDAY 
MYSTERIES: FUN SCI. FACTS FROM THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr 
/scitech/mysteries/weather-sailor.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (explaining the 
history behind the saying). 
 2. Ben Sisario, Lady Gaga Sale Stalls Amazon Servers, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/media/24gaga. 
html?ref=technology.  In May 2011, on the release of Lady Gaga’s new album, 
“Born This Way,” Amazon.com offered “a one-day sale of the MP3 version of the 
album for ninety-nine cents, a full $11 less than its price at iTunes, the Web’s 
dominant music retailer.”  Id.  The discount reportedly provides Amazon a means 
of promoting its new “Cloud Drive” service that “allows users to store music files 
on remote servers and stream them over the Internet to their computer or 
smartphone.”  Id.  However, the promotion proved so popular that the requests 
for the “99 cent” download overwhelmed Amazon’s cloud computing servers, 
which “stalled” and prevented many users from completing the download or from 
listening to the full album.  Id.  In addition, in late May 2011, a staff developer at 
the Tenafly, New Jersey school district employed a Lady Gaga impersonator to 
deliver a presentation about bullying over the Internet.  Karen Sudol, Tenafly 
School Officials Reviewing ‘Lady Gaga’ Incident, NORTH JERSEY.COM (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/Tenafly_school_officials_reviewing_Lady_Gag
a_incident.html.  After a student queried administrators as to the true identity of 
the speaker, the school district called the developer’s actions “a clear lapse in 
judgment.”  Id.  Though the employee has not been formally disciplined, her case 
also highlights the pitfalls that may be encountered when utilizing new 
technologies in the workplace.  Id. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For three decades, the practice of law has adjusted to the 
incoming tide of the Digital Era.  The tide has not raised all boats.  
What has required so much adjustment is the arrival of a succession 
of new communications technologies.  These new technologies 
promise far-reaching benefits including decreased processing time, 
enhanced reach of communications (with e-mail eclipsing faxes), 
global transmission of text messages and “tweets,” compression of 
reams of documents into portable storage devices and thumb 
drives, and finally, global access to entire libraries via website data 
banks.  However, these extraordinary advances have not been 
without cost. 
Counsel have had to adjust to these new technologies and with 
each new advance learn how to take the best advantage of their 
greater efficiencies, and most importantly (although often 
underestimated), how to evaluate the hidden impact of each 
technology on counsel’s professional responsibilities and ethical 
duties.  But the ethical and professional obligations that arise when 
lawyers and law firms become “early adopters” of a new 
communications technology are not always immediately apparent. 
Nor is it clear that the profession’s ethics have kept pace with 
the incipient risks of these new technologies.  The need to keep 
pace with technologies, the risks they may present to counsel and 
the client confidential information entrusted to them, and the 
relationship of those tasks to the professional ethics rules is the 
focus of this article.  These needs will shape the policies that 
counsel establish for their legal practices and for their acquisitions 
of new technologies and will give them an increasingly influential 
role in the legal profession’s operations.  We would therefore 
suggest that the professional ethics rules be accompanied by fresh 
inquiries in light of recently emerging communications 
technologies, particularly cloud-based Web 2.0 applications and 
cloud computing services—and the vulnerabilities that they bring 
unnoticed into the enterprises that adopt and deploy them.  This 
article will attempt to define broad areas of risk created by the new 
technologies and offer guidance to counsel on identifying such 
risks, assessing whether they can be mitigated by reasonable 
precautions, and if not, what counsel may need to do to fulfill their 
professional ethical obligations.  In it, we examine obligations that 
include (1) understanding the features and operations of Web 2.0 
communications, storage, and processing technologies; (2) 
increasing familiarity with emerging practices and customs of users 
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of such technologies; and (3) assessing risks that these technologies 
may pose for lawyers and law firms with obligations to comply with 
applicable rules of professional conduct. 
This inquiry is timely given the vulnerabilities to cyber attacks 
that all enterprises, including law firms, face if they have adopted 
and deployed the communications technologies of the Digital Era.  
In Part II of this article, we discuss the damage done to the targeted 
enterprises and the latent but very real risks to which an enterprise 
exposes itself when it adopts a new communications technology.  
These technologies perforce contain innumerable security 
vulnerabilities whose existence, nature, location, and significance 
are largely unknown to the enterprise.  Upon deployment, 
moreover, they create additional, unquantifiable vulnerabilities in 
an enterprise’s cyber-based systems and provide covert access to an 
enterprise’s privileged, proprietary, or other sensitive digital assets 
and records. 
Thus, the enterprise becomes “porous” and is at high risk of 
having its digital assets targeted for misappropriation or 
destruction and the operations of its computer networks (and any 
machinery and equipment) brought under an adversary’s 
command and control that can direct the enterprise to sabotage 
itself or to launch attacks on other enterprises.  Cyber attacks occur 
by stealth, do their harm unopposed, and cease (often without 
detection or even awareness of the harm suffered).  Company data 
often survives the attack; supervisory control and data acquisition 
(“SCADA”) systems appear to function properly and it is only later 
(sometimes months later) that damage to targeted data or 
equipment becomes apparent.  Often enterprises or information 
networks succumb to exploits that utilized data stolen from another 
enterprise.  Trade secrets believed to be tightly protected are taken 
advantage of elsewhere, with no trail of misappropriation or clear 
evidence of the identity of the adversary.  Finally, the enterprise’s 
most sensitive data—the design of its cyber security safeguards and 
procedures—have been compromised, subverted to become part of 
the exploit that enables the attack to succeed. 
The enterprise in essence engineers its own damage.  Any new 
communications technology should therefore be examined for the 
presence of cyber vulnerabilities, lest a time-saver become a 
technology Trojan horse.  Such a latent threat circumvents the 
enterprise’s own physical safeguards and its cyber defenses. 
An enterprise whose capabilities have been enhanced by 
innovations in communications technologies may belatedly realize 
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that such technology has compromised its cybersecurity, its digital 
assets, its ability to operate, its corporate integrity, in short, its 
existence.  Technology vendors do not inform customers of the 
risks a new technology introduces into an enterprise—perhaps 
because they are aware or anticipate that they have not discovered 
all such vulnerabilities or made cybersecurity their highest priority.  
Some firms have recognized the need to change their priorities—
and other firms have not. 
The marketing literature for technologies seldom alerts 
potential buyers to the latent vulnerabilities created in deploying it, 
particularly if developers (or vendors) failed in design reviews and 
testing to discover these.  Unlike a faulty wire in hardware, or short 
on a motherboard, or “bug” that impairs the operation of software, 
cyber vulnerabilities do not announce their presence by system 
malfunctions.  A cyber attack reveals such vulnerabilities belatedly, 
and misplaced trust can allow the vulnerabilities to persist, 
amplifying the damage, as Cynthia E. Irvine (of the Naval 
Postgraduate School) and J.R. Rao (of IBM Thomas J. Watson 
Research Center) explained: 
[S]ecurity is a behind-the-scenes service that we don’t 
concern ourselves with until something goes wrong.  Most 
of us probably don’t expect our systems to allow criminals 
to obtain or manipulate our valuable information, nor do 
we expect catastrophic failures of large-scale systems due 
to manipulation by adversaries. 
 A typical developer might think that a system is 
acceptable if it provides the customer’s requested 
functionality; a wise developer might also ensure that the 
system isn’t a danger to the user’s health or safety.  The 
result can be a carefully constructed system that also 
provides the intended services.  But wait!  What if the 
system does its job, but still leaves an entryway so that 
cyber miscreants can slip in and steal or modify valuable 
information?  What if these miscreants wreak havoc by 
causing systems to go off kilter?  Even if our wise 
developer could construct the system carefully, many such 
systems are used in ways that were neither intended nor 
anticipated—for example, systems designed for the enterprise 
but used in multitenant settings such as the cloud.  This 
scenario highlights the problem of misplaced trust: the 
system we trust isn’t as trustworthy as we had imagined and now 
exhibits some mixture of both expected and unexpected 
functionality.  A disconnect exists between user 
assumptions regarding what the system was supposed to 
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do and what it ended up doing.  How did this happen?  
The answer is that the system does something 
unexpectedly because it contains unspecified or misused 
functionality in the form of flaws or, worse, clandestine 
artifices. 
 Unspecified functionality is rampant in many of 
today’s systems.3 
In this article, we take a cold, hard look at the frequency of 
successful cyber attacks and the consequent transfers of valuable 
information (often an unlicensed export of export controlled 
technology and with this a transfer of an enterprise’s hard-earned 
competitive edge).  The transfers include source code, intellectual 
property, and cybersecurity information.  These unauthorized 
transfers are not limited to data stored within an enterprise’s 
computers and servers.  Enterprises store such data increasingly in 
servers of cloud computing service vendors where it can be 
similarly breached and misappropriated.  And, enterprises 
frequently entrust some of their most sensitive data to their outside 
counsel who may store it on computers and servers that are no less 
vulnerable to attack than those of their clients and the clients’ 
cloud storage vendors.  For counsel, such unauthorized access to 
client confidential information may result in damage to clients’ 
interests as well as to the counsel’s relationship with affected 
clients.  The rising incidence of cyber attacks and the damage they 
cause radically redefine the risk evaluations in which counsel 
routinely engage.  And, the misplaced trust in technology and the 
high costs it imposes should be seen, we believe, as “handwriting on 
the wall,” intimating that our Digital Era’s technologies are 
compromising the enterprise. 
Nearly ubiquitous connectivity disperses nearly ubiquitous 
vulnerability.  Users demand connectivity, enterprises attempt to 
enhance their competitive edge by purchasing the technology 
without weighing the latent cost of the technological benefits—
cyber defenses may become eroded and porous.  The Digital Era’s 
technology has allowed for unprecedented concentration of 
valuable information assets in digital media.  Once stored there, 
however, the data becomes easily transferrable worldwide in 
seconds: it can be saved to light-weight portable computing devices 
and easily concealed memory sticks that can be taken outside the 
enterprise; information can be uploaded to cloud computing 
 
 3. Cynthia E. Irvine & J.R. Rao, Engineering Secure Systems, IEEE SECURITY & 
PRIVACY, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 18. 
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servers where the vendor may elect to make multiple copies, stored 
in multiple jurisdictions or where the data may be under the 
control of other outsource contractors with unverifiable cyber 
defenses.  Multiplicity of copies and their dispersal creates an 
infinite number of data treasure troves.  An adversary need only 
attack one to infiltrate an enterprise’s valuable information.  If 
copies of the enterprise’s source code have been secreted on 
numerous media, the attacker needs only to exploit one of the 
media in order to misappropriate the complete code. 
Enterprises that rely on the benefits of technology must create 
protocols to reassess the costs of such technology.  They must factor 
the calculable damage to digital assets, and they may well conclude 
that the costs in misappropriated intellectual property, 
compromised cyber security, and reputational or enterprise 
damage dim the luster of the benefits.  Given this cost/benefit 
analysis, future investments in new technology may well prove 
unjustifiable unless cyber security can be appropriately reinforced 
and maintained.  This is the analysis in which we believe law firm 
management and their clients’ Boards of Directors must engage 
when asked to approve a technology acquisition strategy. 
As destructive cyber attacks increase in frequency and severity 
(a pattern already in evidence), we believe they will force a sea-
change in regulations governing critical infrastructure enterprises, 
in the creation of new or enhanced legal duties of care, in legal 
liability, and in the actions required to be taken by responsible personnel to 
fulfill professional ethical duties.  The interpretations of such ethical 
duties are bound to change to reflect the increased risks presented 
by the technology and by users’ failure or inability to mitigate or 
neutralize those risks.  We believe that vulnerabilities to cyber 
attacks and the profusion and continuous onslaught of such attacks 
will prompt officers and directors and their counsel to give serious 
consideration to treating cyber security as material to the financial 
condition of the enterprise.  Cyber attacks could well become 
material events for disclosure purposes. 
Underlying each enterprise’s decision to adopt a new 
communications technology are decisions that have in common 
three questions: 
• First, can we trust the new technology? (i.e., what are the worst-case 
scenarios?); 
• Second, can we trust ourselves to use the new technology 
advantageously? (i.e., can our personnel evaluate the benefits, 
identify the vulnerabilities, and guard against the risks?); and 
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• Third, if we deploy the new technology throughout the enterprise, can 
we trust the enterprise’s cyber defenses? (i.e., will the cyber defenses 
protect against misappropriation of the enterprise’s cyber 
security designs, plans, and procedures?  Will the cyber 
defenses detect and repel an adversary intent on manipulating 
our SCADA systems or damaging the enterprise’s machinery, 
networks, and information systems?). 
Counsel have an additional question.  This is a question that 
really confronts any licensed professional (e.g., lawyer, physician, 
accountant, or engineer) whose practice is subject to ethical 
standards:  
• Fourth, if we adopt the new technology, can we fulfill our ethical duties 
and protect our client’s interests? 
In our haste to gain the benefits of a new technology, there is a 
strong institutional temptation to implement prior to vetting fully 
the risk factors.  In most cases, to forgo is to forget. 
When military operations are planned there is often a carefully 
prepared advantage/risk ratio adjusted to reflect updates provided 
by intelligence assessments.  Enterprises, including law firms, may 
find it in their best interests to require carefully prepared 
advantage/risk ratios when they undertake to decide whether, 
when, and to what extent to adopt and deploy a new 
communications technology.  Counsel will need to be more 
proactive in these decisions as cybersecurity becomes part of their 
professional ethical duties. 
We are not advocating raising the ethical standards applicable 
to counsel.  But, bar associations may review ethical standards with 
the advent of round-the-clock cyber attacks on corporate 
enterprises. 
The effort we undertake in this article is designed to help 
counsel by improving their understanding of the nature of the risks 
and by recommending ways that those risks can be mitigated such 
that counsel can avoid inadvertent mistakes.  We offer some 
guidelines for “best practices” of cybersecurity such that counsel 
may make these an integral part of the practice of law. 
Impregnable cyber defenses may exceed current skills.  
Restoration of the secure enterprise may not be possible, or only 
intermittently achievable.  Attack skills have advanced so far, but we 
ought to be able to reverse the trend of decisions that increase an 
enterprise’s vulnerabilities.  Stemming that tide should not be 
mistaken for the folly of trying to oppose the Digital Era’s incoming 
tide.  And, what is interesting is that a heightened understanding of 
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professional ethical duties amidst the waves of cyber attacks may 
prove to be a valuable skill in that pursuit.  As expressed in the old 
saw, “measure twice, cut once,” a concern for professional ethical 
duties can remind counsel to ensure that the second “measuring” 
of a technology acquisition decision involves an accurate 
assessment of what it will do to the enterprise’s cybersecurity. 
The organization of this article is as follows:  Part II discusses 
the ethical challenges presented by ever-evolving communications 
technology.4  Part III reviews what some lawyers believe has come to 
be an implicit duty under the applicable rules to stay abreast of new 
communications technologies and considers the basis for such an 
implicit duty under the ethical rules that require counsel to provide 
competent representation and to protect client confidential 
information.5 Part IV provides an extensive analysis of cloud 
computing and its security risks, discusses some of the ethical risks 
they may create for lawyers and law firms, and suggests some 
measures that may help put counsel in a good position to minimize 
those risks.6 
We have concentrated on cloud computing for three reasons.  
First, most if not all of the ethical risks that arise under other Web 
2.0 technologies, and particularly social networking technologies, 
are present in cloud computing.  Second, most Web 2.0 
technologies rely heavily on cloud computing platforms for their 
operation.  Third, although most Web 2.0 technologies can be 
understood through “hands-on” use, and such use will also reveal 
many of the most serious security risks to an observant lawyer, that 
is decidedly not the case for cloud computing.  Cloud computing 
vendors tend to disclose little of the workings of their platforms, 
their security precautions, their policies in the event of outages and 
data breaches, and their procedures for the location, storage, 
copying, movement, and purging of customer data.  Moreover, 
when security incidents or outages occur that impair or disrupt a 
vendor’s cloud computing services for prolonged periods, the 
vendor’s explanations have tended to arrive after recovery, not 
during the outages when customers urgently need to know what is 
happening so that they can implement contingency plans.  Also, 
the explanations have tended to be expressed in impenetrable 
jargon (notwithstanding considerable detail provided to unpack 
the jargon), as illustrated in Amazon’s explanation of the four-day 
 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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outage of its cloud services in April 20117 in terms of a “re-
mirroring storm”: 
Now that we have fully restored functionality to all 
affected services, we would like to share more details with 
our customers about the events that occurred with the 
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (“EC2”) last week . . . . 
. . . . 
 Primary Outage.  At 12:47 AM PDT on April 21st, a 
network change was performed as part of our normal 
AWS scaling activities in a single Availability Zone in the 
US East Region.  The configuration change was to 
upgrade the capacity of the primary network.  During the 
change, one of the standard steps is to shift traffic off of 
one of the redundant routers in the primary EBS network 
to allow the upgrade to happen.  The traffic shift was 
executed incorrectly and rather than routing the traffic to 
the other router on the primary network, the traffic was 
routed onto the lower capacity redundant EBS network.  
For a portion of the EBS cluster in the affected Availability 
Zone, this meant that they did not have a functioning 
primary or secondary network because traffic was 
purposely shifted away from the primary network and the 
secondary network couldn’t handle the traffic level it was 
receiving.  As a result, many EBS nodes in the affected 
Availability Zone were completely isolated from other EBS 
nodes in its cluster.  Unlike a normal network 
interruption, this change disconnected both the primary 
and secondary network simultaneously, leaving the 
affected nodes completely isolated from one another. 
 When this network connectivity issue occurred, a 
large number of EBS nodes in a single EBS cluster lost 
connection to their replicas.  When the incorrect traffic 
shift was rolled back and network connectivity was 
restored, these nodes rapidly began searching the EBS 
cluster for available server space where they could re-
mirror data.  Once again, in a normally functioning 
cluster, this occurs in milliseconds.  In this case, because 
the issue affected such a large number of volumes 
concurrently, the free capacity of the EBS cluster was 
quickly exhausted, leaving many of the nodes “stuck” in a 
loop, continuously searching the cluster for free space.  
 
 7. Maija Palmer, Security: Internet is Industry Achilles Heel, FIN. TIMES, June 28, 
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/19f14406-a118-11e0-9a07 
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bAGTdn5D. 
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This quickly led to a “re-mirroring storm,” where a large 
number of volumes were effectively “stuck” while the 
nodes searched the cluster for the storage space it needed 
for its new replica.  At this point, about 13% of the 
volumes in the affected Availability Zone were in this 
“stuck” state.8 
Probably very few, if any, lawyers knew that the Amazon cloud 
computing service had such constituent elements as described in 
that account or were aware of the disarray that could occur among 
them during routine maintenance.  Hands-on use of the cloud 
would not reveal such facts.  Moreover, explanations like Amazon’s, 
albeit well intended, and the withholding of such critical 
information until after the vendor restores cloud computing 
services, puts clients and counsel in a poor position to assess risks.  
The more sensitive and valuable the data to be entrusted to the 
cloud (and the more that counsel may have ethical obligations 
concerning the proper care of such data), the greater the 
probability that a premature decision to move such data to the 
cloud could result in unintended consequences and inadvertent 
ethical lapses.  These challenges may become more complicated as 
vendors, seeking to appear to be offering cloud computing, engage 
in marketing strategies that make unclear the extent to which the 
customer is, or is not, embarking on a cloud computing exercise if 
it purchases the vendors’ services.  Such marketing practices, 
referred to as “cloud washing,” tend to involve placing “cloud” 
labels on data storage advertisements and in vendor pitches.9  For 
these reasons, of all the Web 2.0 technologies, we believe the one 
that is probably going to have the most far-reaching effects on 
counsel’s presentation of clients, and the one most poorly 
understood by clients and counsel, is cloud computing, and it, 
therefore, deserves the greatest attention.  Moreover, as noted 
previously in this introduction, recent developments, and 
particularly high-profile data security breaches involving the 
 
 8. Amazon Web Servs. Team, Summary of the Amazon EC2 and Amazon RDS 
Service Disruption in the US East Region, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon 
.com/message/65648 (last visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
 9. Rachel Kossmann, Cloud Washing Defined: How to Avoid This Marketing 
Trend, SEARCHCLOUDSTORAGE.COM, http://searchcloudstorage.techtarget.com 
/podcast/Cloud-washing-defined-How-to-avoid-this-marketing-trend (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2011).  For examples of “cloud washing,” see Larry Dignan, Oracle’s 
Exalogic Box: Cloud Washing at Its Best?, ZDNET (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.zdnet 
.com/blog/btl/oracles-exalogic-box-cloud-washing-at-its-best/39343. 
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cloud,10 suggest that the risks described in this article are not 
speculative, trivial, or financially insignificant.11 
Part V briefly describes new cybersecurity attacks that have 
changed the landscape of information security.12  Part VI reviews 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) 
revised standards and recommendations that appear in its “DRAFT 
Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations,” Special 
Publication 800-146,13 that was published in May 2011.  Because 
NIST highlights certain problematic views of cloud computing, we 
discuss those and assess the ethical challenges they may pose for 
lawyers and law firms.14  Part VII concludes the discussion with a 
brief review of representative examples of ethical risks that other 
Web 2.0 technologies may pose for lawyers and law firms.15 
II. ETHICAL CHALLENGES FROM NEW COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES 
New technologies often create new and unsuspected technical 
problems as well as new and unanticipated ethical challenges.  
Although data leaks undoubtedly occurred at major corporations 
and financial institutions long before they became the subject of 
frequent headlines and recurrent boardroom agenda items, few 
such leaks were publicly reported.16  This approach, which probably 
resulted from the fear of adverse publicity, has tended to result in a 
state of denial among senior management and an erroneous belief 
that tweaking, but not significantly changing, an enterprise’s 
information security could be adequate. 
As often happens, the external threats have evolved much 
 
 10. See Ben Kuchera, PlayStation Network Hacked, Data Stolen: How Badly Is Sony 
Hurt?, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming 
/news/2011/04/sonys-black-eye-is-a-pr-problem-not-a-legal-one.ars. 
 11. For discussion of some of the ethical risks that may arise in the use of 
other Web 2.0 technologies, see, for example, H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel 
J. Toal, The Ethics on Evidence from Social Networking Sites, 246 N.Y. L.J. 5, 7 (2011) 
and Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to 
Use) Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179 (2011). 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. See BADGER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., DRAFT CLOUD 
COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (MAY 2011) [hereinafter NIST CLOUD 
SYNOPSIS], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-146/Draft-
NIST-SP800-146.pdf. 
 14. See infra Part VI. 
 15. See infra Part VII. 
 16. See M. Eric Johnson et al., Security Through Information Risk Management, 
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, May–June 2009, at 45, 49. 
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faster than the safeguards against them, due to the rapid evolution 
of communications technology.  Spurred by these changes, the law 
has changed as well in an effort to enforce ethical behavior in 
connection with new technologies.  The advent of state data breach 
reporting statutes, beginning in California,17 forced U.S. 
enterprises subject to those statutes to disclose the frequency of 
leakages and the magnitude of data released, lost, or compromised.  
They also motivated company management to pursue radical 
strategies for the protection of the most sensitive and valuable data.  
Nevertheless, data leaks and data breaches continue to occur with 
significant damage to financial and reputational interests, with the 
attendant legal and ethical consequences.  For perspective on these 
incidents, consider the findings of a study published in 2011 and 
conducted by the Verizon RISK Team in cooperation with the U.S. 
Secret Service and the Dutch High Tech Crime Unit: 
361 million >> 144 million >> 4 million.  Thus goes the 
tally of total records compromised across the combined 
caseload of Verizon and the United States Secret Service 
(USSS) over the last three years . . . .  
. . . . 
 It is fascinating from a research standpoint that the 
all-time lowest amount of data loss occurred in the same 
year as the all-time highest amount of incidents 
investigated . . . . We witnessed highly automated and 
prolific external attacks, low and slow attacks, intricate 
internal fraud rings, country-wide device tampering 
schemes, cunning social engineering plots, and much 
more . . . .  
. . . . 
 Cloud, Aurora, Mobility, Zeus, APT,18 Wikileaks, 
Stuxnet,19 Anonymous.  If a word cloud were created using 
 
 17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2009). 
 18. The acronym APT stands for “advanced persistent threats,” which are 
campaigns to steal intellectual property using cyber-attacks including malware by a 
human or an organization.  Greg Hoglund, Info. Sys. Sec. Assoc., Conference 
Presentation, Advanced Persistent Threat: What APT Means to Your Enterprise 
(Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.issa-sac.org/info_resources 
/ISSA_20100219_HBGary_Advanced_Persistent_Threat.pdf.  For an anatomy of 
advanced persistent threat campaigns, see id. 
 19. For an account of the Stuxnet worm, the effect it had on Iranian nuclear 
processing facilities, and the threats that similar malware—using “man-in-the-
middle” attacks—pose to the increasingly widespread supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems, see Roland L. Trope & Geoffrey Schwartz, Cyber 
Security for U.S.-Based Nuclear Power Plants, Continuing Legal Education Program at 
the ABA Cyberspace Law Committee’s Winter Working Meeting (Jan. 2011) (on 
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infosec headlines from 2010, these would certainly be 
rendered big and bold . . . . While the Cloud and mobile 
devices increasingly allow us to do anything from 
anywhere with anyone at any time, Aurora, Zeus, 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), Wikileaks, and 
Stuxnet remind us of the difficulty of protecting our 
information assets in a usability-driven world . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [W]e constantly see breaches involving hosted systems, 
outsourced management, rogue vendors, and even VMs20 
(though the attack vectors have nothing to do with it 
being a VM or not).  In other words, it’s more about 
giving up control of our assets and data (and not 
controlling the associated risk) than any technology 
specific to the Cloud.21 
The severity of the advanced persistent threats, particularly 
those reported based in and launched from China, and the 
ubiquity of risks created, in part, by the nearly ubiquitous access to 
treasure troves of companies’ digital data assets is attested to in the 
release in August 2011 of the McAfee report, authored by Dmitri 
Alperovitch, that observed: 
Having investigated intrusions such as Operation Aurora 
 
file with the authors). 
 20. The acronym VM stands for “virtual machine.” 
 21. VERIZON, 2011 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2, 4 (2011), available 
at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach 
-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf.  As for the sharp decline in the number of 
records compromised in 2010, the report offers this explanation: 
The Secret Service has focused attention on numerous “bullet proof 
hosters,” who provide web hosting services that allow their customer’s 
[sic] considerable leniency in the types of materials they may upload and 
distribute.  Seizures in excess of 200TB [terabytes] of data, [sic] 
belonging to bullet proof hosters, [sic] have made the proliferation of 
malware more challenging for cybercriminals and provided a substantial 
number of investigative leads. 
  With all these factors taken into account, it is not surprising that the 
number of compromised records significantly decreased during 2010.  
After any major investigation and arrest, the cybercriminal underground 
evaluates what happened and evolves from the lessons learned during the 
prosecution of their peers. 
  It appears that cybercriminals are currently satisfied with 
compromising Point of Sale (POS) systems and performing account 
takeovers and Automated Clearing House (ACH) transaction fraud.  
There has been an increase in these areas in 2010.  In relation to prior 
years, it appeared that there were more data breaches in 2010, but the compromised 
data decreased due to the size of the compromised company’s databases. 
Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
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and NightDragon (systemic long-term compromise of 
Western oil and gas industry), as well as numerous others 
that have not been disclosed publicly, I am convinced that 
every company in every conceivable industry with 
significant size and valuable intellectual property and 
trade secrets has been compromised (or will be shortly), 
with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering 
the intrusion or its impact.  In fact, I divide the entire set 
of Fortune Global 2,000 firms into two categories: those 
that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t yet 
know. 
 Lately, with the rash of revelations about attacks on 
organizations such as RSA, Lockheed Martin, Sony, PBS, 
and others, I have been asked . . . whether the rate of 
intrusions is increasing and if it is a new phenomenon.  I 
find the question ironic because these types of 
exploitations have occurred relentlessly for at least a half 
decade, and the majority of the recent disclosures in the 
last six months have, in fact, been a result of relatively 
unsophisticated and opportunistic exploitations for the 
sake of notoriety by loosely organized political hacktivist 
groups such as Anonymous and Lulzsec.  On the other 
hand, the targeted compromises we are focused on—
known as advanced persistent threats (APTs)—are much 
more insidious and occur largely without public 
disclosures.  They present a far greater threat to 
companies and governments, as the adversary is 
tenaciously persistent in achieving their objectives.  The 
key to these intrusions is that the adversary is motivated by 
a massive hunger for secrets and intellectual property; this 
is different from the immediate financial gratification that 
drives much of cybercrime, another serious but more 
manageable threat. 
 What we have witnessed over the past five to six years 
has been nothing short of a historically unprecedented 
transfer of wealth—closely guarded national secrets 
(including those from classified government networks), 
source code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation 
plans and exploration details for new oil and gas field 
auctions, document stores, legal contracts, supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) configurations, 
design schematics, and much more has ‘fallen off the 
truck’ of numerous, mostly Western companies and 
disappeared in the ever-growing electronic archives of 
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dogged adversaries.22 
From such reports, it is reasonable to infer that the widespread 
occurrence of data breaches is due in large part to the 
opportunities created by proliferation of at least four kinds of 
digital-based technologies: 
(1) portable, high density, data devices (e.g., multiple gigabyte 
memory sticks and portable terabyte storage units); 
(2) wireless communications devices providing ubiquitous 
website access (e.g., smartphones that can surf the web and 
store reams of downloaded data, e-mails, and attached 
documents); 
(3) wireless data warehouses (e.g., “cloud computing services”—
the outsourced storage of data in server farms accessed 
wirelessly); and 
(4) online social media (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter) 
that build upon, expand the use of, and enhance the markets 
for wireless web-access. 
Unfortunately, increased connectivity has also been 
accompanied by increased concentrations of sensitive and valuable 
data and increased vulnerabilities, making leakages and losses of 
such data inevitable.  As an H&R Block executive explained: “‘I had 
somebody ask me, ‘Can you protect this piece of information?’ I 
said, ‘Yes, as long as you promise never to use it.”’23  Moreover, the 
changes in the market for stolen data have led data thieves to focus 
their attacks on larger concentrations of personal identification 
information.24  As noted in the earlier 2009 study by the Verizon 
Business RISK Team: 
The value associated with selling stolen credit card data 
[has] dropped from between $10 and $16 per record in 
mid-2007 to less than $0.50 per record today. 
 As supply has increased and prices fallen, criminals 
have had to overhaul their processes and differentiate 
 
 22. DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT, 2 (McAfee 2011), 
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-
shady-rat.pdf.  “Operation Aurora” is the term given to the infiltration of Google’s 
networks and those of at least twenty other major companies in 2009, by what 
apparently was a China-based espionage network that specifically targeted certain 
companies.  See Robin Wauters, McAfee Calls Operation Aurora a “Watershed Moment 
in Cybersecurity,” Offers Guidance, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 17, 2010), http://techcrunch 
.com/2010/01/17/mcafee-operation-aurora-2. 
 23. Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 49. 
 24. WADE H. BAKER ET AL., 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 
(2009), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security 
/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf. 
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their products in order to maintain profitability. In 2008, 
this was accomplished by targeting points of data 
concentration or aggregation and acquiring more 
valuable sets of consumer information.  The big money is 
now in stealing personal identification number (PIN) 
information together with associated credit and debit 
accounts . . . .  Furthermore, PIN fraud typically places a 
larger share of the burden upon the consumer to prove 
that transactions are fraudulent.  This makes the recovery 
of lost assets more difficult than with standard credit-fraud 
charges.25 
The magnitude of the vulnerability of digital data held by 
businesses became publicly evident back in a September 2008 
Department of Justice report concerning information security 
incidents experienced by businesses in 2005.26  The report discloses 
that “[c]ritical infrastructure businesses detected 13 million 
[computer security] incidents (nearly two-thirds of the total).27  
High risk industries detected more than 4 million incidents (a fifth 
of the total).”28  Moreover, “[n]inety-one percent of the businesses 
that detected incidents and answered questions on loss sustained,” 
either monetary loss or system downtime, and forty-one percent 
sustained both kinds of loss.29  It is reasonable to infer that data 
losses were of a comparable magnitude to those involving monetary 
loss, since theft of data is often required for theft of funds.30  The 
annual loss of intellectual property and investment opportunities 
across all industries has reportedly reached “$6 billion to $20 
billion, with a big part owing to oil industry losses.”31  The 
magnitude of the costs to a single company is evident in the 
consequences to RSA, the security service vendor that provides 
tokens that companies and governments use to log on remotely to 
workplace systems: EMC Corp (one of whose divisions is RSA) has 
disclosed that “it had taken a $66 million charge to cover 
remediation costs associated with a March [2011] intrusion of its 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. RAMONA R. RANTALA, CYBERCRIME AGAINST BUSINESSES, 2005, at 1–9 (2008), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cb05.pdf. 
 27. Id. at 6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. See id. at 2. 
 31. Ellen Nakashima, Report on ‘Operation Shady RAT’ Identifies Widespread Cyber-
spying, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/national/national-security/report-identifies-widespread-cyber-spying 
/2011/07/29/gIQAoTUmqI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_tech. 
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RSA division.”32 
Some companies have concluded that some of their security 
processes and structures were inadequate and obsolete, and have 
sought to improve their policies and procedures for information 
security and their guidelines for employees’ use of online social 
media.  For some, this has meant adopting a presumption that yet-
to-be-classified data is sensitive and must be given strong 
protection.33  As one company executive explained, “[w]e also 
block our data, and we have established that if date is not labeled, 
then it is confidential by default.”34  However, the corporate 
response appears to be failing to keep pace with the cyber-threats 
to corporate digital assets.  As noted in Ernst & Young’s thirteenth 
annual Global Information Security Survey, “60% of respondents 
perceived an increase in the level of risk they face due to the use of 
social networking, cloud computing and personal devices in the 
enterprise.”35  However, despite that awareness, the report noted a 
paradoxical lack of enterprise interest in the emerging risks: 
The fact that only 10% of respondents indicated the 
examination of new and emerging IT trends as a critically 
important function is further evidence that few 
organizations have assessed the impact of social 
networking . . . . As the use of social networking and Web 
2.0 sites continues to increase and become a part of the 
standard work environment, the behaviors related to 
sharing personal information are often being transferred 
to sensitive business information, where they are not 
appropriate.  If no action is taken, this will likely lead to 
an increase in the disclosure of business information or 
protected privacy-related data, either intentionally or 
accidentally through the use of social media.36 
The reported data leaks and other technological incidents at 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Gregg Keizer, Hacker Break-in of Twitter E-mail Yields Secret Docs, 
COMPUTERWORLD (July 16, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s 
/article/9135591/Hacker_break_in_of_Twitter_e_mail_yields_secret_docs.  Note 
that in one account, the vulnerable password reset was in the Yahoo! web mail, 
and in another, the vulnerable password reset was in Google Apps.  Id.  It may be 
that the hacker breached the password reset at both Yahoo!’s and Google’s web-
based applications. 
 34. Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 49. 
 35. ERNST & YOUNG, BORDERLESS SECURITY: ERNST & YOUNG’S 2010 GLOBAL 
INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com 
/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_information_security_survey_2010_advisory/$L
LE/GISS%20report_final.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 12–13. 
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major corporate, governmental, and financial enterprises contrast 
sharply with the paucity of reports of such problems at law firms.37  
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that similar problems may 
well have occurred but not been reported in the media, and that 
law firms face the same or similar threats as their clients.  When 
such technical problems do occur, as seems likely to happen with 
the advent of the new communications technologies, the risks of 
reputational damage may be compounded by the risks of ethical 
violations under the jurisdiction’s applicable rules of professional 
responsibility.38 
Web 2.0 communications technologies have increased the 
opportunities for attackers who seek unauthorized access to data, 
both personal and corporate.  As noted in a 2008 study by the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA): 
“Web 2.0 . . . malware infections [increasingly require] no 
intervention or awareness on the part of the user.  To give some 
idea of the threat posed, a Scansafe report analyzing malware 
trends reported that risks from compromised websites increased 
407% in the year to May 2008.”39 
The ENISA highlighted the tendency of Web 2.0 services to ask 
users to grant the service (such as an online social network) 
authorization to access a variety of their accounts without specifying 
in a precise way what, if any, security precautions have been 
implemented to prevent unauthorized access to the user’s 
accounts: 
Many Web 2.0 services ask users to delegate access 
credentials to, for example, email accounts or bank 
accounts.  Currently, users often have to give away the 
highest level of privilege, e.g., unlimited, permanent 
access to all features of their email account rather than 
just time-limited access to their address book, to access a 
service.  The lack of finer grained authorisation is a 
barrier to the use of such applications and a serious risk 
for those who do.40 
Apparently, an attacker was able to use similar information to 
 
 37. But see Josh Halliday, Law Firm Could Face £500,000 Fine Over Data Breach, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2010, 11:04 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media 
/2010/sep/28/filesharing-acs-law. 
 38. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (describing 
ethical violations that may result from technological problems). 
 39. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, WEB 2.0 SECURITY AND PRIVACY 2 
(2008), available at http://www.ifap.ru/library/book392.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
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gain access to multiple web-based applications in a May 2009 
incident that Twitter acknowledged.41  The attacker reportedly took 
advantage of the simplicity of Yahoo!’s web mail password recovery 
or re-set system and hacked into a Twitter administrative 
employee’s e-mail account.42  The hacker apparently used 
information obtained in that account to gain access to the 
employee’s Google Apps account, which contained “cloud 
computing services” such as Google Docs, Calendars, and “other 
Google Apps Twitter relies on for sharing notes, spreadsheets, 
ideas, financial details and more within the company.”43 
Twitter reported that the breach did not involve any flaw in 
web applications, but instead was due to a failure to follow good 
personal security guidelines, such as selection of a strong 
password.44  But this explanation overlooks the fact that Twitter 
relied on web-based—i.e., cloud computing—applications, and that 
the attacker’s additional penetration of Twitter’s files appears to 
have been facilitated by Twitter’s use of such applications and the 
linkage of the employee’s Web 2.0 accounts.45  Because the 
password reset feature at Yahoo!’s and Google’s web applications 
(like many other sites) operates by asking a set of personal 
questions in order to authenticate the user, who may select 
questions and give answers that can be derived from the 
information that he or she posts on social networking sites, hackers 
interested in attacking a company can target an employee and 
 
 41. Biz Stone, Even More Open than We Wanted, TWITTER BLOG (July 15, 2009, 
11:15 AM), http://blog.twitter.com/2009_07_01_archive.html. 
 42. Josh Lowensohn & Caroline McCarthy, Lessons from Twitter’s Security 
Breach, CNET (July 15, 2009, 12:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-
10287558-2.html. 
 43. Stone, supra note 41. 
 44. For example, in April 2011, Amazon’s cloud computing “Web Services” 
experienced a prolonged outage with significant consequences to companies that 
depended on it: 
Cloud computing is learning the harsh reality of resiliency as Amazon 
Web Services’ outage has crossed its second day.  Meanwhile, startups 
and a host of other AWS customers are in uncharted waters.  On 
Wednesday, the common belief was that startups could build their 
infrastructure on AWS completely.  Set the servers up and forget them . . 
. . Given that AWS’ North Virginia data center has been out of whack for 
more than 24 hours, it’s clear you need to procure more than one cloud.  
You need a backup for your cloud provider’s backup. 
Larry Dignan, Amazon’s Web Services Outage: End of Cloud Innocence?, ZDNET (Apr. 
22, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/amazons-web-services-
outage-end-of-cloud-innocence/47731. 
 45. The hacker gained access to the employee’s Yahoo! Mail as a means to 
accessing Twitter’s Google Apps.  See Lowensohn & McCarthy, supra note 42. 
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equip themselves with data drawn from a social networking site 
where the employee may have posted such information: 
Like the breach of Gov. Sarah Palin’s Yahoo e-mail 
account [in 2008], security researchers guessed that 
Hacker Croll gained access to the Twitter employee’s 
account using Google’s password reset feature, which 
poses several personal questions to authenticate the user.  
Hacker Croll likely dug up possible responses by rooting 
through the Web for details on the assistant, then used 
those to reset the password to one only he knew.46 
The attacker stole several hundred Twitter internal documents 
and then forwarded them to websites, such as TechCrunch, that 
decided to publish some of them despite objections by Twitter’s 
legal counsel, as well as retransmitting some to other sites.47  
Twitter’s co-founder, Biz Stone, recognized the significance of this, 
stating, “as they were never meant for public communication, 
publishing these documents publicly could jeopardize relationships 
with Twitter’s ongoing and potential partners.”48
 
More recent data security breaches49 and outages at cloud 
providers50 demonstrate the types and magnitude of risks that may 
 
 46. Gregg Keizer, Hacker Break-in of Twitter E-mail Yields Secret Docs, 
COMPUTERWORLD (July 16, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s 
/article/9135591/Hacker_break_in_of_Twitter_e_mail_yields_secret_docs. 
 47. Devin Coldewey, Twitter’s Financial Forecast Shows First Revenue in Q3, 1 
Billion Users in 2013, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2009), http://techcrunch.com 
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2013. 
 48. Biz Stone, supra note 41. 
 49. As reported in August 2011:  
A widespread cyber-espionage operation has penetrated 72 government 
and other organizations, most in the US, copying everything from 
military secrets to industrial designs.  Analysts said circumstantial 
evidence pointed to China as the most likely suspect . . . .  News of the 
newly discovered effort will put additional pressure on Washington 
policymakers grappling with the challenge posed by such espionage. 
Joseph Menn, Cyberattacks Penetrate Military Secrets and Designs, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4f09016-bda3-11e0-babc-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz1YFednwOg. 
 50. Examples of 2011 cloud service, or cloud based product, outages at major 
vendors include Sony, Microsoft, and Amazon: 
In April, technology giant Sony (www.sony.com) faced an outage to its 
Playstation Network that compromised approximately 100 million users 
private information.  Now, nearly a month later, the system is still down 
and many experts are suggesting that this outage could have a much 
larger impact on the way people perceive the security of the cloud. 
. . . .   
  According to a report by Arik Hesseldahl on CNET, Sony first 
became aware of the attack on April 19 after it discovered “several 
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be present in cloud computing environments and online social 
networking systems such as Twitter.  Although the White House, in 
May 2011, proposed an International Strategy for Cyberspace,51 its 
implementation and effectiveness remain unclear and may be 
hampered by budgetary constraints, which suggest that clients and 
 
PlayStation Network servers had rebooted themselves unexpectedly.  
Four servers were immediately taken offline in order to figure out what 
was going on.  By the next day, it was clear that another six had been 
attacked, and they were taken offline as well. 
Nicole Henderson, Noise Filter: Sony PlayStation Network Outage Raises Cloud Security 
Concerns, THE WHIR (May 11, 2011), http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-
news/051111_Noise_Filter_Sony_PlayStation_Network_Outage_Raises_Cloud_Sec
urity_Concerns. 
Microsoft has served up another apology for the unreliability of its cloud 
after burning converts to its BPOS collaboration service by killing their 
email. 
. . . .  
  Customers on BPOS in the US and worldwide were kicked off their 
hosted Exchange email systems, being unable to read, write, or access 
their messages.  All users were affected—from down in the cubicle farm 
all the way up to the CEO’s corner office.  The outages started Tuesday 
and came after weeks of the service slowly degrading. 
Gavin Clarke, Microsoft BPOS Cloud Outage Burns Exchange Converts, CHANNEL 
REGISTER (May 13, 2011, 23:45 GMT), http://www.channelregister.co.uk 
/2011/05/13/microsoft_bpos_apology. 
Amazon’s cloud crashed, taking sites like Reddit, Foursquare, Quora, 
Hootsuite, Indaba, GroupMe, Scvngr, Motherboard.tv and a few more 
down with it.  As reported several components of Amazon Cloud 
portfolio like, EC2, Elastic Block Store (EBS), Relational Database 
Service (RDS), Elastic Beanstalk, CloudFormation and lately MapReduce 
were all impacted. 
. . . .  
. . . [T]his has created a huge impact on the Cloud Adoption for the 
large enterprises. 
Srinivasan Sundara Rajan, Lessons from the Amazon Cloud Outage, CLOUD COMPUTING 
J. (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:00 PM EDT), http://cloudcomputing.sys-con.com/node 
/1805849. 
 51. THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, 
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy
_for_cyberspace.pdf.  If a reader of the Strategy looks in it for some enforcement 
or protection mechanisms it probably rests in the asserted right of self-defense in 
cyberspace as in territorial defense: “Consistent with the United Nations Charter, 
states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain 
aggressive acts in cyberspace.”  Id. at 10.  However, in light of the reported 
incidents that appear to have originated outside of the countries attacked, it is 
increasingly unclear what threshold countries will eventually settle upon as 
constituting an attack that warrants a self-defense response or that might justify 
preemptive action in self-defense.  For further discussion of these issues, see David 
P. Fidler, Was Stuxnet an Act of War?  Decoding a Cyberattack, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, 
July–Aug. 2011, at 56. 
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their legal counsel cannot wait for such measures to safeguard their 
digital assets from cyber-threats.  Nor will such measures address 
the ethical challenges that will probably accompany the adoption 
of new communications technologies and the vulnerabilities that 
such technologies bring with them in their design and in ways that 
users manage them.  To the extent that data security incidents, and 
the occasional enforcement52 or private action related to them, 
continue, they provide additional information on the nature of 
risks that lawyers and law firms should be prepared to manage.  
These are serious and complex ethical issues.  Considering such 
issues before the problem arises will help those affected formulate 
better responses when problems do arise, as well as help to position 
firms to present credible defenses to claims that they violated the 
applicable rules of professional responsibility. 
The Ethics Essays,53 focused on the New York Rules of 
Professional Conduct (NYRPC), which became effective on April 1, 
2009.54  This article retains the original presentation of the NYRPC 
and expands the analysis to include the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).  It also evaluates 
selected opinions by state and local bar associations and decisions 
by courts under both the NYRPC and MRPC. 
The Ethics Essays anticipated the conclusions that bar 
associations and courts have reached when asked to set forth 
policies involving use of Web 2.0 and cloud computing.  This 
article reaches beyond the opinions and decisions of bar and bench 
to probe the scope of lawyers’ and law firms’ ethical obligations to 
their clients that may arise as new communications technologies 
continue to evolve.  New technologies will probably require 
adjustments by lawyers and law firms in order to ensure that they 
 
 52. See Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316 (F.T.C. Mar. 2. 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/110311twitterdo.pdf (deciding and 
ordering settling charges against Twitter, Inc. and ordering the corporation, 
among other things, not to misrepresent the “extent to which [Twitter] maintains 
and protects the security, privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any nonpublic 
consumer information, including . . . misrepresentations related to its security 
measures to: (a) prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic consumer information; 
or (b) honor the privacy choices exercised by users”). 
 53. The Ethics Essays are Roland Trope & Claudia Ray, The Real Realities of 
Cloud Computing: Ethical Issues for Lawyers, Law Firms, and Judges, Essay for CLE 
Program, ABA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 2010 and Roland Trope & 
Claudia Ray, Head in the “Cloud”–Feet on the Ground: Understanding the Ethical 
Challenges of Web 2.0for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges (2010), each of which is on file 
with the authors. 
 54. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2011). 
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continue to be in good positions to make the common sense 
applications of the profession’s ethical precepts to the risks created 
by the availability of new technologies and the choices in conduct 
such technologies present.  It is our belief that the development 
and adoption of new communications technologies will seldom 
require significant changes to the long-standing professional 
ethical rules, however surprising, rapid, and disruptive the 
technologies prove to be upon their emergence.  When properly 
understood, each new communications technology will be seen to 
have advantages and drawbacks, competitive benefits and 
unanticipated risks, and to the extent that those are not fully 
explored, assessed, and appreciated early, they may put lawyers and 
law firms that use them in positions where inadvertent ethical 
lapses can occur.  The lessons we try to draw during the course of 
this discussion are intended to apply to any new communications 
technology, not merely those under review at the time of this 
writing.  For that reason, this article will include discussion relevant 
to three representative aspects of the most serious ethical risks that 
lawyers and law firms may face when using Web 2.0 technologies: 
those that may arise (1) in performing client-related work; (2) in 
pursuing new clients; and (3) in the course of leisure activities.  
Having identified what we believe to be the salient ethical risks, we 
will suggest precautions that lawyers and law firms might consider 
in order to put themselves in a good position to diminish, if not 
avert, such risks.  
In considering these issues, we assume that readers understand 
that ethical issues are inherently fact dependent.  To date, there 
are few bar opinions or court decisions to guide this analysis.  At 
best, one can try to infer how a future disciplinary body might 
decide these issues.  We believe, however, that the greatest risks 
from Web 2.0 technologies are likely to arise from inadvertent 
actions or oversights that result from a lack of understanding of the 
operations and use of these technologies, as well as an 
underestimation of lawyers’ and law firms’ obligations under 
applicable rules of professional conduct, such as the NYRPC and 
the MRPC.55  For example, a firm might not understand that it may 
 
 55. The essays from which this article grew contained a discussion of the 
kinds of risks that judges and members of their chambers might face in using Web 
2.0 technologies and of the risks to lawyers and law firms from engaging in the use 
of Web 2.0 technologies to make surreptitious recordings.  See sources cited supra 
note 53.  Those issues are no less important than the issues on which we 
concentrate in this article, but we have opted to defer discussion of that material 
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arguably have an obligation to conduct meaningful risk assessments 
of such technologies early and repeatedly in order to reach informed 
conclusions and ensure that those conclusions do not need to be 
changed in light of rapidly evolving technologies and practices. 
The true potential of new communications technologies often is 
not immediately clear.56  Lawyers and law firms are well advised to 
be among the first to explore new communications technologies 
and the associated customs and practices, given their access to, and 
custody of, confidential client information and ethical obligation to 
protect such information. 
III. IMPLICIT DUTY UNDER THE NYRPC TO STAY ABREAST OF NEW 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND COMPARISON OF DUTIES 
IMPOSED BY THE MRPC 
Although neither the NYRPC nor the MRPC expressly require 
counsel to stay abreast of the latest advances in communications 
technologies, several of their provisions appear to imply a duty to 
monitor such developments and understand the potential benefits 
and risks of new communications technologies.  The basis for this 
implicit duty is derived from two explicit duties: (1) the duty to 
provide “competent representation” in NYRPC Rule 1.1; and (2) 
the duties to protect clients’ confidential information in NYRPC 
Rule 1.6, including protection of the attorney-client privilege, 
prevention of client embarrassment or detrimental disclosure of 
information, and protection of information deemed confidential 
by the client. 
The next part of this article focuses on the origins and 
applications of the implicit duty to stay abreast of new 
communications technologies. 
A. The Duty to Provide “Competent Representation” Implies a Duty to 
Stay Abreast of New Communications Technologies  
Rule 1.1 of both the NYRPC and the MRPC obligate lawyers to 
“provide competent representation to a client.”57  This arguably 
requires lawyers and law firms to make reasonable efforts to 
 
to a later article. 
 56. See Richard Waters, Cloud Control, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c9e3bf12-1973-11de-9d34-0000779fd2ac 
.html#axzz1YcY9x6gn [hereinafter Cloud Control]. 
 57. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1 (2011); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007). 
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recognize the risks inherent in a new communications technology 
and to advise the client accordingly.  For example, suppose counsel 
has been engaged to advise on compliance with U.S. “dual use” 
export controls under the Export Administration Act (EAR)58 or 
with U.S. military export controls under the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR).59  “Competent representation” in that 
case would require a clear understanding of the ways in which 
digital transmissions can result in unlicensed, and thus illegal, 
releases of EAR-controlled or ITAR-controlled data.60  Such risks 
have substantially increased with each new communications 
technology, including the advent of Web 2.0 technologies. 
The advent of e-mail increased risks of non-compliance with 
ITAR and EAR, because such transmissions could cause an 
extraordinary amount of ITAR-controlled or EAR-controlled data 
to be exported overseas in an instant or to be a “deemed export” to 
a foreign national within the United States.  Similarly, the ease with 
which videos can be discretely or covertly made and uploaded to a 
Web 2.0 host such as YouTube now makes it possible for 
unlicensed, unauthorized exports of a much broader range of 
technical knowhow.  A lawyer cannot meet the requirements of 
MRPC Rule 1.1 in this context if he or she fails to become aware of 
the emergence of new communications technologies and the 
changes that they make in the capabilities to communicate—and 
transfer—sensitive information in violation of applicable laws and 
regulations. 
Even if a lawyer does not have extensive knowledge of 
communications technology, the comments to the MRPC appear to 
contemplate that a lawyer can accept representation where the 
requisite level of competence can be achieved by preparation and 
study.61  As with legal issues, if a lawyer could either educate herself 
on the risks, or associate herself with individuals who have a greater 
understanding of the risks posed by new technologies, she will be 
in a stronger position to fulfill the competence requirement.  The 
Initial Draft Proposals—Technology and Confidentiality composed 
by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 (ABA Commission’s Draft 
Proposals)—supports this position.  The ABA Commission’s Draft 
 
 58. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–20 (2006). 
 59. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–129.10 
(2010). 
 60. See Roland L. Trope, Immaterial Transfers with Material Consequences, IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 74. 
 61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2007). 
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Proposals concluded that a competent lawyer should be aware of 
the benefits and risks of new technology and accordingly 
recommended the following change to Comment 6 of MRPC Rule 
1.1: 
 Maintaining Competence.  [6] To maintain the 
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep 
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including 
the benefits and risks associated with technology, engage 
in continuing study and education and comply with all 
continuing legal education requirements to which the 
lawyer is subject.62 
Although, at the time of this writing, the ABA has not voted on the 
measure, the ABA Commission’s Draft Proposals reflect the 
Commission’s carefully considered view that to maintain 
competence in representation of clients a lawyer should be aware 
of the potential need to keep abreast of new technologies.  
Moreover, the proposals appear to recommend that the standard 
for keeping abreast in such circumstances involve, at a minimum, 
understanding the technologies’ benefits and risks, both to the 
client and to the lawyer. 
Whether or not the proposals are adopted in the form 
proposed, they contain prudent guidance.  Consider, for example, 
that a court issues an order of protection prohibiting a client from 
contacting a particular person.  It would be prudent for counsel to 
advise the client that such a court order may well extend to and 
prohibit even indirect communications via online social networks.  
Doing less might, in some circumstances, evince a failure to 
provide competent representation.  If counsel is unfamiliar with 
the use of such networks to communicate, he or she might 
overlook or underestimate the ease with which the client could 
contact the party named in the court order, thus violating the 
order.63  Whether keeping abreast of new communications 
technologies is ultimately an ethical duty, express or implicit, the 
fact remains that the competence of a lawyer’s representation will 
be enhanced by making the often considerable effort it takes to 
keep abreast of such new technologies.  Notice that in the following 
 
 62. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposals—Tech. and 
Confidentiality 5 (2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-
content/files_flutter/1304367997ethics2020_technologyproposals050211.pdf. 
 63. See People v. Fernino, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008) 
(holding that defendant violated orders of protection mandating “NO 
CONTACT” by sending a “friend request” message through the MySpace.com 
Friend Request Manager system). 
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commentary on the subject the ethical question may be open to 
debate, but common sense nonetheless leads one to the conclusion 
that keeping abreast of new communications technologies will 
probably improve counsel’s ability to represent the client: 
Given the increasing use of social networking sites, does 
the duty of competent representation require that lawyers 
obtain a basic understanding of navigating social 
networking sites, and keep informed of rulings on the 
discoverability and admissibility of evidence obtained 
from these sites? 
 In at least some instances, standard practice among 
practitioners of a particular legal discipline may dictate 
the minimum amount of familiarity with social networking 
sites that lawyers within that discipline should have. 
 The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, for 
instance, “reports that 66 percent of divorce attorneys use 
Facebook as their primary source of online evidence.”  It 
would seem, therefore, that divorce attorneys lacking 
familiarity with social networking sites would be hampered 
in their ability to provide competent representation, 
particularly when their adversaries are likely availing 
themselves of all available online content.64 
The need to learn new or upgraded communications 
technologies will probably become a priority for many practitioners 
due to the enactment of statutes or promulgation of regulations 
that mandate adoption of technology-based capabilities.  Federal 
examples include the Federal Trade Commission’s promulgation 
of the Red Flags Rule Regulations and Guidelines65 pursuant to 
section 114 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003 (under which “financial institutions and creditors must 
develop a written program that identifies and detects the relevant 
warning signs—or ‘red flags’—of identity theft”).66  Counsel to 
financial institutions and other entities to which the Red Flags rules 
apply would find it difficult to advise on compliance with such 
regulations without continuously updating their knowledge and 
 
 64. Boehning & Toal, supra note 11, at 7. 
 65. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,718–75 (Nov. 9, 
2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pts. 41, 222, 334, 364, 571, 717, and 16 C.F.R pt. 
681), available at http://ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2007/November/071109redflags.pdf. 
 66. Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–319, 124 
Stat. 3457 (excluding lawyers and law firms from the scope of the Red Flags 
regulations). 
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understanding of the latest techniques used in identity theft and of 
the indicia that must be detected early in order to protect against 
such digitally based theft.67  Another example is the enactment of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), with its provisions 
prohibiting circumvention of technological measures that control 
access to copyrighted works, and the U.S. Copyright Office’s 
successive rulemaking proceedings (mandated by the DMCA) in 
2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.68  Copyright and copyright litigation 
counsel cannot fully appreciate the Copyright Office’s rules 
changes without being up to date on the technologies addressed by 
the rulemaking proceedings. 
At the state level, examples include the continuing enactment 
of certain state data breach reporting statutes,69 some of which 
include requirements for various degrees of data encryption.70  
Counselors who advise on such matters would find it prudent to 
ensure that they have expertise on the mechanics of encryption, as 
well as the problems it can solve or may create, in order to advise 
clients competently on the application of such statutes.71  The 
capabilities of new communications technologies may not be fully 
disclosed to users.  Counsel advising clients in such circumstances 
probably cannot do so competently under the applicable ethics 
rules without ensuring that they are fully briefed on the technology 
and have worked with it sufficiently to appreciate its usefulness and 
risks. 
Risks from specific kinds of software, particularly anti-piracy 
programs, help explain why this “keep abreast” philosophy may 
 
 67. Peter McLaughlin, Remarks at the United States Federal Trade 
Commission Conference on Securing Personal Data in the Global Economy 19–21 
(Mar. 16, 2009) available at http://htc-01.media.globix.net/COMP008760MOD1 
/ftc_web/transcripts/031609_sess2.pdf. 
 68. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006).  Discussions about exemptions for 
copy-protection circumvention took place in 2010.  See generally Memorandum 
from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office, to 
James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress, Library of Congress, Recommendation 
of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8; Rulemaking on Exemptions from 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Prot. Sys. for Access Control Techs. 
(Jun. 11, 2010), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/initialed-
registers-recommendation-june-11-2010.pdf. 
 69. As of September 2011, new security breach legislation had been 
introduced in fourteen states.  For a complete list, see Security Breach Legislation 
2011, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=22295. 
 70. E.g., S.B. 267, 2011 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011); MINN. STAT. § 
62J.321 subdiv. (b) (2010). 
 71. McLaughlin, supra note 67, at 17. 
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have an under-appreciated importance.  For example, counsel to 
software companies that experimented with creating “back doors” 
and “time bombs” in their products to enforce their rights to 
royalties72 may not have known of the existence of such devices 
until a crisis arose from their use.  One can imagine the challenges 
faced by counsel to Amazon and the owners of the copyrights to 
George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm as they dealt with the 
problems caused by buyers’ complaints to Amazon that copies of 
those works sold by Amazon to its Kindle customers were removed 
without the customers’ permission.73  Amazon’s customers 
apparently were unaware that Amazon had the technological 
capability to issue an electronic command that could wirelessly 
communicate with every Kindle (within the wireless range) and 
cause selected works to be completely erased.  Amazon’s customers 
were surprised (and reportedly outraged) when Amazon did just 
that after learning that it had inadvertently sold unauthorized 
copies of Orwell’s works: 
An Amazon spokesman, Drew Herdener, said in an e-mail 
message that the books [1984 and Animal Farm] were 
added to the Kindle store by a company that did not have 
rights to them, using a self-service function.  “When we 
were notified of this by the rights holder, we removed the 
illegal copies from our systems and from customers’ 
devices, and refunded customers,” he said.74 
Customers who had made notes on or annotated their Kindle 
copies of the books lost those materials as well, despite the 
assurance in Amazon’s terms of service that states that the customer 
is granted a right to keep a “permanent copy of the applicable 
digital content.”75  Copyright counsel advising in such 
circumstances would probably need to understand not only the 
technology, but also the potentially unforeseen results of remotely 
 
 72. In fact, a federal court in New Jersey has ruled that allegations of “time-
bombs” in software were sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss claims under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  Kalow & Springnut, LLP v. Commence 
Corp., No. 07-3442 (FLW), 2009 WL 44748, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2009).  More 
benign time-bombs are typically found on trial or “shareware” software.  Alexia 
Gaudeul, Software Marketing on the Internet: the Use of Samples and Repositories 2 (Dep’t 
of Econ. and ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Univ. of East Anglia, CCP 
Working Paper No. 08–23, 2008), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk 
/polopoly_fs/1.104681!ccp08-23.pdf. 
 73. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle (One Is “1984”), N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at B5. 
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erasing infringing content along with a customer’s own additional 
or even copyrighted material.  
The significance of the undisclosed remote erasure capability 
goes far beyond the Kindle episode; it demonstrates the capability 
of wireless service providers to create electronic links that not only 
give a customer access to data, but also can be used (and 
potentially misused) to change, corrupt, or erase the customer’s 
data even on a device the customer believes is within the 
customer’s exclusive control.  As companies and law firms come 
increasingly to rely on wireless devices and on third-party providers 
of remote and wirelessly accessible “cloud” data storage, the need 
for counsel to keep abreast of new security risks will continue to 
grow. 
One of the most broad-ranging examples of a law making it 
necessary for counsel to improve their knowledge and use of 
communications technology is the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), which 
requires the digitalization of health records.76  Under the HITECH 
Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) must 
“issue guidance on the most effective and appropriate technical 
safeguards for use in carrying out” certain sections of the Act, 
including certain security standards.77  The Act further requires the 
Secretary to update “guidance specifying the technologies and 
methodologies that render protected health information unusable, 
unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” on an 
annual basis.78  The HITECH Act also imposes on vendors of 
personal health records a duty to report the “discovery of a breach 
of security of unsecured PHR79 [personal health record] identifiable 
 
 76. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. (226 Stat.) 123 (2009). 
 77. Id. § 13401(c). 
 78. Id. § 13401(h)(2). 
 79. The HITECH Act defines a “personal health record” as “an electronic 
record of PHR identifiable health information (as defined in section 13407(f)(2)) 
on an individual that can be drawn from multiple sources and that is managed, 
shared, and controlled by or primarily for the individual.”  Id. § 13400(11).  In 
addition, section 13407(f)(2) defines “PHR identifiable health information” as:  
[I]ndividually identifiable health information, as defined in section 
1171(6) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d(6), and includes, 
with respect to an individual, information—(A) that is provided by or on 
behalf of the individual; and (B) that identifies the individual or with 
respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
information can be used to identify the individual. 
Id. § 13407(f)(2). 
Moreover, the term “unsecured PHR health information” is defined in section 
144 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
health information that is in a personal health record maintained 
or offered by such vendor . . . .”80  The security breach notice must 
be sent to each U.S. citizen or resident whose “unsecured PHR 
identifiable health information was acquired by an unauthorized 
person as a result of such a breach of security” and to the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC).81
 
Dispatch of such security breach notices under the HITECH 
Act can involve a substantial cost,82 and notice to the FTC may 
trigger an investigation resulting in a settlement agreement with 
additional costly compliance burdens.83  Vendors seeking to avoid 
such consequences might retain counsel to reduce the probability 
of a security breach of unsecured PHR identifiable health 
information, which the Act defines in terms of failure to adhere to 
the Secretary’s annual guidance: “‘[U]nsecured PHR identifiable 
health information’ means PHR identifiable health information 
that is not protected through the use of a technology or methodology specified 
by the Secretary in the [annual] guidance issued under section 
13402(h)(2).”84  Thus, counsel advising the affected vendors 
appear to have an implied duty to keep abreast of the technologies 
and methodologies that keep such electronic records “unusable, 
unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals,” and in 
 
13407(f)(3) as: 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (B), the term “unsecured 
PHR identifiable health information” means PHR identifiable health 
information that is not protected through the use of a technology or 
methodology specified by the Secretary in the guidance issued under 
section 13402(h)(2).  (B) EXCEPTION IN CASE TIMELY GUIDANCE 
NOT ISSUED.—In the case that the Secretary does not issue guidance 
under section 13402(h)(2) by the date specified in such section, for the 
purposes of this section, the term “unsecured PHR identifiable health 
information” shall mean PHR identifiable health information that is not 
secured by a technology standard that renders protected health 
information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized 
individuals and that is developed or endorsed by a standards developing 
organization that is accredited by the American National Standards 
Institute. 
Id. § 13407(f)(3). 
 80. Id. § 13407(a) (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. § 13407(a)(1)–(2). 
 82. A Colorado hospital spent more than $3 million on notifications alone 
after a physical security breach. Jaikumar Vijayan, Insurer Says It’s Not Liable for 
University of Utah’s $3.3M Data Breach, COMPUTERWORLD (June 4, 2010, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177702/Insurer_says_it_s_not_liable_
for_University_of_Utah_s_3.3M_data_breach?taxonomyId=144. 
 83. See Genica Corp., F.T.C. File No. 082 3113 (2008) (Agreement Containing 
Consent Order). 
 84. HITECH Act § 13407(f)(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
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particular, to those to be identified annually by the Secretary. 
Depending on the nature and complexity of the applicable 
laws, the level of understanding that lawyers and law firms need to 
achieve may be significant.  For example, as of 2004, merely 
knowing how to use e-mail was probably not sufficient for trial 
counsel to fulfill their duties to monitor and oversee a client’s 
obligations to preserve electronic records in anticipation of 
litigation, as it might not have alerted a lawyer or firm to the fact 
that deletion of an e-mail does not necessarily purge it from a hard 
drive (where it may remain recoverable).  Nor would it necessarily 
be apparent that daily, automatic backups of a company’s e-mails 
might overwrite and render irrecoverable certain electronic 
records that the company had a duty to preserve.  The minimum 
depth of understanding that counsel practicing in the Southern 
District of New York need to have of such digital communications 
technology was made clear in Judge Scheindlin’s Zubalake 
decisions,85 and particularly in Zubalake V, where Judge Scheindlin 
provided this instruction to counsel for a party obligated to 
preserve electronic records:  
Once a “litigation hold” is in place, a party and her 
counsel must make certain that all sources of potentially 
relevant information are identified and placed “on hold,” 
to the extent required in Zubulake IV.  To do this, counsel 
must become fully familiar with her client’s document 
retention policies, as well as the client’s data retention 
architecture.  This will invariably involve speaking with 
information technology personnel, who can explain 
system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as 
opposed to theoretical) implementation of the firm’s 
recycling policy.86
 
Web 2.0 technologies have almost certainly expanded the 
scope of potentially accessible and discoverable electronic records 
beyond e-mail to include text messaging, Facebook postings, 
Twitter broadcasts (tweets), videos uploaded to social network 
websites, and cloud data storage.87  Litigants and courts may be 
 
 85. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zublake V), 229 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake 
v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 86. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432 (footnotes omitted). 
 87. As some commentators have observed, New York Rules of Professional 
Conduct Rule 1.3, which requires that lawyers “act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client,” may obligate counsel to make enhanced use 
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drawn into controversies over the discoverability of records 
generated by such technologies and stored in multiple locations, 
whether they persist in mobile devices in possession of the sender 
and the recipient (as in tweets and video stored on mobile phones 
or display devices such as an iPod Touch), have been preserved in 
company backups (if the transmission or reception became 
recorded on company media) or have been stored on third-party 
servers (as appears to be the current practice for tweets, Facebook 
postings and geotagging features of social networking sites such as 
foursquare),88 or in other cloud storage environments.  The 
litigation value of such “works” and the risks resulting from 
creating and “sharing” them, if overlooked by litigation counsel, 
may expose such counsel to serious risks of failing to fulfill the 
ethical duty to provide clients with “competent representation” and 
diligent representation. 
To understand and appreciate the litigation value and risks, 
counsel are likely to decide to do more than read newspaper or 
blog accounts about the use and misuse of such technologies.  
There is no substitute for understanding gained from hands-on 
experience.  Moreover, repeated use of a new technology can 
reveal to the user unreported utilities and undisclosed capacity to 
create vulnerabilities.  It is worth remembering that “the most far-
reaching effects of new technology are normally ones that were not 
 
of new technologies: 
Presumably this rule [NYRPC 1.3] would require lawyers to search the 
internet not only for information favorable to his or her client’s case, but 
also for information detrimental to the client for the sake of being better 
prepared to advocate on the client’s behalf.  Not knowing that a client 
routinely posts information on social networking sites, and not knowing 
how to navigate such sites for information, could compromise a lawyer’s 
ability to identify where relevant information is located, and may thus 
hamper a lawyer’s effective and diligent representation. 
Boehning & Toal, supra note 11, at 7. 
 88. See, e.g., Leanne Italie, Divorce Lawyers: Facebook Tops in Online Evidence, 
WPTV.COM (June 29, 2010), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news 
/local_news/water_cooler/divorce-lawyers%3A-facebook-tops-in-online-evidence-
1277832262612 (“Oversharing on social networks has led to an overabundance of 
evidence in divorce case.”); Belinda Luscombe, Facebook and Divorce: Airing the Dirty 
Laundry, TIME, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time 
/magazine/article/0,9171,1904147,00.html (describing how online social 
networking sites provide lawyers an “evidentiary gold mine”); Molly McDonough, 
Facebook Is ‘Unrivaled Leader’ for Online Divorce Evidence, Survey Says, ABA JOURNAL 
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com 
/news/article/facebook_is_unrivaled_leader_for_online_divorce_evidence_survey
_says/ (noting how clients should nix Facebook accounts during divorce 
proceedings due to heightened levels of personal scrutiny). 
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anticipated.”89 
Although the risks and benefits might be most apparent in the 
litigation context, such knowledge can also benefit counsel in other 
contexts.  Incautious creation of electronic records and use of 
technologies that facilitate their generation, dissemination, and 
preservation cannot be avoided by actions of litigation counsel.  
Thus, it is important for non-litigation counsel to understand the 
new communications technologies and the customs and practices 
that can cause indiscreet or recklessly foolish transmittals, whether 
in e-mails, instant messages (IMs), tweets, or geotagging.  Once 
released, such electronic records may be lost to the sender’s 
company, but may have been preserved at the recipient’s company, 
giving the recipient’s company a litigation advantage that may not 
be suspected by the sender’s company until it is used for 
impeachment in a cross-examination. 
Since the original essay and CLE were prepared, the authors 
believe that many litigation counsel have continuously updated 
their knowledge and understanding of the limitations to, and 
potential fallacies in, the use of computer forensics on which so 
much of electronic discovery depends.  Just because electronic 
records exist on a company employee’s computer, the company’s 
servers, or a third-party provider of off-site electronic storage—a 
cloud or otherwise—does not necessarily mean that the employee 
or the company allowed it to be there or knew of its existence.  It 
may be incorrect and misleading for counsel to assume that the 
owner of an electronic device intentionally placed digital data on it, 
allowed the data to be stored there, or was aware of its existence 
and presence.  As a computer security expert observed:  
[T]he data in “our” computers and other devices that 
overzealous adversaries and prosecutors present as 
evidence to courts as being “obviously” ours often isn’t.  
Just because we paid the bill for a home computer doesn’t 
mean that we placed an invisible force-field around it to 
shield it from hackers and others who . . . could add, 
remove, or alter any and all data in that computer without 
our knowledge.  
. . . .  
 Classical computer forensics creates the illusion of an 
airtight investigatory process by diverting attention away 
from the crucial fact that forensics can’t determine who 
put the data on a device, and focusing instead on the 
 
 89. Cloud Control, supra note 56. 
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mechanics of the forensic ritual: investigators create an 
exact copy of data found on a digital device and present it 
to a decision authority (court, employer, and so on) 
without any ability to address the key question of who put 
the data in that device . . . .  
. . . Files can and do end up on our computers in myriad 
ways without our knowledge, let alone our consent.90 
Several of the ways for data to become lodged in a hard drive, 
such as by remote hacking, Wi-Fi hacking, war driving, malicious e-
mail attachments, and “web bugs”91 are familiar to many lawyers, 
but nonetheless could be overlooked during the pressures and 
exigencies of discovery.  Other vulnerabilities that may be less 
familiar to lawyers include the electromagnetic “compromising 
emanations,” “Tempest radiation,” or “Van Eck radiation” that tend 
to be broadcast by desktops, laptops, display monitors, and cables 
(functioning as parasitic antenna) and that can be intercepted and 
reconstructed by electronic eavesdroppers.92  When a computing 
device is located on a high-elevation floor, its emanations become 
all the easier to intercept because the signal has minimum 
attention on its way to an interceptor’s device.93
 
An ethical issue could arise if a law firm or its lawyers failed to 
take reasonable precautions to shield their computers and other 
devices from such emanations and client confidential information 
is subsequently intercepted.  Ethical issues might also arise if a law 
firm or lawyer outsourced the storage of client data to a third party 
off-site provider and did not make a “due diligence” inquiry to 
determine if the provider had failed to implement reasonable 
precautions against such interception of client confidential 
 
 90. Michael A. Caloyannides, Forensics is so “Yesterday,” IEEE SECURITY & 
PRIVACY, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 18, 19. 
 91. A “web bug” is a concealed HTML code that can cause a computing 
device connected to the Internet to connect to a particular website each time the 
user opens the document containing the bug or copies of such document.  See 
Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries & Peter S. Menell, The Rise of Internet Interest 
Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5 n.12 (2004) (noting “web bugs,” among 
tools that constantly monitor and record individual users’ activities, are 
“shattering” anonymity on the Internet). 
 92. Id.; see also Marcus G. Kuhn & Ross J. Anderson, Soft Tempest: Hidden Data 
Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations, INFORMATION HIDING 124 (David 
Aucsmith ed. 1998), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98-
tempest.pdf (observing that the discovery of such electronic data leakage dates 
back to the 1960s, when the British government discovered the leakage of 
electronic data in the process of attempting to intercept enciphered traffic among 
French government officials). 
 93. Caloyannides, supra note 90, at 21. 
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information.94 
 
 94. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 
(2008) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 08-451] (setting forth standards for 
outsourcing that would apply to cloud computing services as “nonlegal support 
services”).  The opinion concludes that under MRPC Rule 1.1 there is “nothing 
unethical about a lawyer outsourcing legal and nonlegal services, provided the 
outsourcing lawyer renders legal services to the client with the ‘legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation,’ 
as required by Rule 1.1.”  Id. at 2.  However, the opinion adds several important 
cautions, including that “[a]t a minimum, a lawyer outsourcing services for 
ultimate provision to a client should consider conducting reference checks and 
investigating the background of the . . . nonlawyer providing the services as well as 
any nonlawyer intermediary involved, such as a . . . service provider.”  Id. at 3.  
Furthermore, of particular importance to cloud computing services, which can 
store client sensitive information offshore in possibly undisclosed countries, is the 
opinion’s caution that “[c]onsideration also should be given to the legal landscape 
of the nation to which the services are being outsourced, particularly the extent 
that personal property, including documents, may be susceptible to seizure in 
judicial or administrative proceedings notwithstanding claims of client 
confidentiality.”  Id. at 4; see also Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., European Rejection of 
Attorney-Client Privilege for Inside Lawyers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010 
/10/02/european-rejection-of-attorney-client-privilege-for-inside-lawyers (stating 
that such cautions are particularly relevant in light of the 2010 decision of the 
European Court of Justice in Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd I v. European Commission that 
ruled that the attorney-client privilege applied solely to communications 
connected to a “client’s right of defence” and in circumstances where such 
communications came from “independent lawyers,” which the Court defined as 
lawyers “not bound to the client by a relationship of employment,” i.e., those who 
are not in-house counsel).  Furthermore, the ABA opinion identified several 
additional considerations that it stated “must be taken into account under the 
Model Rules[,]” including that “at the outset, it may be necessary for the lawyer to 
provide information concerning the outsourcing relationship to the client, and 
perhaps to obtain the client’s informed consent to the engagement of . . . 
nonlawyers . . . .”  Formal Op. 08-451, supra, at 4.  As we note elsewhere in this 
article, it would be a prudent precaution to inform clients, and obtain their 
consent, before taking on the additional and still uncertain risks of placing the 
client’s sensitive information in a cloud computing vendor’s servers. 
Additional guidance on the issue can be found in the recent opinions issued by 
the New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics (NYSBA Op. 842 (2010)) 
that addresses the ethics of online storing of confidential information and the 
opinion issued by the Arizona State Bar Ass’n Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct (AZ Bar Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009)).  NYSBA Op. 842 (2010) provides: 
We conclude that a lawyer may use an online “cloud” computer data 
backup system to store client files provided that the lawyer takes 
reasonable care to ensure that the system is secure and that client 
confidentiality will be maintained.  “Reasonable care” to protect a client’s 
confidential information against unauthorized disclosure may include 
consideration of the following steps: 
• Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an enforceable 
obligation to preserve confidentiality and security, and that the 
provider will notify the lawyer if served with process requiring the 
production of client information; 
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In short, as information technology (IT) has become a 
cornerstone of corporate enterprises and critical to a company’s 
communications both internally and with strategic allies, suppliers, 
and customers, it has become increasingly important for boards of 
directors and their lawyers to understand IT and each wave of new 
communications technologies that impact it.  Not infrequently, 
however, such changes and their commercial significance are 
difficult for a board to appreciate, making it all the more important 
for legal counsel to stay abreast of changes in new communications 
technologies.  For example, there were reports that companies and 
their boards were struggling to figure out the advantages of Web 
2.0 technologies, and particularly those supporting online social 
networks and the collaborative ways of working such networks can 
facilitate.  As a June 2009 report stated: 
Company boards don’t recognize what IT is or does any 
more . . . . It used to be a thing that you used to increase 
productivity or automate processes, but that’s been done.  
Even chief information officers, who thoroughly 
understand enterprise IT, have been left behind by social 
IT—which they can’t control.95 
Given such developments, competent representation arguably 
implies a duty to stay abreast of new communications technologies.  
The failure to do so can quickly erode counsel’s ability to 
anticipate, prepare for, and offer advice about the actions, 
communications, contexts, and crises that such technologies can 
create or alter.  New communications technologies may be most 
risky when a client has achieved a comfort level with such 
technology without being aware of recent changes made to the 
technology by its developer that may have enhanced its features, 
deleted features, and created new risks for users.  In addition, a 
company’s business culture may be changed by use of a technology 
with little awareness (or only belated understanding) of the 
consequences.  For example, companies that have fully integrated 
 
• Investigating the online data storage provider’s security measures, 
policies, recoverability methods, and other procedures to determine 
if they are adequate under the circumstances; 
• Employing available technology to guard against reasonably 
foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data that is stored . . . . 
New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 842 (2010) 
[hereinafter New York Op. 842], available at http://www.nysba.org/Content 
/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/Opinions825present/EO_842.pdf. 
 95. Peter Whitehead, Does Business Understand Technology Anymore?, FIN. TIMES, 
June 17, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dabb29e-5a0d-11de-b687 
-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1. 
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e-mail use into their business often regret their over-reliance on 
internal e-mails, which are rarely if ever drafted with an eye to their 
possible disclosure in the context of litigation.96  The same thing 
can happen with records created and published with Web 2.0 
technologies. 
B. The Duties to Protect Client Confidential Information Imply a Duty to 
Keep Abreast of New Communications Technologies  
A second source of an implied duty for lawyers and law firms to 
keep abreast of new communications technologies may be found in 
NYRPC Rule 1.6 “Confidentiality of Information,” which defines 
“confidential information” as consisting of: 
[I]nformation gained during or relating to the 
representation of a client, whatever its source, that is (a) 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, (b) likely to be 
embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or 
(c) information that the client has requested be kept 
confidential.97 
We conclude that the “confidential information” category is 
broader than information covered by the “attorney-client 
privilege,” and arguably includes all information covered by the 
“attorney work product” doctrine (given that disclosure of such 
information would be “detrimental to the client”).  Even 
information that has been obtained indirectly through the use of a 
new communications technology should probably be treated as 
“confidential information” under the NYRPC, if it contains or may 
subsequently become client confidential information. 
NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) requires that, unless certain specified 
conditions have been met,98 a “lawyer shall not knowingly reveal 
confidential information, as defined in this Rule, or use such 
information to the disadvantage of a client or for the advantage of 
 
 96. See, e.g., Ann O’Neill, E-mail Can Bounce Back to Hurt You, CNN (Nov. 7, 
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-11-03/justice/email.legal_1_e-mail 
-office-cubicle-fema?_s=PM:LAW (explaining that e-mails are in the range of 
litigation discovery, and therefore, improperly drafted e-mails can have significant 
consequences). 
 97. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 98. Id. (specifying three alternative conditions: (1) informed consent by the 
client; (2) the disclosure is impliedly authorized to advance the client’s best 
interests; or (3) the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to avert 
serious harm such as death, bodily injury, commission of a crime, etc.). 
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the lawyer or a third person.”
99 
It is unclear whether such disclosure would be considered 
“knowing” if a lawyer or law firm disregarded well-known risks that 
could lead to an inadvertent disclosure.  Although NYRPC Rule 1.6 
does not explicitly adopt a “knew or should have known” standard, 
counsel who do not keep abreast of new communications 
technologies could find themselves being held to such a standard if 
the risks involved were brought to their attention (in, for example, 
a commissioned risk assessment) or were the subject of widely 
reported incidents.100 
The MRPC, on the other hand, does not have a “knowing” 
requirement for disclosure.  Rather, MRPC Rule 1.6 states instead 
that a “[l]awyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, 
[or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation . . . .”101  The Rule adds that a lawyer “may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary.”102 under certain specified 
circumstances.  However, based on the nature of the circumstances 
listed in the Rule, it does not appear that disclosure through 
communications technologies is “necessary.”  Rather, MRPC Rule 
1.6(b) seems to contemplate that disclosure is necessary only in 
situations where the safety or financial viability of an individual or 
an entity is at risk due to the client’s actions or potential actions.  
MRPC Rule 1.6(a) ultimately embodies the general principle 
underlying attorney-client relationships: that, absent informed 
consent, the lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation.  The absence of a qualifying subjective mental 
element in 1.6(a) suggests that the MRPC impose a higher 
standard than under the NYRPC.  Thus, it is possible that a lawyer’s 
inadvertent failure to understand the risks posed by 
 
 99. Id. at 1.6 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 100. Henry Blodget, Amazon’s Cloud Crash Disaster Permanently Destroyed Many 
Customer’s Data, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/amazon-lost-data-2011-4; Richard Waters, Technology: Grand 
Theft Data, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1718ec22-
7290-11e0-96bf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Whhbzxxu (providing that the security 
breach at Sony not only compromised private information, but it also temporarily 
prevented the online multiplayer functionality in PlayStation 3 games from 
working as Sony found it necessary to take the network offline after discovering 
that an unknown hacker had misappropriated names, e-mail addresses, user IDs 
and passwords of over 77 million participants in the PlayStation Network).  
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007). 
 102. Id. at 1.6(b). 
2011] RED SKIES IN THE MORNING 153 
communications technologies—risks that could result in 
unauthorized disclosure of client information—would increase the 
likelihood of putting the lawyer at risk of violating MRPC Rule 
1.6(a). 
However, Comment 5 to MRPC Rule 1.6 appears to diminish 
the strength of such an argument by stating, “[e]xcept to the 
extent that the client’s instructions or special circumstances limit 
that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures 
about a client when appropriate in carrying out the 
representation.”103  This guidance seems to indicate, first, that a 
lawyer should be aware of the risks that communications 
technologies pose, and second, that a lawyer should inform the 
client of such risks in order to determine whether the client has 
any special requests for guarding the confidentiality of its 
information.  Nevertheless, it seems that there might be room for 
the lawyer to utilize his or her traditional method of storing client 
information in spite of some risk of disclosure.  A properly vetted 
communications technology, for example, which is standard for the 
firm or for the lawyer, would seem to be “appropriate” in 
representing the client, although it would be prudent to disclose to 
the client the use of any new communications technology that 
could put the confidentiality or secure storage of the client’s 
information at enhanced risk and to obtain the client’s consent 
before subjecting the client’s information to such risks. 
NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) arguably sets an elevated standard, however, 
when the source of the disclosure is a non-lawyer whose services are 
utilized by the lawyer or law firm, stating that “[a] lawyer shall 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the lawyer’s employees, 
associates, and others whose services are utilized by the lawyer from 
disclosing or using confidential information of a client . . . .”104  The 
underlying principle appears to be that where the disclosure or use 
might be committed by a non-lawyer, such persons should not be 
assumed to be as aware of the risks and sensitivities of the 
information as would be a lawyer. 
A provision similar to NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) can be found in 
Comment 16 of the MRPC.  As it currently reads, Comment 16 to 
MRPC Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer must act “competently to 
safeguard information relating to the representation of a client 
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or 
 
 103. Id. at 1.6 cmt. 5 (2007). 
 104. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(c) (2011). 
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other persons who are participating in the representation of the 
client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”105  In 
borrowing the competence language of MRPC Rule 1.1, Comment 
16 indicates that with reference to protecting client information, a 
lawyer must recognize the risks that technology poses, particularly 
where a third party might have access to the information.106  The 
competence requirement embodied in the MRPC does not seem to 
differ substantially from the “reasonable care” requirement of the 
NYRPC.  Thus, in addition to recognizing risks, to competently 
safeguard information, the lawyer must similarly assume and 
provide for the fact that third-party communications providers are 
not likely to protect client information as zealously as the client’s 
advocate should.107 
The ABA Commission’s Draft Proposals for amendments to 
the MRPC and comments has recommended that MRPC Rule 1.6 
be amended by the addition of a new section (c) that states: “A 
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent 
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the 
representation of a client.”108 
The Proposals also recommended that additional guidance be 
inserted in Comment 16 containing, among other changes, the 
following statement concerning the obligations under the 
proposed new section (c) to MRPC Rule 1.6: 
Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure 
 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007). 
 106. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94 (concluding that a lawyer may 
outsource support services, but recognizing that the lawyer ultimately remains 
responsible for rendering competent legal services to the client). 
 107. This view is consistent with the guidance provided by the New York State 
Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 842 from 2010 on the 
topic of “[u]sing an outside online storage provider to store client confidential 
information,” which observes, in pertinent part: 
Rule 1.6(c) provides that an attorney must “exercise reasonable care to 
prevent . . . others whose services are utilized by the lawyer from 
disclosing or using confidential information of a client” except to the 
extent disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(b).  Accordingly, a lawyer must 
take reasonable affirmative steps to guard against the risk of inadvertent 
disclosure by others who are working under the attorney’s supervision or 
who have been retained by the attorney to assist in providing services to 
the client.  We note, however, that exercising “reasonable care” under 
Rule 1.6 does not mean that the lawyer guarantees that the information is 
secure from any unauthorized access. 
New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶ 5. 
 108. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 6. 
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if additional safeguards are not employed, and the cost of 
employing additional safeguards.  Whether a lawyer may 
be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s 
information in order to comply with other law, such as 
state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that 
impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or 
unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond 
the scope of these Rules.109 
In explanation, the ABA Commission acknowledged that the duty 
to protect a client’s confidential information was “already implicit 
in MRPC Rule 1.6[,]” but that “in light of the pervasive use of 
technology to store and transmit confidential client information, 
this obligation should be stated explicitly in the black letter of 
MRPC Rule 1.6.”110  The Commission may also have been mindful 
that some lawyers may check the black letter rules without taking 
time to also consult the comments, and therefore, thought it was 
advisable to ensure the widest possible audience for this 
enhancement of the existing guidance.  We remind readers that 
our purpose in writing this article is not to create liability for 
lawyers and law firms, but to assist them in identifying and avoiding 
the vulnerabilities that they are facing now and will face in the 
future. 
We would note also that the proposed addition to Comment 
16 basically makes “reasonable efforts” subject to a common sense 
judgment call by the lawyer, rather than imposing stringent duties 
that might quickly become obsolete in light of technologies that 
may emerge in the near future.  However, it should be 
remembered that the ethical standards set forth in the NYRPC and 
the MRPC are not intended as the highest standard to which a 
lawyer should adhere.  They set standards below which lawyers 
should not allow their conduct to go.  Common sense and what is 
for most lawyers the relentless pursuit of their clients’ interests will 
often motivate a lawyer to implement safeguards that exceed those 
required or recommended in the MRPC.  Such common sense 
often appears most clearly in the ethics opinions thoughtfully 
prepared by state and city bar associations, as illustrated in the New 
York State Bar’s additional observations in its opinion on using an 
online system (such as the cloud) to store a client’s confidential 
information, which emphasizes the need to stay abreast of new 
technologies: 
 
 109. Id. at 9. 
 110. Id. at 2. 
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 Not only technology itself but also the law relating to 
technology and the protection of confidential 
communications is changing rapidly.  Lawyers using 
online storage systems (and electronic means of 
communication generally) should monitor these legal 
developments, especially regarding instances when using 
technology may waive an otherwise applicable 
privilege. . . . 
 This Committee’s prior opinions have addressed the 
disclosure of confidential information in metadata and 
the perils of practicing law over the Internet. . . . [T]he 
duty to “exercise reasonable care” to prevent disclosure of 
confidential information “may, in some circumstances, 
call for the lawyer to stay abreast of technological 
advances and the potential risks” in transmitting 
information electronically.  N.Y. State 782 (2004), citing 
N.Y. State 709 (1998) (when conducting trademark 
practice over the Internet, lawyer had duty to “stay abreast 
of this evolving technology to assess any changes in the 
likelihood of interception as well as the availability of 
improved technologies that may reduce such risks at 
reasonable cost”) . . . . The same duty to stay current with 
the technological advances applies to a lawyer’s 
contemplated use of an online data storage system.111 
A 2008 ABA Opinion on outsourcing legal services provides 
additional insight into the precautions that a lawyer would be wise 
to take in retaining outside services.  The Opinion states that at a 
minimum, a lawyer outsourcing services, which will ultimately 
involve client information, should “consider investigating the 
security of the provider’s premises, [and] computer network . . . 
.”112  Only through a proper vetting process of the communications 
technology provider will the lawyer have made an attempt to carry 
out his or her services competently.  Additionally, a lawyer’s 
obligations under MRPC Rule 1.6 arguably extend to outside 
service providers under MRPC Rule 5.3(b).  The rule requires 
lawyers who retain outside services of non-lawyers to make 
“reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”113 
Given these obligations, it could be argued that both MRPC 
Rule 1.6(a) and NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) impose an implicit duty on 
 
 111. New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶¶ 11–12. 
 112. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94, at 3. 
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b) (2007). 
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lawyers and law firms to keep abreast of new communications 
technologies. Yet new communications technologies may be 
adopted without a clear understanding of the attendant risks of 
inadvertent disclosure.  For example, Bluetooth, as a wireless 
transmission method, arguably makes the conversations it transmits 
vulnerable to interception.114  Similarly, users of ear-buds for 
mobile phones often do not realize that the voice of their 
interlocutor can be overheard in elevators if the volume has not 
been adjusted to account for the close proximity of third parties.115
 
A lawyer or law firm that ignores such vulnerabilities may be at 
risk of violating NYRPC or MRPC Rule 1.6(a) if they use such 
technologies for communicating confidential information.  
Moreover, as upgrades boost or enhance a communications 
technology and as “potential adversaries”116 probe and identify 
vulnerabilities in the new technologies and plan attacks that exploit 
such vulnerabilities, it is important for lawyers and law firms to 
understand those developments and to implement appropriate 
precautions.  For example, counsel to financial institutions would 
find it prudent to ensure that their review and assessment of such 
developments and their responses with appropriate updated 
precautions should not lag behind that required by regulators of 
their financial institution clients.  In that regard, the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) decided in 
2011 that the guidance it had issued in 2005 for a risk management 
framework for financial institutions offering Internet-based 
products and services to customers, entitled Authentication in an 
Internet Banking Environment (the 2005 Guidance), needed 
reinforcement and a substantive upgrade to keep abreast of the 
subsequent evolution of external and internal cyber-threats and to 
ensure that financial institutions responded accordingly.  For 
example, the FFIEC explained that its 2005 Guidance had stated 
that “institutions should use effective methods to authenticate the 
 
 114. Indeed, mobile application developers are developing programs that will 
only make eavesdropping easier.  See Amplify’d, JOONITI, http://jooniti.com 
/products/amplifyd (last visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
 115. Even more common is the use of smart phones and e-mail-enabled PDAs 
while in an elevator in the apparent belief that the information displayed on the 
device’s brightly lit and easily read display screen is not visible to others. 
 116. We use the term “potential adversaries” to refer to any individual, group, 
organization, government, or government-sponsored entity that seeks 
unauthorized access to an enterprise’s digital assets with the objective of gaining 
advantage over the enterprise and damaging its defenses, financial well-being, or 
reputation. 
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identity of customers and that the techniques employed should be 
commensurate with the risks associated with the products and 
services offered and the protection of sensitive customer 
information.”117  The FFIEC further explained the standards and 
measures it expected as a minimum that financial institutions 
would implement and maintain, such as periodic reassessments of 
the risks and implementation of layered defenses: 
The Guidance provided minimum supervisory 
expectations for effective authentication controls 
applicable to high-risk online transactions involving access 
to customer information or the movement of funds to 
other parties. The 2005 Guidance also provided that 
institutions should perform periodic risk assessments and 
adjust their control mechanisms as appropriate in 
response to changing internal and external threats.118 
Apparently, the FFIEC had concluded that the 2005 Guidance 
had ceased to be sufficiently effective, and that the enhancements 
by adversaries of their capabilities to attack and successfully 
penetrate financial institution defenses was outdistancing the 
efforts to defend against and avert such exploits.  Thus, the release 
of updated guidance, entitled Supplement to Authentication in an 
Internet Banking Environment (the 2011 Guidance), came with 
several strong cautions that reflected the FFIEC’s assessment of the 
growing gap between attacker’s capabilities (and successes) and the 
regulated financial institutions’ defenses (and breaches): 
 The Agencies are concerned that customer 
authentication methods and controls implemented in 
conformance with the Guidance several years ago have 
become less effective. Hence, the institution and its 
customers may face significant risk where periodic risk 
assessments and appropriate control enhancements have 
not routinely occurred. 
. . . . 
 Since virtually every authentication technique can be 
compromised, financial institutions should not rely solely on 
any single control for authorizing high risk transactions, 
but rather institute a system of layered security, as 
described herein.119 
 
 117. Press Release, FFIEC, Supplement to Authentication in an Internet 
Banking Environment 1 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov 
/news/news/press/2011/pr11111a.pdf. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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. . . . 
. . . [T]he Agencies are concerned that fraudsters are 
utilizing increasingly sophisticated and malicious 
techniques to thwart existing authentication controls, gain 
control of customer accounts, and transfer funds to 
money mules that facilitate the movement of those funds 
beyond the reach of financial institutions and law 
enforcement.120 
The 2011 Guidance requires at least annual review and update 
of a financial institution’s online risk assessment, which should 
consider, but not be limited to, “changes in the internal and 
external threat environment” (focusing apparently on the 
capabilities of those posing the threats) and “changes in the 
customer functionality offered through electronic banking” 
(focusing apparently on the vulnerabilities that new technologies 
would bring or create).121  The 2011 Guidance, in its Appendix, 
highlighted forms of attack that, in some instances, may have been 
only theoretical possibilities at the time of the 2005 Guidance’s 
publication, but that by 2011 had led to widely reported, severely 
damaging attacks, such as the following noted in the 2011 
Guidance Appendix: 
• Fraudsters use of keyloggers to obtain the logon IDs, 
passwords, and challenge question answers of financial 
institutions’ customers. 
• Sophisticated malware allowing fraudsters to perpetrate man-
in-the-middle (MIM) or man-in-the-browser (MIB) attacks.122 
It would not be surprising if many lawyers, even those who 
advise financial institutions, were not acquainted with and may not 
even have ever read accounts of MIM/MIB attacks.  However, 
counsel who advise defense contractors and nuclear power plant 
operators should have at least seen mention of MIM since it was 
one of the more sophisticated elements of the Stuxnet worm that 
attacked the uranium processing facilities in Natanz, Iran and was 
finally discovered and reported in 2010.123  As explained by the 
2011 Guidance: 
In a MIM/MIB attack, the fraudster inserts himself 
between the customer and the financial institution and 
 
 120. Id. at 9. 
 121. Id. at 3. 
 122. Id. at 9. 
 123. William J. Broad et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear 
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html. 
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hijacks the online session. In one scenario, the fraudster is 
able to intercept the authentication credentials submitted 
by the customer and log into the customer’s account. In 
another scenario, the fraudster does not intercept the 
credentials, but modifies the transaction content or 
inserts additional transactions not authorized by the 
customer which, in most cases, are funds transfers to 
accounts controlled by the fraudster. The fraudsters 
conceal their actions by directing the customer to a 
fraudulent website that is a mirror image of the financial 
institution’s website or sending the customer a message 
claiming that the institution’s website is unavailable and to 
try again later. Fraudsters may have the capacity to delete 
any trace of their attack from the log files.124 
MIM attacks on SCADA systems have come to be viewed by 
security experts as the “ultimate aggressive attack,” because: 
[N]ot only [is] the controller . . . no longer in control, but 
the controller doesn’t even recognize that [it is] no 
longer in control.  And certainly the SCADA, the HMI, 
and the operators also do not recognize . . . what’s going 
on . . . . If you were to implement this type of an attack on 
a pipeline leak detection system, back in the control 
center [they] would think everything is fine because [they 
would be] getting replay data showing that the liquids 
were flowing through as [expected] and there were no 
leaks, when in fact [liquids] could be gushing out 
somewhere.125 
 
 124. FFIEC, supra note 117, at 9–10.  The MIM reportedly used by Stuxnet, 
resembled deceptions illustrated in the film Ocean’s Eleven (where the thieves 
substitute fictitious pre-recorded video for what is supposed to be the real-time 
video feed from the on-site surveillance observation cameras).  Stuxnet’s MIM 
reportedly concealed from the uranium processing plant’s SCADA system and the 
plant operating personnel the unauthorized changes that Stuxnet was executing 
in the speed of the centrifuge motors, causing them to spin intermittently at 
excessively high, then excessively low, speeds.  As explained by security expert 
Ralph Langner:  
Rogue code intercepts physical I/O [inputs/outputs] and provides the 
legitimate program running on the controller with ‘normal’ input 
patterns that are actually pre-recorded by Stuxnet . . . .The controller is 
no longer controlling I/O, but doesn’t recognize that.  The same is true 
for the HMI [human machine interface] and for operators.  In the 
meantime, Stuxnet writes to outputs at its discretion [to cause the 
variations in the frequency of the centrifuge motors].   
Ralph Langner, How to Hijack a Controller: Why Stuxnet Isn’t Just About Siemens’ PLCs, 
CONTROLGLOBAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2011 
/IndustrialControllers1101.html. 
 125. Interview by Dale Peterson with Ralph Langner, at 21:05–23:40, DIGITAL 
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In light of the 2011 Guidance and the reported exploits that 
occurred in 2010 and 2011, we believe that in interpreting the 
scope of an ethical requirement to keep abreast of new 
technologies, it would be reasonable and prudent to infer that such 
scope could well include not only the development of new 
communications technologies and the vulnerabilities they bring or 
create, but also the development of new and enhanced forms of 
attacks launched by adversaries, since clients will need to defend 
against and respond to such attacks and, counsel will be in a far 
better position to advise clients in such situations if counsel has 
kept abreast of such developments.  However, we understand that 
client and counsel will probably always be attempting to catch up 
with such developments. 
Such an interpretation would be prudent to apply also to the 
use of new technologies by associates, employees, and others whose 
services the lawyers and law firms utilize.  Supervising lawyers need 
to be aware of the potential risks and vulnerabilities that may be 
introduced into their legal practice in order to take appropriate 
precautions, which may include instructing such personnel on the 
potential risks and ways to avoid disclosing confidential 
information.  Of course, the adequacy and timeliness of such 
supervision depends on law firms and lawyers remaining abreast of 
emerging developments in communications technologies.126 
On initial reading, Comment 17 to MRPC Rule 1.6, which has 
no parallel in the NYRPC, seems to address several of these 
technological concerns.  Comment 17 states that when a lawyer is 
“transmitting a communication” that includes client information, 
“the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
information from coming into the hands of unintended 
recipients.”127  However, the Comment goes on to state that the 
duty does not require the lawyer to put special security measures in 
place “if the method of communication affords a reasonable 
 
BOND (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.digitalbond.com/2010/12/15 
/december-podcast-ralph-langner-stuxnet-interview. 
 126. As observed in an article in the ABA Journal: “If the history of technology 
in the legal profession is any guide, most lawyers will eventually understand the 
utility of today’s latest technology as well as any of today’s college students do.  
And they’ll come to that understanding about the same time as those college 
students make partner.”  Edward A. Adams, Web 2.0 Still a No-go: Lawyers Slow to 
Adopt Cutting Edge Technology, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 2008, at 52, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/web_20_still_a_no_go. 
 127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007). 
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expectation of privacy.”128  In light of the rapid and extensive 
erosion of privacy that has resulted from the development and use 
of Web 2.0 technologies, such guidance is far from clear and may 
appear, to some, to amount to putting lawyers in the position of 
trying to speculate on the present and future boundaries of an 
already admittedly controversial grey area—that of what constitutes 
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”129 
As a 2010 California State Bar opinion illustrated, courts have 
come to different conclusions on the degree of privacy that lawyers 
should expect from communications technologies, such as e-
mail.130  Some courts have indicated that, unlike postal mail, e-mails 
are generally not sealed or secured in the same fashion and thus 
pose a greater security risk.131  Nevertheless, a majority of state bar 
associations have taken the position that e-mails enjoy the same 
sense of security as traditional postal mail.132  An ABA Formal Ethics 
Opinion from 1999 supports this view.133  In that opinion, the ABA 
states that lawyers may transmit information relating to client 
representation through unencrypted e-mail without violating the 
MRPC “because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy from a technological and legal 
standpoint.”134  Furthermore, the ABA found that the same privacy 
afforded to U.S. mail applies to e-mail, but it noted that the lawyer 
should nevertheless consult with the client regarding any specific 
instructions about transmitting highly sensitive information.135  
Although there is a threat that information transmitted through 
either method will be intercepted, lawyers are under no greater 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Some privacy experts have begun to argue that the focus on “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” is misplaced and that the locus of discussion should be 
changed.  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 114 (2011) (“For a long time, I believed the fix was for the 
Supreme Court to adopt a more sophisticated and forward-looking view of privacy.  
I now realize that I was wrong.  The entire debate over reasonable expectations of 
privacy is futile, for it is not focused on the right question.”). 
 130. See California State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & 
Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-179, at 3 (2010) [hereinafter California Formal Op. 
2010–179], available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket 
=wmqECiHp7h4%3D&tabid=837. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) 
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 99-413]. 
 134. Id.  It should be noted, however, that the Committee’s conclusions in this 
opinion were based upon the information available to it in 1999. 
 135. Id. 
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security obligations when using technological transmission than 
they would be in using postal services.136 
However, it is possible that Comment 17 is not broad enough, 
or that it was not intended to address the expansion of 
technologies such as Bluetooth or products and services based on 
cloud computing platforms.  Arguably, Comment 17 suggests that 
lawyers can expect a reasonable degree of privacy when 
transmitting e-mails through the lawyer or the law firm’s secure 
system.137  But where a lawyer utilizes a third party mechanism or a 
less secure communications technology, additional precautions 
may be warranted, particularly if it becomes apparent—as it should 
be with data stored in the cloud—that counsel will have less control 
over the handling of client data stored, processed, copied, and 
relocated at off-site server farms, and if, in relinquishing such 
control, counsel is unable to satisfy herself or himself that the 
client’s data is as well protected against unauthorized access, 
disclosure, damage, or destruction as it was before moving such 
data to the cloud.138 
 
 136. See id. (“It is not . . . reasonable to require that a mode of communicating 
information . . . be avoided simply because interception is technologically 
possible.”). 
 137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007). 
 138. ABA Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 133; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007).  As Alabama Bar Ethics Opinion 2010-02 observes 
and cautions: 
The duty of reasonable care requires the lawyer to become 
knowledgeable about how the provider will handle the storage and 
security of the data being stored and to reasonably ensure that the 
provider will abide by a confidentiality agreement in handling the data.  
Additionally, because technology is constantly evolving, the lawyer will 
have a continuing duty to stay abreast of appropriate security safeguards 
that should be employed by the lawyer and the third-party provider.  If 
there is a breach of confidentiality, the focus of any inquiry will be 
whether the lawyer acted reasonably in selecting the method of storage 
and/or the third party provider. 
Alabama State Bar, Formal Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www.alabar 
.org/ogc/PDF/2010-02.pdf. 
Moreover, even the experts that counsel may consult in attempting to assess risks 
to digital systems and data stored and processed on them may find that the experts 
have underestimated the capabilities of really determined, well-funded, potential 
adversaries.  As noted in a recent Scientific American article: 
[T]he average control system engineer would have once dismissed out of 
hand the possibility of remotely launched malware getting close to 
critical controllers, arguing that the system is not directly connected to 
the Internet.  Then Stuxnet showed that control networks with no 
permanent connection to anything else are still vulnerable.  Malware can 
piggyback on a USB stick that technicians plug into the control system, 
for example.  When it comes to critical electronic circuits, even the 
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IV. MINIMIZING LAWYERS’ ETHICAL RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
SERVICES 
In this section, we provide an overview of how cloud 
computing services work as a general proposition.  Next, we 
evaluate the risks that at present appear inherent in the use of such 
services and some of the ethical challenges and risks that may arise 
when lawyers and law firms consider whether to entrust client data 
to cloud computing service vendors.  And, finally, we suggest some 
measures that may help to minimize those risks. 
A. Cloud Computing Services 
By 2007, individuals and enterprises were already deciding to 
migrate various kinds of data to third party vendors who 
maintained large server farms in order to store, process, and make 
wirelessly accessible such data to the data customers.  Referred to 
by names such as “grid, utility, or cloud computing,” such services 
promised the data customer that if it would outsource the hosting 
of hardware and software, the customer could “just link” to the data 
and software when needed.139  The more companies that decide to 
locate, at least, part of their data in the cloud and the more 
sensitive the data that they entrust to the cloud, the greater the 
probability that potential adversaries will come to view cloud servers 
as a treasure trove of digital assets and may be tempted to probe 
such servers for vulnerabilities and to design attacks to exploit 
them.  Our concern is that the decision for clients, lawyers, and law 
firms about whether to make use of cloud services carries with it 
risks that are difficult to assess, in part because the vendors keep 
the structure and operation of their cloud computing services 
remarkably opaque to customers, and in part because the use of 
cloud computing involves creation of potentially multiple copies 
 
smallest back door can let an enterprising burglar in. 
David M. Nicol, Hacking the Lights Out, SCI. AM. (July 2011), available at 
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Hacking_the_Lights_Out.pdf.  For at least 
two years, it has for such reasons been impermissible for faculty at Department of 
Defense (DoD) educational institutions, such as the U.S. Military Academy, to 
insert USB sticks into the institution’s networked computers.  Of course, for the 
military, as for counsel, the problem with such safeguards is whether they can be 
consistently enforced, or whether human nature and the pressure of coping with 
exigencies will lead someone to violate the prohibition in order to achieve a 
valuable convenience without realizing that it only takes one such lapse for the 
locked door to swing open to a potential adversary’s malware. 
 139. M. Mitchell Waldrop, Data Center in a Box, SCI. AM. (Aug. 2007), available 
at http://www.angelfire.com/folk/thegrieves/transfer/200708.pdf. 
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whose location the data customer will not be aware of.  As a result, 
clients may be at risk of underestimating the risks to their 
intellectual property of keeping sensitive data in the cloud (e.g., it 
would seem a premature and perilous exercise for an enterprise to 
authorize the storage of any copy of its trade secret information in 
the cloud), and counsel face a double risk: the challenge of 
advising clients and ensuring that their interests will be protected if 
they decide to move their data to the cloud and the challenge of 
deciding in what circumstances a lawyer or law firm may authorize 
the uploading of client data to the cloud without putting at risk 
their obligations to the client, the client’s trust, and their 
professional ethical duties.  We will explore such issues in this 
section and attempt to identify the most important considerations 
that lawyers and law firms should inform themselves of and assess 
before deciding whether any client data should be stored in the 
cloud, and if so, what kinds of data can be and what kinds should 
probably not be moved there. 
1. Overview of the “Cloud” —Features and Potential Benefits 
Time-shared computing preceded the proliferation of 
personal computers into each office of a company.140  “Big, 
expensive computers were kept behind big glass walls, tended by 
shrouded acolytes. For the rest of us, it was ‘keep your hands off.’  
You rented computation by the second for your dumb terminal.”141 
Before the advent of the Web, visionaries hailed the coming 
era of “desktop publishing,” in which each office would boast a 
computer linked to nearby printers, enabling each member of an 
enterprise to publish in hard copy.142  The World Wide Web’s 
emergence made “desktop publishing” into an unexpectedly 
shortsighted vision of what would become computer-aided 
dissemination, but it still promoted the decentralization of 
computing—where each employee would have a terminal on their 
desk, and later each would have a laptop, a smart phone, or a tablet 
to take on business trips, on the daily commute, or for working 
remotely from home. 
 
 140. See Robert W. Lucky, Cloud Computing, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 2009), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/cloud-computing (remembering 
the days of time-shared computing). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See History of Desktop Publishing, TEXAS SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF, http://www 
.tsd.state.tx.us/cte/careertech/desktoppublishing/historyDTP.HTM (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2011). 
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Today, the amount of data processed is growing daily, and the 
need for company personnel to access it from nearly everywhere 
has become compelling.143  The costs of providing such capabilities 
are substantial, and once invested, a company is stuck with the 
processing capability even if it is underutilized and, therefore, an 
inefficient investment.  In response to these challenges, major high 
tech firms have built enormous server farms and are offering to 
take on the computer processing and information technology 
responsibilities for numerous corporate clients.144  Potential clients 
are being encouraged to scrap their in-house servers and save on 
the associated costs by outsourcing their data storage and 
processing to off-premises server farms that promise to provide 
each customer with access to its data and to no one else’s.145  The 
promise is a “virtual computing environment that’s dynamically 
allocated to meet user needs.”146 
The term “cloud computing” is imprecise and ambiguous, 
because cloud services and the meaning of the term “cloud 
computing” (and related terms and concepts such as 
“virtualization”) are rapidly evolving.  As NIST has observed, 
“[c]loud computing is still an evolving paradigm.  Its definitions, 
use cases, underlying technologies, issues, risks, and benefits will be 
refined in a spirited debate by the public and private sectors.  
These definitions, attributes, and characteristics will evolve and 
change over time.”147 
 In 2009, NIST proposed a working definition that described 
“cloud computing” as “a model for enabling convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
 
 143. See Roger Cheng, So You Want to Use Your iPhone for Work? Uh-oh, WALL ST. 
J. Apr. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424052748704641604576255223445021138.html. 
 144. See, e.g., Mark Milian, What Makes Apple’s iCloud Different from Google and 
Amazon Services, CNN TECH (June 6, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH 
/web/06/06/apple.icloud/index.html?iref=allsearch (discussing Apple’s new 
iCloud service and how it compares to Google and Amazon’s similar services). 
 145. Sharon K. Sandeen, Kenneth L. Dorsey, Theodore F. Claypoole, James 
Garrity & Christopher Kudlick, Protecting Trade Secrets in the Cloud: What Efforts are 
Reasonable Enough?, CLE Presentation, Boston (Apr. 2011) (copy of handout on 
file with the authors). 
 146. John Harauz, Lori M. Kaufman & Bruce Potter, Data Security in the World of 
Cloud Computing, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2000, at 61, available at 
http://www.idi.ntnu.no/emner/tdt60/papers/05189563.pdf. 
 147. Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 
(Draft), NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 1 (June 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.newinnovationsguide.com/NIST_Cloud_Definition.pdf. 
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and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”148  
NIST identified five essential characteristics of “cloud computing”: 
[1.] On-demand self-service.  A consumer can unilaterally 
provision computing capabilities, such as server time and 
network storage, as needed automatically without 
requiring human interaction with each service’s provider. 
[2.] Broad network access.  Capabilities are available over the 
network and accessed through standard mechanisms that 
promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client 
platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs). 
[3.] Resource pooling.  The provider’s computing resources 
are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-
tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources 
dynamically assigned and reassigned according to 
consumer demand.  There is a sense of location 
independence in that the customer generally has no 
control or knowledge over the exact location of the 
provided resources but may be able to specify location at a 
higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or 
datacenter).  Examples of resources include storage, 
processing, memory, network bandwidth, and virtual 
machines. 
[4.] Rapid elasticity.  Capabilities can be rapidly and 
elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to 
quickly scale out, and rapidly released to quickly scale in.  
To the consumer, the capabilities available for 
provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be 
purchased in any quantity at any time. 
[5.] Measured service.  Cloud systems automatically control 
and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering 
capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the 
type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and 
active user accounts).  Resource usage can be monitored, 
controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both 
the provider and consumer of utilized service.149
 
NIST announced changes to its standards in May 2011.150 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 
(Draft), NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 2 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 NIST 
Standards], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-
145.pdf. 
 150. NIST CLOUD SYNOPSIS, supra note 13, at 2-1.  These changes are discussed, 
to the extent relevant to this article, in Part VI, infra. 
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A major objective of cloud computing is the linkage and 
integration of the numerous computing devices that are purchased 
for specialized tasks so that the data stored on each and the 
processing each performs can be done on commands from 
portable or office-based (or home-office based) devices.  As one 
observer emphasized, “[c]loud computing means that information 
is not stranded on individual machines; it is combined into one 
digital ‘cloud’ available at the touch of a finger from many 
different devices.”151 
At present, three main delivery models for cloud computing 
have been developed: 
[i] Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS).  The capability 
provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s 
applications running on a cloud infrastructure.  The 
applications are accessible from various client devices 
through a thin client interface such as a web browser (e.g., 
web-based e-mail).  The consumer does not manage or 
control the underlying cloud infrastructure including 
network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even 
individual application capabilities, with the possible 
exception of limited user-specific application 
configuration settings. 
[ii] Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS).  The capability 
provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud 
infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications 
created using programming languages and tools 
supported by the provider.  The consumer does not 
manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure 
including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, 
but has control over the deployed applications and 
possibly application hosting environment configurations. 
[iii] Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).  The capability 
provided to the consumer is to provision processing, 
storage, networks, and other fundamental computing 
resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run 
arbitrary software, which can include operating systems 
and applications.  The consumer does not manage or 
control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has 
control over operating systems, storage, deployed 
applications, and possibly limited control of select 
 
 151. Steve Hamm, Cloud Computing’s Big Bang for Business, BUS. WK., June 15, 
2009, at 43. 
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networking components (e.g., host firewalls).152 
Unless otherwise specified, reports concerning cloud 
computing tend to refer to cloud “software as a service.”153  Such 
services typically are marketed as “pay-per-use” with projections of 
substantial cost reductions because they replace costly, licensed 
software with purportedly less expensive access to software on an as 
needed basis.  The charges are based on usage and allow 
companies to scale up or down their use to fit their needs by 
accessing remotely stored programs instead of purchasing licensed 
software and upgrades.154  In essence, cloud “software as a service” 
is an outsourcing of data processing and storage that previously 
occurred within a customer’s enterprise.  Such services involve a 
vendor’s provision of raw data processing power and storage 
capacity at times of need, or even to replace in-house capacities 
altogether.155 
Two examples of prodigious cloud storage are “Amazon 
Simple Storage Service”156 and Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing 
platform.  Microsoft Azure is built on more than one million 
servers in the company’s data centers157 and charges “12 cents an 
hour for computing, 15 cents per gigabyte for storage and 10 cents 
per 10,000 storage transactions.”158  Amazon has emerged as one 
leader in this business.159  As one observer noted, “[m]ore than half 
the online bookseller’s computing resources are being consumed 
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by other companies, which run their own applications in its data 
centres . . . . Customers include the New York Times and 
Nasdaq.”160  Small to medium-size companies may benefit as they 
gain access to computing advantages previously available only to 
large companies, by “buying computing capacity from a ‘cloud,’ 
rather like electricity from the grid.”161 
In addition to the three kinds of delivery of cloud computing 
services, there are four different ways for such computing services 
to be deployed: 
(1) “public clouds” operated by third-party providers and made 
available to the general public or a large industry group;162 
(2) “private clouds” operated by companies that have the funds 
available to invest in off-site or on-site servers to serve their 
own personnel (or that can hire a third party to manage);163 
(3) “community clouds” located on-premise or off-premise, 
managed by the participating organizations or a third party, 
shared by participating organizations, and used to support a 
specific community that shares certain objectives (such as 
mission objectives, security requirements, or legal compliance 
requirements);164 and 
(4) “hybrid clouds” composed of two or more clouds (private, 
public, or community), each of which remains a separate 
entity, that are linked by shared standards or shared 
proprietary technology that enhances the portability and 
movement of data and applications.165 
For example, a “hybrid cloud” can be set up to allow a 
customer to operate and store data on its own private cloud, but in 
times of a surge in need for computing resources, the customer can 
“burst” into and utilize the resources of a “community cloud” or 
“public cloud”—a process known as “cloud bursting.”166  One 
commentator explained the distinction between public and private 
clouds as follows: 
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Thanks to ever more powerful chips and new software, 
servers and other hardware can now be “virtualized,” 
meaning physically separate systems can act as one.  This 
enables computing power to become a utility: it is 
generated somewhere on the network (“in the cloud”) 
and supplied as a service.  To simplify their complex data 
centres and cut costs, more and more companies are 
thinking about building in-house computing utilities, 
called “private clouds,” or outsourcing computing to 
“public clouds” of the kind Sun [Microsystems] 
launched.167 
In 2009, some observers predicted that cloud-based computing 
would increasingly become the primary platform for web 
applications.168  As measured in 2011 by the subsequent actions of 
major software and cloud computing developers, the forecast 
appears to have been accurate.  For example, in October 2010, 
Microsoft announced that the next generation of its Office suite 
software, Office 365, would be a cloud-based version.169  In June 
2011, Apple announced its iCloud services that reportedly would 
include storage of documents created using iCloud Storage APIs 
and that would “automatically” push them to the user’s mobile 
devices; Apple deployed iCloud in October 2011.170  Measured by 
the number of hours that they are accessed by users, cloud-based 
networks already have become a significant platform, and in some 
activities, the predominant platform.171  According to the Aspen 
Institute’s 2009 report, Identity in the Age of Cloud Computing: 
The cloud has become our entertainment network: we are 
spending hundreds of millions of hours on sites like 
YouTube, Hulu and Flickr.  The cloud has become our 
social network: Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, hi5 and similar 
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sites now claim hundreds of millions of members.  The 
cloud has become our virtual library: when we do a 
Google search we are fingering the cloud.  The cloud has 
become our workbench: we manage projects in Basecamp, 
share large files with Pando, tweak photos in online photo 
editors like Adobe Photoshop Express and Picnik, and 
edit videos online with JayCut and Jumpcut (now closed).  
The cloud has become our development network: open 
source programmers trade code on sites like 
SourceForge.net and Drupal.org.172 
The promised benefits of cloud computing, however, appear 
to be outpacing many users’ ability to identify and understand the 
attendant risks and what might qualify as adequate safeguards to 
avert or minimize such risks.  The reported benefits of cloud 
computing include reduced costs, scalable use of resources, 
utilization of enhanced computer processing power, and almost 
ubiquitous availability by company personnel to company records 
and data.173  Other advantages purportedly include “[allowing 
users] to flexibly experiment with new services, and to remove 
unneeded capacity when demand slackens. . . . The cloud is also 
easier to manage—you can install a single software patch to cover 
all of a company’s users . . . .”174
 
There are, however, serious risks—some known, some guessed 
at, and some that will probably arise and surprise even the vendors 
themselves.  For example, as reported in early August 2011, security 
researchers at the Black Hat USA security conference 
demonstrated ways in which users of Amazon’s Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2) services had been “tricked into using virtual machines 
that could have included ‘back doors’ for snooping.”175  It would be 
naïve to assume that cloud computing, unlike previous new 
communications technologies related to cyberspace, will not result 
in serious data breaches.  Although it is a difficult fact for vendors, 
clients, customers, and lawyers to accept, if data needs to be kept 
secure and safe from unauthorized access (as needed to protect 
trade secrets, privacy of personally identifiable data, safeguards for 
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nuclear power plants, national security information, etc.), then 
such data should not be accessible from the Internet and should be 
kept “air gapped” from the Internet.  Otherwise, it is probably only 
a matter of time before it will be compromised, often without the 
owner’s or custodian’s knowledge.  These concerns have been 
echoed by analysts seeking to get security taken seriously, as 
illustrated in the following three observations by such analysts: 
“The security of these cloud-based infrastructure services is like 
Windows in 1999.  It’s being widely used and nothing tremendously 
bad has happened yet.  But it’s just in early stages of getting 
exposed to the internet, and you know bad things are coming.”176  
Ryan Rubin, U.K. head of security and privacy at Protiviti, an IT 
security company, says: “There aren’t many people putting mission-
critical data in the cloud.  The crown jewels—customer records, for 
example—are still very much embedded in the organisation.”177  A 
director at one London investment bank says: “We use the cloud 
for things such as e-mail.  We would never put our client services on 
it.”178 
Technology vendors who know or suspect that risks exist may 
be reluctant to disclose them for fear that such disclosure would 
give prospective customers pause and thus undermine sales.179  
Nonetheless, counsel should consider at least the currently known 
risks, particularly before they and their law firms adopt cloud 
computing and put their own and their clients’ records into the 
cloud.  This article also argues that lawyers and law firms should 
review developments in cloud computing and risks on a dynamic 
basis as cloud capacities change and reports of specific risks or 
incidents emerge. 
2. Potential Ethical Risks for Lawyers and Law Firms from Cloud 
Computing 
The ethical risks for lawyers and law firms from cloud 
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computing are most likely to originate from the security risks that 
cloud computing presents to all of its users, including risks from 
Internet facilitated breaches (malware, hackers, etc.), risks from 
careless or disgruntled insiders (resulting in data shared with 
unauthorized persons), and risks from state surveillance and 
interception under the auspices of legal authority.180  The 
discussion below focuses on public clouds, as it seems unlikely that 
law firms will initially set up their own private clouds (such 
investments are hard to justify during recessions), or will find it 
impractical at this time to negotiate participation in a legal-
community cloud or in a hybrid cloud.  
a. Security Risks Inherent in the Use of Public Clouds 
Some of the mystery and confusion surrounding the concept 
of cloud computing can be eliminated by simply viewing it as a type 
of outsourcing.  Certain risks can be predicted from the 
outsourcing experience,181 but many of the risks inherent in cloud 
computing are new and require an understanding of underlying 
features of the cloud that goes beyond what is needed in order to 
use cloud-based services.182  The cloud service providers themselves 
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tend not to provide such information, however, and customers may 
be ill equipped to assess the risks involved in placing sensitive data 
in the cloud. 
One of BAE’s deputy chief technology officers has reasoned 
that the cloud-computing environment “requires an implicit level 
of trust as well as an explicit level of vigilance to ensure success.”183  
Unless cloud service providers explicitly explain what is being taken 
on trust, customers and their legal counsel (and customers who are 
lawyers, law firms, or judges) will be well advised to conduct an 
enhanced and rigorous due diligence review of the cloud 
provider’s security measures and of the particular cloud’s 
architecture and methods of operation.  Moreover, by encouraging 
and cooperating with an enhanced security due diligence, a cloud 
service provider can also avoid risks, such as learning belatedly that 
it is alleged to have participated in violations of laws involving 
certain kinds of sensitive data whose movement out of the 
originating jurisdiction or into a jurisdiction may be impermissible. 
In the discussion below, we identify what appear at present to 
be the most severe cloud security risks.  In the following section, we 
discuss how those potential security risks can lead to ethical risks 
for lawyers and law firms. 
b. Instabilities of Cloud Software 
i. Program Instability and Defects   
 Programs like Google Docs have a relatively short track record 
or performance history.  Thus, their stability—their ability to 
remain operable without intermittent or prolonged interruption 
from “crashes” and “outages”—has to be taken on faith.  Cloud 
service providers offer seemingly high levels of service availability 
until one looks closely at the meaning of the specified availability, 
e.g., “Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud, its virtualized server 
offering, promises 99.95% uptime, but calculates uptime based on 
the whole year rather than individual months.  That means uptime 
could fall below the promised level for an entire month without 
customers becoming eligible for service credits.”184
 
That level of availability would not meet the requirements set 
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by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) in the request 
for quotation (RFQ) it issued on July 30, 2009 for cloud service 
offerings to support a “Cloud Computing Storefront Site—which 
will enable Government purchasers to buy . . . service offerings.”185  
Presumably to avert such shortcomings, the GSA’s RFQ requires 
the contractor to provide availability based on a monthly 
calculation as follows: “Service Availability (Measured as Total 
Uptime Hour / Total Hours within the Month) displayed as a 
percentage of availability up to one-tenth of a percent (e.g. 
99.95%).”186 
The problem with such specifications for “uptime” is the kind 
commonly encountered in any computer-based, mission-critical 
system (such as flight control and military fire-control systems).  
Unless the specified requirement is simple and straightforward, 
and can be verified with tests based on facts accessible to the 
customer or end-user, the requirement becomes incomputable, 
hopelessly vague, and ultimately unenforceable.  For example, a 
military tactical display (in a fighter aircraft or submarine) must be 
updated rapidly, at consistently timed intervals, and completely, or 
else the end-user will lose sight of the tactical environment and be 
“blind” to changes in the adversary’s position and in weapons fired.  
If the specified response time for such a display is “every 0.5 
second,”187 that must be measurable with data accessible to the end-
user.  Regrettably, the typical service level agreement of cloud 
vendors expresses the crucial value of “uptime” in a percentage 
whose calculation requires facts that only the vendor possess (such 
as processing time for all requests during a specified interval) or 
that neither party has access to (such as excluding the “time for 
transmittal from a customer’s system to the cloud vendor’s servers).  
The apparent precision carried out to two places past the decimal 
point (99.95%) and the apparent high probability of system 
“uptime” (which looks so close to 100%) are illusory.  Since the 
consumer cannot compute “uptime,” the precision is a disguised 
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inexactitude.  Since the vendors also include numerous caveats and 
exclusions for “downtime” that will not be counted against the 
promised “uptime” percentage, the seemingly high reliability 
proves to be something less and indefinite.188 
Moreover, the service level agreements apply a “red tape” 
barrier that creates extraordinary hurdles to a customer seeking a 
credit for a failure of the cloud vendor’s system to achieve the 
specified “uptime.”  Consider the steps that a leading cloud vendor 
requires the customer to complete in order to qualify for a credit 
that it even then might not necessarily receive: 
To receive a Service Credit, you must submit a request by 
sending an e-mail message to aws-sla-request @ 
amazon.com.  To be eligible, the credit request must . . . 
(ii) include, in the body of the e-mail, the dates and times 
of each incident of Region Unavailable that you claim to 
have experienced including instance ids of the instances 
[sic] that were running and affected during the time of 
each incident; (iii) include your server request logs that 
document the errors and corroborate your claimed 
outage (any confidential or sensitive information in these 
logs should be removed or replaced with asterisks); . . . .  
If the Annual Uptime Percentage of such request is 
confirmed by us and is less than 99.95% for the Service 
Year, then we will issue the Service Credit to you . . . .  
Your failure to provide the request and other information 
as required above will disqualify you from receiving a 
Service Credit.189 
The record of outages and the opaque and often delayed 
explanations the vendors tend to give for the causes suggests that 
customers are being asked to treat the “uptime” percentages as a 
sufficiently high reliability to entrust their data and processing to 
the cloud, but without any effective recourse or remedy in the 
event of an outage or a denial of access that the vendor can impose 
in its sole discretion.  Amazon, for example, requires the customer 
to agree that Amazon may take “any of the corrective action 
regarding Customer Accounts to the extent we deem necessary or 
appropriate, in our sole discretion,”190 and that such action may 
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include “suspending, canceling or closing of Customer 
Accounts.”191  Moreover, the agreement further authorizes Amazon 
to “throttle, suspend or terminate your access to SES (Simple Email 
Service), or block or decline to send any SES Email,”192 in Amazon’s 
sole discretion if it determines that certain events have occurred, 
including alleged customer noncompliance with the agreement.  
That is extraordinary leverage when the pressure the vendor can 
apply is denial of access to, and use of, a communications mode 
that is as fundamental to current business as e-mail. 
ii. Operating System Instability and Defects   
 The same risks of unproven, long term stability arise equally 
with regard to a cloud vendor’s operating systems as with any 
operating system whose uptime and reliability must be sufficient to 
avoid a costly and untimely disruption to a customer’s business 
activities.  Anyone who used an early Windows-based computer has 
probably had the experience of adding new applications that 
conflicted with, or would not operate reliably on top of, the 
Windows operating system.  Similarly, such conflicts would often 
appear with distressing results when a new version of the operating 
system was issued or patched.  At least, in such instances, the 
individual user or the business enterprise could decide what 
applications to add or remove to reduce the frequency and severity 
of conflicts and disruptions.  However, when a customer elects to 
use a cloud vendor’s services, such decisions also are entrusted to 
the sole discretion of the cloud vendor, which can put customers at 
risk without them knowing when the vendor is taking the risks by 
adding or subtracting applications or making so-called “routine” 
maintenance updates to its operating system, which may result in a 
sustained outage.  As one commentator has observed: 
[With a software-as-a-service cloud system] [y]ou would 
have no control over what other applications are sharing 
the same server; each other application provides a 
potential point of entry for hackers, and poorly written 
software might have adverse effects on the stability of the 
operating system . . . . [I]n the event of server instability, 
the hosting company could easily transfer the site to a 
different server.  You would however be reliant upon them 
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to monitor their systems closely and expedite the move.193 
. . . .  
 In addition, there is the issue of loss of control.  
Providers like Amazon reserve the right to shut off the 
server without prior notice if it is behaving in a way that 
leads them to believe it has been compromised by 
hackers, or if they think we are using it for unethical 
activities like spamming.  This means that if you were to 
end up on a blacklist by mistake, the consequences would 
be worse than with a non-cloud server.194 
iii. Upgrade Instability and Defects   
 Upgrades often introduce new instabilities or instabilities 
whose symptoms and recovery times are unfamiliar to the user.  
Indeed, the chief executive of Hyundai Capital, which is South 
Korea’s largest consumer-finance company, recently observed: 
We need to put a price tag to every IT door and window.  
Maybe we want to have another website, and we think the 
development cost is $500,000.  But that could also mean 
there is an additional hacking route.  So that adds to the 
cost and consideration.  Before this, we were crazy making 
apps.  Apps are more convenient for us and for the 
clients.  But now, we understand that each application 
creates a new route for hacking.  We are now slowing 
down the whole organization.  How things look and how 
they work is now secondary.  Security is now first.195 
Law firms do not usually rush to be the “first on their block” to 
adopt the latest version of software, preferring instead to see the 
reported experiences of “early adopters.”  If a program is 
reportedly “buggy,” causes frequent program or system “crashes,” 
or wipes out data or documents that the user thought had been 
saved when the “Save” button was clicked, a law firm or lawyer may 
prudently postpone purchasing a license for the new version or 
upgrade.  The law firm that relies on the cloud may find it has 
given up that control and the ability to limit its exposure to such 
risks.  The cloud provider may insist that, when it upgrades or 
introduces a new version of software, every customer must accept it.  
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This may happen regardless of, whether the customer wants the 
risks and whether the customers are prepared for those risks and 
for the accompanying learning curve for using the software. 
The risks in cloud computing remain hard to assess.  That they 
are not imaginary or far-fetched has been demonstrated by 
reported “crashes” and “outages” of cloud computing services,196 
corruption of data in at least one instance,197 and unauthorized 
release of customer data.198  An early example of the types of risks 
cloud computing may raise occurred on February 24, 2009, when 
Google’s e-mail service, which at the time had over 100 million 
customers (including both individuals and businesses), suffered a 
complete world-wide shut down, depriving customers of access to 
their Gmail accounts for more than two hours.199  Because it 
occurred at 1:30 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, most U.S. customers 
were unaffected.200 
Users in Europe and Asia had a brief experience of a “worst-
case scenario” for users of a public cloud software as a service: an 
inability to send, receive, or to gain access to their remotely stored 
e-mail data and attachments.201  On March 10, 2009, Google’s e-
mail service went down for an undisclosed reason, but apparently a 
significant number of users found service restored within a half 
hour, but others reportedly remained without access to their 
accounts for several hours.202  A similar shut down of Gmail 
occurred in August 2008.203  A May 14, 2009 “outage at Google” 
 
 196. See Blodget, supra note 100 (noting that Amazon experienced a “massive 
service outage” that led to gaps in customers’ historical data). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach, 
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sony-
stoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426 (stating that about 77 million Sony users 
had their identities stolen because of a massive breach of Sony’s video game 
network). 
 199. Chris Nuttal, Google E-mail Crash Hits Millions and Raises Fears over Web 
Services, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0950a2b6-
02de-11de-b58b-000077b07658.htmlWTO#axzz1YuyDoGKi. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See generally Four Hours Without Gmail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2009, 9:47 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/four-hours-without-gmail/ (noting 
that millions of users in Europe were without e-mail access during work hours, and 
those in Asia were without services post-work). 
 202. Andrew Morse, Google Mail Hit by Outage, Second in Less than Month, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at B5. 
 203. See Murad Ahmed, Google Mail Users Hit by Global Outage, SUNDAY TIMES 
(Feb. 24, 2009), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and 
_web/article5797157.ece (“The last major Gmail outage was in August 2008, when 
the service shut down for ‘a couple of hours.’”). 
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disabled use of Google’s cloud services for many of its customers.204
 
Google has yet to reveal the cause of the August 2008 shut 
down.  Google eventually disclosed the cause of the February 2009 
shutdown, but the explanation revealed further risks that 
customers take when they rely on public cloud computing services.  
The failure occurred during routine maintenance of Google’s 
European data centers when Google staff was moving data to a 
back-up center to allow for maintenance to proceed:205
 
[T]he relocation triggered a software program that is 
designed to direct data to the centre nearest to where 
users are based, a measure that improves the response 
time for online applications. 
 As it unexpectedly set to work on the new mass of 
data, the code greatly increased the workload on the 
reserve data cent[er] and triggered an overload, causing 
data to be pushed automatically into a third cent[er]. 
 That in turn led to another overload, eventually 
triggering a series of failures that toppled Google’s data 
cent[er]s like falling dominoes.206 
The so-called “rogue code” that caused the shutdown was written by 
one of Google’s in-house programmers.207 
iv. Potentially Irrevocable Losses of Data or Data 
Temporarily Inaccessible   
 As noted in the Introduction to this article, serious data 
breaches and outages have been reported in 2011 concerning 
cloud computing services offered or used by several major vendors 
such as Google, Amazon, and Sony.  Although the vendors 
acknowledge that such incidents are regrettable and try to play 
down their significance, the consequences from security breaches, 
to cloud and non-cloud computing systems, appear to be growing 
in severity, financial cost, and reputational damage.208  Sony, for 
 
 204. Steve Hamm, Cloud Computing’s Big Bang for Business, BUSINESSWEEK, Jun. 
15, 2009, at 44. 
 205. Richard Waters, Rogue Code Led to Gmail Shutdown, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/c5dd4574-06a3-11de-ab0f 
-000077b07658.html#axzz1QoIjDiB7. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. One of the most costly breaches to date involved the March 2011 breach 
by an advanceMD persistent threat attack of RSA’s SecurID two-factor 
authentication tokens reportedly used by “40 million employees to access sensitive 
corporate and government networks.”  Dan Goodin, RSA Breach Leaks Data for 
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example, whose online gaming system is “delivered through the 
cloud,”209 reported that its April 2011 security breach, which 
resulted in the theft of “names, addresses, passwords and possibly 
credit card details of 77m accounts,”210 would probably cost it 
“¥14bn.”211  However, probably the worst adverse consequence for 
data customers is the potential irrevocable loss of data.  Illustrative 
of such a loss is the one that occurred at Ma.gnolia, a cloud 
provider of bookmarking services, (i.e., one that enables customers 
to bookmark web sites and web pages).212  Ma.gnolia revealed in 
February 2009 that it “could not recover” customers’ work “from a 
corrupted database.”  “There was also no recoverable back-up, 
meaning many users would have lost their carefully cultivated 
collections.”213  As one commentator noted:  
We have been led to believe that the advantage of web 
[cloud] services is that they are ubiquitous and always 
available, but instead have discovered that they are 
sometimes difficult to find or have disappeared 
altogether.  
. . . .  
 Data can be lost in the fog of cloud computing, 
whereas with traditional local hard drives and client-based 
software, users have more control over, and responsibility 
for, the data.214 
After Amazon’s April 2011 outage, it was reported that “[s]ome 
 
Hacking SecurID Tokens, THE REGISTER (Mar. 18, 2011, 00:39 GMT), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/18/rsa_breach_leaks_securid_data.  RSA’s 
parent, EMC, disclosed in July 2011 that to deal with the cyber attack it spent $66 
million in second quarter 2011, most of which was devoted to transaction 
monitoring for its corporate customers who were concerned that their RSA 
security tokens had been compromised as a result of the attack.  Hayley 
Tsukayama, Cyber Attack on RSA Cost EMC $66 million, WASH. POST (July 26, 2011, 
4:46 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/cyber-attack-on-
rsa-cost-emc-66-million/2011/07/26/gIQA1ceKbI_blog.html. 
 209. Online Reputations in the Dirt, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2011, at 65. 
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 211. Jonathan Soble, Tax Charge Takes Sony Into $3bn Loss, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/bf4fd94a-8506-11e0-871e-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz1Z1J8FfJ5. 
 212. Michael Calore, Ma.gnolia Suffers Major Data Loss, Site Taken Offline, WIRED 
(Jan. 30, 2009, 12:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/01/magnolia-
suffer. 
 213. Chris Nuttall, Global Crashes Spark Crisis of Confidence, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb4a1fea-0d0d-11de-a555-0000779fd2ac,dwp 
_uuid=b50bc45e-0d16-11de-a555-0000779fd2ac.html. 
 214. Id. 
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data seem to have been lost permanently.”215 
Data that becomes temporarily inaccessible can have profound 
consequences for a lawyer or law firm whose clients need work 
performed urgently.  Delays in getting to data can translate into 
serious disadvantages for the client’s interests in a negotiated 
transaction or in the midst of time-pressured trial or arbitration 
preparations.  Data that is released or made available to 
unauthorized persons could compromise client confidentiality or 
result in waivers of privilege.  It may also deprive a client of 
enforceable trade secrets, or if the data was subject to the attorney-
client privilege, it might result in a waiver of the privilege.  Such 
issues would require investigation if a cloud provider lost control 
over access to data it stores for customers, which occurred with 
Google Docs in March 2009.  As Google disclosed to certain Google 
Docs customers, a glitch allowed unauthorized shared access to 
certain documents stored online with Google Docs: 
We’ve identified and fixed a bug which may have caused 
you to share some of your documents without your 
knowledge.  This inadvertent sharing was limited to people 
with whom you, or a collaborator with sharing rights, had 
previously shared a document . . . . The issue only occurred 
if you, or a collaborator with sharing rights, selected 
multiple documents and presentations from the documents 
list and changed the sharing permissions.  This issue 
affected documents and presentations, but not 
spreadsheets.216
 
v. Ethical Issues 
If a lawyer or law firm is considering the use of a public cloud 
for storage or processing of records that include confidential client 
information, certain precautions are advisable in order to protect 
the client’s interests and to ensure compliance with the NYRPC and 
the MRPC.  Because outsourcing such functions can reduce the 
extent to which a law firm customer can be sure of continuous 
access to such data, it also may increase the risk that the law firm 
might fall short of complying with NYRPC Rule 1.1(a) to “provide 
competent representation” and NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2): [A] lawyer 
shall not intentionally . . . prejudice or damage the client during 
 
 215. Online Reputations in the Dirt, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2011, at 65. 
 216. Stephen Shankland, Google Docs Suffers Privacy Glitch, CNET (Mar. 9, 2009, 
7:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/google-docs-suffers-privacy-glitch. 
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the course of the representation . . . .”217 
The NYRPC does not define “intentionally.”  However, it gives 
the following interpretive guidance for the use of the word 
“knowingly”: “A person’s knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances.”218  Similarly, it would be reasonable to infer a 
lawyer’s intentions “from circumstances.”  If circumstances 
surrounding a law firm’s selection of a cloud provider evidence a 
clear lack of care for widely publicized risks such as temporary loss 
of access to data, the law firm could arguably be viewed as taking 
the risk of prejudicing or damaging the client in breach of NYRPC 
Rule 1.1(c)(2).  Suppose a law firm engages the services of a public 
cloud provider that a due diligence review would have revealed to 
be an unreliable vendor or provider of unreliable access to data.  
The law firm could be at risk of appearing to have acted with 
insufficient care for its client’s interests.  Suppose that as a result of 
such engagement, the law firm found itself for a period of time 
unable to gain access to a client’s documents stored in the cloud.  
The firm could then be at risk of having breached not only NYRPC 
Rule 1.1(c)(2), but also NYRPC Rule 1.3(a) and 1.3(b), which 
provide that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client” and “[a] lawyer shall not 
neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”219 
The “competent representation” requirement in the MRPC 
contains far less detail than NYRPC Rule 1.1.  MRPC Rule 1.1 
merely states that “a lawyer shall provide competent 
representation,” which “requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”220  Thus, as previously discussed, MRPC Rule 1.1 
provides no requisite mental limitations for competent 
representation, perhaps inferring the broader reach of the 
MRPC.221  Consequently, a lawyer who fails to take reasonable care 
to investigate the risks involved with a particular cloud provider 
 
 217. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R.1.1 (2011). 
 218. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “knowingly” as “with knowledge; 
consciously; intelligently; willfully; intentionally.  An individual acts ‘knowingly’ 
when he acts with awareness of the nature of his conduct.”  BLACK’S LAW 
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Labor, 649 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (defining “knowingly” as when 
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 219. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.3(a)–(b) (2011). 
 220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007). 
 221. See supra Part III. 
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might similarly have violated MRPC Rule 1.1.  As a result, lawyers or 
firms seeking to utilize cloud providers must review the vendors to 
ensure that their services are both reliable and secure. 
vi. Considerations and Precautions 
Lawyers and law firms may need to choose between adoption 
of a public cloud service (and carefully examining the provider) or 
postponing such adoption until the technology is mature, proven, 
and reliable.  Firms considering use of a public cloud should 
conduct a thorough due diligence review of the cloud service 
provider.  The review might examine the service provider in light 
of the inherent risks of any public cloud.  Such a review also might 
explore how the service provider would respond to incidents 
involving the shutdown of the system or inability to provide the law 
firm access to its client’s confidential information. 
If the law firm was outsourcing storage of hard copy to a 
domestic or overseas warehouse, it would be prudent to question 
the warehouse operator about its experience with an inability to 
provide access to documents on short notice.  Similarly, a law firm 
should question a cloud provider about all outages it has 
experienced, what back-up copies it makes (if any), and what 
formal written policies and procedures it has for detecting loss of 
access to electronic records and for responding to temporary loss 
of access to records stored in its servers.222  The firm also should 
negotiate terms of service that require the cloud vendor to assist 
the firm in fulfilling its duties to collect, preserve, and produce a 
client’s electronic records under applicable e-discovery rules. 
It may appear unrealistic to expect that major cloud providers 
such as Google, Microsoft, IBM, and Amazon will cooperate with 
any request for such a due diligence review and negotiate terms of 
service based on that review’s findings.  However, if law firms were 
to weigh the risks to their clients, their reputations, and their 
compliance with the NYRPC or the MRPC, the need to conduct a 
due diligence review could appear compelling.  In addition, a 
cloud vendor’s refusal to assist counsel in fulfilling its e-discovery 
obligations could expose lawyers and clients to sanctions. 
 
 222. See, e.g., Contract Between the City of Los Angeles and Computer Science 
Corporation for the SAAS E-Mail and Collaboration Solution (SECS), City of L.A. 
Inter-Departmental Correspondence (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http:// 
www.infolawgroup.com/uploads/file/City%20of%20Los%20Angeles%20and%20
CSC-Google%20Contract%281%29.pdf (explaining prudent procedures 
regarding the implementation of a cloud computing system). 
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Moreover, the New York State Bar Association’s Committee on 
Professional Ethics (NYSBA Ethics Committee), in a 2008 opinion 
on the use of an e-mail service provider that scans e-mails for 
advertising purposes, cautioned that “[a] lawyer must exercise due 
care in selecting an e-mail service provider to ensure that its 
policies and stated practices protect client confidentiality.”223  
Complying with the guidance in the NYSBA’s 2008 opinion will 
now be particularly difficult because Yahoo! and Google use or 
have used terms of service that allow them to scan the contents of 
outgoing and incoming e-mails.224  A New York disciplinary body 
might expect a comparable exercise of due care by a lawyer or a law 
firm in selecting a public cloud service provider. 
Similarly, the ABA has cautioned lawyers to investigate the 
security of a provider’s premises and network before outsourcing 
any client services.225  Particularly where confidential information is 
at stake, a lawyer must “recognize and minimize” the risk that a 
service provider could reveal client information to unauthorized 
parties.226  The ABA opinion suggests that a written confidentiality 
agreement be drafted to prevent wrongful disclosure—a precaution 
that might be difficult if utilizing the services of a large cloud 
provider.227 
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 227. Id.  The ABA Opinion emphasizes that “[w]ritten confidentiality 
agreements are, therefore, strongly advisable in outsourcing relationships.”  Id.  
However, the ABA Opinion adds a recommendation that would be difficult for 
major customer law firms to follow if the same cloud vendor provided services to 
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risk of potentially wrongful disclosure, the outsourcing lawyer should verify that 
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view, then it would appear that the reasonable inference to be drawn is that it may 
well be impracticable for large law firms, if not any law firms, to store client 
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Reasonable care in the selection of a cloud vendor may not be 
sufficient to protect a client’s interests to the extent we believe may 
be required by MRPC Rule 1.1 or the NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2) to 
avoid intentionally damaging a client’s interests. 
The security risks and ethical challenges involved in the 
decision to rely on a public cloud are substantially greater than 
those faced by law firms when they elected to adopt e-mail 
communications.  Some of the most costly lessons learned from the 
reliance on e-mail communications came from mistakes that were 
easy for lawyers to make and that had sometimes irreversible 
consequences.228  Selection of a trustworthy e-mail service provider 
may not have averted such mistakes, but such mistakes are 
 
confidential data with a major cloud computing service provider and to follow the 
ABA Opinion’s recommendation. 
 228. As John Barkett perceptively observed: 
I do not know of a lawyer who has not suffered from Microsoft Outlook’s 
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not scroll down for the list of potential recipients to identify the intended 
addressee.  This failure to protect a client confidence is usually 
immediately remedied by the recipient who responds: “I don’t think you 
intended this e-mail for me.  I am immediately destroying it.”  After 
sending a “thank you” e-mail, the sender will resolve to be more careful: 
After all, Rule 1.6 is prescriptive unless the lawyer has received the 
client’s informed consent to make the disclosure. 
JOHN M. BARKETT, THE ETHICS OF E-DISCOVERY 43 (2009).  There are several 
examples of irreversible mistakes which led to a waiver of privilege because 
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2009 WL 798044 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2009) (“[W]hen an 
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such correspondence is generally not protected by the attorney client 
privilege if the employer maintains a policy warning its employees that E-mail 
correspondence from company issued E-mail accounts are subject to 
review.”); see also Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. 
Ct. 2007) (holding that e-mails between a hospital employee and his personal 
attorneys were not privileged because employer’s policy regarding computer 
use and e-mail monitoring stated that employees had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mails sent over the employer’s e-mail server); In re 
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding a 
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question of whether the party waived their attorney-client privilege in that 
regard); Kaufman v. SunGard Invest. Sys., No. 05-cv-1236, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28149 (D.N.J. May 9, 2006). 
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sometimes foreseeable if one takes the time to consider ways in 
which lawyers working under time pressures might err in their 
manipulation of a computer and program software.  Sending an e-
mail to the wrong recipient, which almost every e-mail user has 
done, is an example of this type of error.  The mistakes occurred, 
nonetheless.  And if compared to similar mistakes made with the 
earlier communications technology of facsimile transmittals, the 
consequences were much greater and the mistakes were far easier 
to make. 
For example, a confidential document could be faxed to an 
unintended recipient by misdialing a number (a risk somewhat 
reduced as fax machines were developed with a capacity to store 
numbers).  The number of misdirected transmittals when such a 
mistake occurred was usually one, or only a few, serious and 
potentially costly errors, but one that seldom caused the transmittal 
to compromise a client’s interests, provided that the recipient was 
not a party with interests adverse to the client’s.  Often the 
misdirected document arrived at an office with no relationship to 
the matter whatsoever, and the recipient would cooperate with 
efforts by the sender to mitigate the damage (such as destroying 
the document without making any use of it).  Misdirected 
transmittals by e-mail have tended to cause far larger and more 
serious problems.229  Instead of one unintended recipient, there 
may be many.  Instead of transmittals to a randomly misdialed 
number, the misdirected transmittals have often gone to recipients 
whose addresses are automatically suggested by the software.230  
Because counsel often corresponds by e-mail to opposing counsel, 
there is a heightened risk (however implausible it may seem) of an 
inadvertent transmittal to parties with interests adverse to those of 
the client.  Because security risks and risks from breaches of 
confidentiality from use of public clouds could be even greater 
than those experienced with e-mail, the lessons learned from 
 
 229. See, e.g., Joseph R. Chenelly, Misdirected Email Doomed Convoy, 
MILITARY.COM (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.military.com/news/article/misdirected-
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e-mail misdirected to an individual with the same surname as the intended 
recipient).  Indeed, as this article was in its final drafting, one of the authors 
received a misdirected e-mail from a former employee of an organization on 
whose board the recipient serves that contained information personal to the 
employee. 
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adoption of e-mail technologies should be viewed as useful, but less 
than the minimum, precautions a law firm should take when 
deciding whether and when or to what extent to rely on a public 
cloud for software services and document storage. 
A helpful guide for considerations appropriate for e-mail 
technologies can be found in a 2008 opinion by the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York’s Committee on Professional and 
Judicial Ethics (ABCNY Ethics Committee) on the subject of “A 
Lawyer’s Ethical Obligations to Retain and to Provide a Client with 
Electronic Documents Relating to a Representation” (Opinion 
2008-1).231  Opinion 2008-1 summarized certain substantive 
changes in the realities of law practice in the digital era: 
Lawyers routinely use e-mail to formally convey important 
information and documents to clients, colleagues, and 
other counsel. Just as routinely, lawyers use e-mail to 
conduct informal conversations. In many law practices, 
lawyers are as likely to send an e-mail as to pick up the 
telephone or walk down the hall to a colleague’s office. 
 The growing reliance by lawyers on digital 
technology, of course, is not limited to e-mails. Virtually 
all correspondence, transactional documents, and court 
filings originate as electronic documents . . . . In addition, 
many lawyers and law firms, taking advantage of widely 
available document imaging technology, convert their 
paper records into electronic documents for 
organizational and storage purposes.232
 
In light of those changes in practice, the ABCNY Ethics 
Committee believed “it would be useful to address some of the 
ethical issues implicated by a lawyer’s reliance on e-mails and other 
electronic documents.”233  On the issue of a client’s access to 
electronic records, the ABCNY Ethics Committee did not believe 
that “a lawyer has any ethical obligation to organize electronic 
documents in any particular manner, or to store those documents 
in any particular storage medium.”234  But it added an important 
caution: “From an ethical standpoint, a lawyer should ensure that 
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the manner of organization and storage does not (a) detract from 
the competence of the representation or (b) result in the loss of 
documents that the client may later need and may reasonably 
expect the lawyer to preserve.”235 
Because public clouds have been temporarily shut down,236 
and the risks of additional shutdowns will likely persist, and possibly 
grow, if the occurrences of cyberattacks increase, law firms arguably 
should not rely incautiously on a public cloud.  Law firms already 
should know not to rely solely on storage of electronic records on 
the computer used to create them, that backups are needed, and 
that on-site and off-site storage of backups are prudent measures.  
Law firms should endeavor to ensure that they do not relinquish 
the only current copies of any client confidential information to a 
public cloud.  Nor should they do so for any copies of client related 
documents that might be needed urgently to provide the client 
with competent representation consistent with the requirements of 
NYRPC Rules 1.1(a) and (c). 
Unfortunately, there is also the risk that law firms may be 
persuaded by a cloud provider’s promised benefits and fail to take 
certain reasonable precautions.  For example, if a law firm retains a 
digital copy on its premises of all data stored in the cloud, it might 
sacrifice some of the benefits of outsourcing storage but retain the 
ability to protect its clients’ documents.  The representations for 
Google Docs all but discourage such precautions by stating: 
Because Google Docs saves to a secure, online storage 
facility, you can create documents, spreadsheets and 
presentations without the need to save to your local hard 
drive.  You can also access your documents from any 
computer.  In the event of a local hard drive crash, you 
won’t lose your saved content. 
 While we can’t give you exact figures, please be 
assured that we back up data almost as often as you can 
change it.237 
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words: “You can also access your documents from any computer.  In the event of a 
local hard drive crash, you won’t lose your saved content.  While we can’t give you 
exact figures, please be assured that we back up data almost as often as you can 
change it.”  Google substituted the following: “Your presentation will begin saving 
within Google Docs almost as soon as you begin entering text.”  Create and Save a 
Presentation, GOOGLE , http://docs.google.com/support/bin/answer 
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In light of the potential ethical issues, including the problem 
noted below, that can arise if a cloud computing service agreement 
places the responsibility for security of a customer’s data on the 
individual or organization that sent the information to the cloud, 
lawyers and law firms might well be reluctant to rely too much on 
this assurance. 
The ABCNY Ethics Committee Opinion 2008-1 also 
recommended a step that many firms may be reluctant to take, but 
that warrants strong consideration: disclosure to, and discussion 
with, the client.  Large firms with large numbers of clients may well 
find such disclosure and discussion particularly burdensome and 
potentially risky if some clients concur in the use of a public cloud 
and others resist it.  As explained in Opinion 2008-1 (in the context 
of e-mail, but applicable also to the public cloud), such disclosure 
and discussion recognizes that a client may be entitled to know of 
the risks at the start of the engagement and to reflect a shared 
understanding of safeguards in the letter of engagement: 
In light of the exponential growth in e-mails and other 
electronic documents, and the pace of technological 
change involving the organization and storage of 
electronic documents, it may be prudent for a lawyer and 
client to discuss the retention, storage, and retrieval of 
electronic documents at the outset of an engagement.  
Lawyer and client may find it worthwhile to discuss and 
reach agreement at the outset on issues such as (i) the 
types of e-mail and other electronic documents that the 
lawyer needs to retain, given the nature of the 
engagement; (ii) how the lawyer will organize those 
documents; (iii) the types of storage media the lawyer 
intends to employ; (iv) the steps the lawyer will take to 
make e-mail and other electronic documents available to 
the client, upon request, during or at the conclusion of 
the representation; and (v) any additional fees and 
expenses in connection with the foregoing . . . . [T]hose 
costs should accord with the lawyer’s customary fee 
schedule and must not be excessive.  By raising these 
issues at the outset of the representation, perhaps as part of 
the engagement letter, a lawyer and a client will be able to 
make informed decisions about the appropriate manner 
 
.py?hl=en&answer=69074 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).  The authors found no 
redline of the changes to such descriptions or to Google’s Terms of Service.  Thus, 
only by printing and saving the Terms of Service at a moment in time would users 
be able to trace changes in the master agreement most users have with Google. 
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of retention, storage, and retrieval of electronic 
documents to which a client has a presumptive right of 
access.238 
Even stronger cautions appear in the California State Bar 
Opinion No. 2010-179 (Opinion No. 2010-179) on the need to 
inform clients when use of technology may result in a heightened 
risk to their data.  The opinion examined an attorney’s duties when 
using technology to transmit or store confidential client 
information when such technology “may be susceptible to 
unauthorized access by third parties,” describing that “[t]he greater 
the sensitivity of the information, the less risk an attorney should 
take with technology.  If the information is of a highly sensitive 
nature and there is a risk of disclosure when using a particular 
technology, the attorney should consider alternatives unless the 
client provides informed consent.”239 
Among the risks to its data that should be reviewed with a 
client is that of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or 
confidential information or work product that might result in a 
court deciding that such disclosure waived the applicable attorney-
client or attorney work product privilege.  Moreover, as Opinion 
No. 2010-179 noted, even the mere use of an insufficiently secure 
technology without a disclosure could be deemed to have waived 
the privilege: 
[I]t is possible that, if a particular technology lacks 
essential security features, use of such a technology could 
be deemed to have waived these protections.  Where the 
attorney-client privilege is at issue, failure to use sufficient 
precautions may be considered in determining waiver.  
Further, the analysis differs with regard to an attorney’s 
duty of confidentiality.  Harm from waiver of attorney-
client privilege is possible depending on if and how the 
 
 238. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 6 (emphasis added).  The 
Opinion concludes: “In New York, a client has a presumptive right to the lawyer’s 
entire file in connection with a representation, subject to narrow exceptions.”  Id. 
 239. To clarify what it meant by “informed consent,” California State Bar 
Opinion No. 2010-179 explained in a footnote that:  
For the client’s consent to be informed, the attorney should fully advise 
the client about the nature of the information to be transmitted with the 
technology, the purpose of the transmission and use of the information, 
the benefits and detriments that may result from transmission (both legal 
and nonlegal), and any other facts that may be important to the client’s 
decision . . . .  It is particularly important for an attorney to discuss the 
risks and potential harmful consequences of using the technology when 
seeking informed consent. 
California Formal Op. 2010–179, supra note 130, at 5 n.15. 
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information is used, but harm from disclosure of 
confidential client information may be immediate as it 
does not necessarily depend on use or admissibility of the 
information, including as it does matters which would be 
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client 
if disclosed.240 
Prior to 2010, although some state bar associations had issued 
ethics opinions on issues related to a lawyer’s storage of client data 
in a cloud computing platform,241 no New York ethics opinion had 
issued guidance on the ethics of storing client confidential 
information online, which includes storing information in a cloud 
computing vendor’s off-site servers where it would be accessible 
wirelessly.  Lawyers and law firms subject to the NYRPC will find 
instructive the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) Committee 
on Professional Ethics’ Opinion 842 (Opinion 842), issued on 
September 10, 2010.  The opinion addresses whether a lawyer may 
“use an online system to store a client’s confidential information 
without violating the duty of confidentiality or any other duty,” and 
if so, what steps the lawyer should take to “ensure that the 
information is sufficiently secure.”242  Opinion 842 concluded that a 
lawyer “may use an online ‘cloud’ computer data backup system to 
store client files provided that the lawyer takes reasonable care to 
ensure that the [cloud vendor’s] system is secure and that client 
confidentiality will be maintained.”243 
Although that conclusion, as stated, may appear to require that 
“reasonable care” under NYRPC Rule 1.6 must guarantee “that 
client confidentiality will be maintained[,]” that was not the 
Committee’s intended guidance as reflected in its explanation that 
“exercising ‘reasonable care’ under Rule 1.6 does not mean that 
the lawyer guarantees that the information is secure from any 
unauthorized access.”244  Of particular value is the Committee’s 
identification of the steps that a lawyer may take to protect client 
confidential information against unauthorized disclosure, 
including: 
 
 240. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 241. Such ethics opinions include the following:  Alabama State Bar Ass’n, 
Formal Op. 2010–02, supra note 138; California Formal Op. 2010–179, supra note 
130; Nevada State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 33 (2006), available at http://ftp.documation.com/references 
/ABA10a/PDfs/3_12.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 242. New York Op. 842, supra note 94. 
 243. Id. ¶ 9. 
 244. Id. ¶ 5. 
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• Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an 
enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and 
security . . . .; 
• Investigating the online data storage provider’s security 
measures, policies, recoverability methods, and other 
procedures to determine if they are adequate under the 
circumstances;  
• Employing available technology to guard against reasonably 
foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data that is stored[.]245 
Lawyers, however, will probably in the near future find it a 
significant challenge to follow the Committee’s recommendation 
that the data storage provider have “an enforceable obligation to 
preserve confidentiality and security.” 
There are at least three significant obstacles to overcome in order to 
fulfill that obligation in negotiation of a cloud computing service 
level agreement with a major vendor.  The first obstacle is 
identification and understanding of the vulnerability points in a cloud 
platform’s structure and processes; such vulnerability points may be in 
the cloud vendor’s servers, the data customer’s computers and 
networks, or in the communication between those two systems. 
The second obstacle is determining whether the cloud computing 
service vendor or the data customer is ultimately responsible for security 
under the terms of their service level agreement.  Although marketing 
language on a vendor’s website will usually offer assurances 
concerning the security of data stored on its cloud servers, a careful 
examination of the vendor’s standard service level agreement 
usually reveals that the vendor disclaims responsibility and declares 
it the data customer’s responsibility.  For example, Amazon offers 
the following assurance concerning security of its EC2 cloud 
service: “Secure – Amazon EC2 provides numerous mechanisms for 
securing your computer resources”246 and Amazon supports that 
assurance with a referral to a link to its security white paper, 
entitled Amazon Web Services: Overview of Security Process.247  However, 
those assurances are undercut and the responsibility for security is 
firmly placed on the data customer by the standard Amazon Web 
Services Customer Agreement, which asserts that while Amazon 
“will implement reasonable and appropriate measures designed to 
help you secure Your Content against accidental or unlawful loss, access or 
 
 245. Id. ¶ 9. 
 246. Amazon Elastic Computer Cloud (Amazon EC2), supra note 155. 
 247. Id. 
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disclosure,”248the ultimate responsibility for security rests with you—
the data customer: 
4. Your Responsibilities 
. . . . 
4.2 Other Security and Backup.  You are responsible for 
properly configuring and using the Service Offerings and 
taking your own steps to maintain appropriate security, 
protection and backup of Your Content, which may 
include the use of encryption technology to protect Your 
Content from unauthorized access and routine archiving 
Your Content.249 
Amazon is not unique among cloud computing vendors in its 
insistence that the data customer accept responsibility for security 
of its data stored on Amazon’s cloud servers that Amazon has 
exclusive custody of and over which Amazon exercises exclusive 
control.  Although it may seem paradoxical that cloud service 
vendors offer to be bailees of a data customer’s digital assets and 
yet refuse to be responsible for the security of such data while in 
their servers, on their premises, and under their control, that 
appears to be the emerging standard (at least for data customers 
who lack the leverage to negotiate a different allocation of 
responsibilities for data security).  One of the major criticisms 
directed at cloud vendors in the aftermath of the data security 
incidents in the second quarter of 2011 is the insufficiency of 
security provided by the cloud vendors for the customer’s data: 
The biggest complaint in the wake of recent data 
breaches, whether it’s Sony or Epsilon, has centered on 
the lack of security controls in place to protect customer 
data.  A recent Ponemon Institute report found that cloud 
providers don’t think that’s their job. 
 A shocking 73 percent of U.S. service providers and 
75 percent of their European counterparts said their 
cloud services did not substantially protect and secure 
their customers’ confidential or sensitive information, 
according to the recent Security of Cloud Computing 
Providers report from the Ponemon Institute.  Nearly 62 
percent of U.S. providers and 63 percent of European 
providers were not confident that their cloud applications 
and resources were secure.  
 
 248. Amazon Web Services Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated Aug. 23, 2011) (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement]. 
 249. Id. § 4.2. 
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. . . . 
 A majority of the surveyed [cloud] vendors don’t 
even have dedicated security personnel to oversee the 
security of their applications, infrastructure or platform, 
the report found.  On average, providers allocated 10 
percent or less of their resources to address security.250 
Such findings suggest that obtaining an enforceable 
agreement from a cloud service vendor to be responsible for the 
security of a customer’s data could prove a formidable challenge. 
The third obstacle is that cloud computing vendors tend to include in 
their service level agreements the right to suspend a customer’s access to its 
data as a remedy triggered by the vendor’s sole determination that the data 
customer is the source of a security risk.251  Although suspending a 
customer’s access to its data does not constitute a direct violation of 
the confidentiality and security of such data, it renders both 
concepts rather hollow since the same agreement both makes the 
customer responsible for security of its data in the cloud computing 
vendor’s servers and gives the vendor the right to suspend 
customer access to such data, making it impossible thereafter for 
the customer to monitor or otherwise protect such data.  An 
example of such a provision, in the August 2011 Amazon Web 
Services Agreement, states: 
We may suspend your or any End User’s right to access or 
use any portion or all of the Service Offerings immediately 
upon notice to you if we determine: (a) your or an End 
User’s use of the Service Offerings (i) poses a security risk 
to the Service Offerings or any third party, (ii) may 
adversely impact the Service Offerings or the systems or 
Content of any other AWS customer, or (iii) may subject 
us, our affiliates, or any third party to liability . . . .252 
A noteworthy omission from such agreements further 
compounds the problem: there is no undertaking by the cloud 
computing vendor that it will provide the data customer with any 
notice of a security breach that might have affected the customer’s 
 
 250. Fahmida Y. Rashid, Cloud Service Providers Say Data Security ‘Not My Job’: 
Study, EWEEK (May 7, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Cloud-Service-
Providers-Say-Data-Security-Not-My-Job-Study-381728 (noting that cloud providers 
are in the business of giving their customers what they want). 
 251. See, e.g., Legal Cloud Services Agreement, LOGICWORKS, § 4, http://www 
.logicworks.net/legal/cloud-services-agreement (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (giving 
the vendor the right to suspend the customer’s access to his or her own data). 
 252. August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 6.1(a). 
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data.253  As a result, there is also no requirement that the vendor 
alert the customer to the need to take precautions to protect its 
data or its enterprise from unauthorized use of its data or that the 
vendor give the customer any information of the kind of attack, the 
vulnerability it exploited, or other information that would be 
crucial to a customer.  The precautions are not only for the data 
protection, but in order to ensure that it complies with applicable 
laws and regulations that might require it to give notice to third 
parties that their data too may have been affected by the security 
breach.254  Also omitted from cloud service agreements are any 
grants of rights to the data customer to audit the vendor’s 
maintenance of security or to gain access to the vendor’s premises 
and to interview its staff in order to investigate a security breach. 
If such serious omissions are not corrected in the negotiated 
definitive service agreement between a cloud computing vendor 
and a lawyer or law firm, then counsel may find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to fulfill other important obligations required by 
Opinion 842 which cautions: 
[T]he lawyer should periodically reconfirm that the 
[cloud] provider’s security measures remain effective in 
light of advances in technology.  If the lawyer learns 
information suggesting that the security measures used by 
the online data storage provider are insufficient to 
adequately protect the confidentiality of client 
information, or if the lawyer learns of any breach of 
confidentiality by the online storage provider, then the 
lawyer must investigate whether there has been any 
breach of his or her own clients’ confidential information, 
notify any affected clients, and discontinue use of the 
service unless the lawyer receives assurances that any 
security issues have been sufficiently remediated.255 
In that passage, the standards set for a New York lawyer or law 
firm would appear to be significantly higher than those described 
in the ethics opinions on cloud computing by other states’ bar 
associations, the ABA, and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20.256  
 
 253. See, e.g., id. (illustrating that the vendor does not have to inform its 
customer of a security breach). 
 254. Cf. Peter Fretty, Turbulence in the Clouds, PETERFRETTY.COM (Feb. 25, 2011), 
http://www.peterfretty.com/2011/02/25/turbulence-in-the-clouds (explaining 
precautions taken by cloud computing vendors and the purpose of these 
precautions). 
 255. New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶ 10. 
 256. See Cloud Computing Among Issues of Ethics 20/20 Hearing in Atlanta, ABA 
(Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/02/cloud-computing-among-
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The obligations to ensure that counsel receive prompt notice of a 
security breach, that counsel can effectively investigate such breach, 
and that counsel “discontinue use of the service” if the vendor fails 
to provide assurances that “any security issues have been sufficiently 
remediated” arguably create a potential Armageddon scenario if 
counsel have not negotiated a cloud computing service agreement 
that contains provisions that would avert such an outcome.257  
Moreover, the considerable disruption of work and the resulting 
financial and reputational costs that would ensue from counsel 
having to discontinue use of cloud computing services (and 
notifying any affected clients) after having become dependent 
upon such services would appear to set a very high entry barrier for 
New York lawyers and law firms that might be considering moving 
client confidential data from onsite computers to a cloud 
computing server.  We doubt whether fulfillment of Ethics Opinion 
842 obligations would be possible under the customer service 
agreements that cloud computing service vendors currently have 
posted on their web sites as their standard terms and conditions.  
Therefore, if a lawyer or law firm does not negotiate appropriate 
modifications of such agreements to ensure that they have the 
means to achieve such compliance, they would appear to be 
putting themselves in potential conflict with their ethical 
obligations under the NYRPC rules as interpreted by Ethics 
Opinion 842.258  However, it should also be noted that Ethics 
Opinion 842 might also provide a lawyer or law firm with leverage 
in negotiations with a cloud computing vendor, since such opinion 
could be cited as an applicable standard that a vendor would need 
to ensure that a data customer lawyer or law firm could fulfill under 
any definitive cloud computing service level agreement. 
Continued occurrences of data breaches that affect cloud 
computing services would probably also further raise the ethical 
entry barrier for New York lawyers and law firms—and for counsel 
practicing in other jurisdictions that decide to follow or 
incorporate the obligations set forth in Ethics Opinion 842.  
Moreover, Ethics Opinion 842 does not address, and thus leaves 
unclear, whether the ethical obligations it identifies apply also to 
in-house counsel of government agencies, companies, and financial 
institutions (such as the New York Federal Reserve Bank) whose 
 
issues-of-ethics-2020-hearing-in-atlanta. 
 257. See Rebecca S. Eisner, Clear Skies or Stormy Weather for Cloud Computing: Key 
Issues in Contracting for Cloud Computing Services, 1060 PLI/Pat 393 (2011). 
 258. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.2 (2011). 
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offices are located within New York state.259  To what extent are 
such counsels subject to, or relieved of, obligations identified by 
Ethics Opinion 842 if their employers decide, without consulting 
them, to move the enterprise’s confidential data to a cloud 
computing vendor’s servers?  Clarification of such issues in a future 
NYSBA Ethics Opinion would help avert confusion at a time when 
many enterprises are attempting to decide when, and to what 
extent, to move data of varying sensitivities to the cloud. 
c. Diminished Ability to Locate Faults 
When a firm runs its own network, it tends to develop the 
ability to locate the source of a “crash” or other fault in the system’s 
performance (such as a plummeting pace of performance).  When 
major functions like word processing are outsourced to the cloud, 
it may become quite difficult to determine whether a fault 
originates within the law firm’s networks or within the cloud 
provider’s networks.260  The law firm’s partners can require their IT 
staff to report fully and promptly any problems they have found, 
but depending on the cloud service agreement such reports may 
not be available on demand, or contain complete or sufficiently 
reliable information for the firm to learn the cause of a problem.  
An isolated instance of a complete and prolonged loss of word-
processing capabilities may be important to trace to its cause as 
such losses occur briefly but repeatedly.261 
The significance of the ability to locate faults in the cloud 
becomes clearer when one considers that the architecture of a 
cloud service provider and its reliance on multiple entities make 
the cloud increasingly likely to have vulnerabilities and the rich 
store of sensitive data in the cloud is a highly attractive target for 
cyber-exploitation.262  John Harauz explains the cloud architecture 
vulnerabilities as follows: 
Clouds can comprise multiple entities, and in such a 
 
 259. See New York Op. 842, supra note 94. 
 260. See Matthew A. Verga, Cloudburst: What Does Cloud Computing Mean to 
Lawyers, 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 41, 46 (2010) (“Depending on the service 
provider chosen and the configuration of its facilities, the data could be in one 
facility or several, and the facilities could be almost anywhere in the world.  Where 
the data is located will dictate the laws to which it is subject.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Jack Newton, Putting Your Practice in the Cloud a Pre-Flight Checklist, 
73 TEX. B.J. 632 (2010). 
 262. See, e.g., Harauz, Kaufman & Potter, supra note 146, at 63 (discussing that 
if a cybercriminal finds out the identity of a vulnerable cloud computing provider, 
then it becomes an easy target). 
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configuration, no cloud can be more secure than its 
weakest link.  If a cybercriminal can identify the provider 
whose vulnerabilities are the easiest to exploit, then this 
entity becomes a highly visible target.  The lack of security 
associated with this single entity threatens the entire cloud 
in which it resides.  If not all cloud providers supply 
adequate security measures, then these clouds will 
become high-priority targets for cybercriminals.  By their 
architecture’s inherent nature, clouds offer the 
opportunity for simultaneous attacks to numerous sites, 
and without proper security, hundreds of sites could be 
comprised [sic] through a single malicious activity.263 
Moreover, if the cloud provider does not implement 
encryption of data at rest in its servers or has a breach of security 
concerning the encryption’s keys, then the principle of “access to 
one gives access to all” will apply and multiply the risks to all 
customers’ data.  Put differently, a cloud that has not been 
optimized for security (for the customer’s benefit) will be likely to 
have been inadvertently optimized for a breach (for the attacker’s 
benefit): 
The best case (from an attacker’s standpoint) is when the 
same vulnerability exists at all levels within large 
interconnected systems, where “redundant” resources can 
be compromised, resulting in cascading effects.  This 
situation could allow an adversary to very quickly 
commandeer a large and diverse population of systems, as 
has been witnessed in various worm outbreaks over the 
past few years.264 
With such risks in mind, consider the U.S. intelligence 
community’s 2009 annual threat assessment with respect to cyber-
exploitation (a term that “refers to the penetration of adversary 
computers and networks to obtain information for intelligence 
purposes . . . .”):265 
 
 263. See id. 
 264. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF 
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 157–58 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12651&page=R1. 
 265. Id. at IX.  The report explains: 
Cyberexploitations do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a 
computer system or network from the user’s point of view—indeed, the 
best cyberexploitation is one that such a user never notices. 
. . . .  
. . . [I]f the targeted party does not know that its secret information has 
been revealed, it is less likely to take countermeasures to negate the 
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A growing array of state and non-state adversaries are 
increasingly targeting—for exploitation and potentially 
disruption or destruction—our information 
infrastructure, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers in critical 
industries.  Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity 
has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more 
serious.  The Intelligence Community expects these 
trends to continue in the coming year.266
 
 
i. Ethical Issues 
The ethical issues discussed in the context of public cloud 
instabilities are much the same as those raised by a law firm’s 
diminished ability to locate faults.  They differ, however, in one 
important respect: with diminished ability to locate faults comes a 
diminished ability to mitigate adverse consequences and to avert 
reoccurrences.  The diminished ability to mitigate and avert 
consequences and reoccurrences may implicate a law firm’s ability 
to provide competent representation.267 
Here again, a review of the cloud provider’s Terms of Service 
may reveal that the magnitude of risks and the probability of their 
manifestation in the cloud are greater than customers might 
anticipate.  Enhanced risks and probabilities of problems will likely 
affect a law firm’s assessment of the ethical issues.  For example, the 
2009 Google Docs Terms of Service contain, in the “Exclusion of 
Warranties,” a provision that raises such risks and probabilities with 
respect to a law firm’s need to know the location and nature of 
faults that develop in the operation of the cloud: 
14.3 IN PARTICULAR, GOOGLE, ITS SUBSIDIARIES 
AND AFFILIATES, AND ITS LICENSORS DO NOT 
REPRESENT OR WARRANT TO YOU THAT: . . . 
(C) ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED BY YOU AS A 
RESULT OF YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES WILL BE 
ACCURATE OR RELIABLE, AND 
(D) THAT DEFECTS IN THE OPERATION OR 
FUNCTIONALITY OF ANY SOFTWARE PROVIDED TO 
 
compromise. 
Id. at 11, 151. 
 266. DENNIS C. BLAIR, ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMITTEE FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 39 (Feb. 12, 
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The 2011 text of the same section 14.3 replicates the 
warranties from 2009.269 
Thus, under the standard Terms of Service, there appears to 
be no assurance that a customer would be given any explanation of 
faults in the system.  Moreover, Google disclaims any responsibility 
to correct “defects in the operation or functionality” of the cloud 
software.270  A law firm user might lack the information to know 
whether the fault occurred within its system, in Google’s, or in a 
conflict between software installed on the user’s network and 
software installed in Google’s cloud servers.  Under the Terms of 
Service, a law firm would also have no right to require Google to 
attempt to correct faults or defects or any right to require Google 
to attempt to mitigate the damage to the law firm customer.271  
These represent potentially significant negatives that could make 
the promised potential cost reductions, scalability of computing 
power, and ubiquitous access appear transitory or illusory in the 
long term. 
Moreover, while a commercial enterprise may decide it can 
accept the tradeoffs of potential benefits and potential risks, a law 
firm’s fiduciary relationships with each of its clients and its ethical 
obligations—under NYRPC Rule 1.1(a) to provide “competent 
representation”272 and Rule 1.1(c) to “not intentionally . . . 
prejudice or damage the client during the course of the 
representation,”273 may change the calculus of such assessments.  
The disclaimers may increase the law firm’s need to take 
precautions in order to avoid seeming to “intentionally” disregard 
the risks of damage to the client that could arise if faults in the 
cloud remained uncorrected. 
MRPC Rule 1.1’s competency requirement provides an 
obligation analogous to that in NYRPC Rule 1.1(a).274  Providing 
competent representation appears to require a law firm to ensure 
 
 268. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, § 14.3(c)–(d) (Apr. 16, 2007), 
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 270. See supra text accompanying note 237; Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, § 14 
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 271. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268. 
 272. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(a) (2011). 
 273. Id. R. 1.1(c). 
 274. Id. R. 1.1(a). 
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that the technologies it utilizes do not hinder a client’s objectives 
through technological faults.  The inability to correct functional 
flaws in a cloud system, particularly those that are recurring, 
arguably detracts from the lawyer’s effectiveness and ultimately 
could harm the client’s fiduciary interests by imposing additional 
costs or by delaying action necessary to the advancement of the 
case. 
Similarly, NYRPC Rule 1.1(c) may find an analogue in MRPC 
Rule 1.3’s diligence requirement.  MRPC Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer 
to act with “reasonable diligence” in representing a client.275  
Diligence requires a lawyer to pursue a client’s interests despite any 
obstacles that may arise.276  The essence of MRPC Rule 1.3 is that 
lawyers take “whatever lawful and ethical measures are required” to 
ensure that the client’s objectives are achieved and to ensure that 
the client is not prejudiced through the lawyer’s dilatory actions.  
Arguably, an inability to control the technology through which 
client information is processed could be construed as a failure to 
pursue the client’s interests through the lawful means available to 
the lawyer. 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
The security risks concerning faults in the cloud, and the lack 
of an obligation to attempt to correct them, heighten the need for 
lawyers and law firms, as prospective customers, to consider 
precautions beyond those noted above in the discussion of cloud 
instabilities.  This may mean having contingency plans to minimize 
the consequences in the event such problems occur.  Such issues 
could be addressed in the Terms of Use, to the extent such terms 
are negotiable.  Law firms also might seek to negotiate whether the 
Terms of Use agreed to with the law firm would be subject to the 
typical practice of online service providers who reserve the right to 
change the terms unilaterally, at any time, and without notice to the 
customer.  Some terms of use or terms of service, such as those for 
Google Docs, not only claim the right to vary the terms unilaterally, 
but also to treat the continued use of the service after such changes 
as acceptance of those changes even though a customer may not 
have been aware of the change because posting of such changes is 
not accompanied by any e-mail notice to the users.277  A law firm 
 
 275. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007). 
 276. See id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 277. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, § 19.2. 
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entering into standard Terms of Use for a public cloud software 
service that gave such rights to the cloud provider might want to 
give careful consideration to the attendant ethical risks, as these 
terms may mean relinquishing the right to review and veto the 
terms (and therefore the risks to be taken with clients’ electronic 
records). 
The Terms of Service for Google Docs make interruption of 
access to a customer’s documents a virtual certainty, given that 
Google requires the customer to agree that Google has the right to 
intentionally interrupt or to disable such access—temporarily or 
permanently: 
4.2 Google is constantly innovating in order to provide the 
best possible experience for its users. You acknowledge 
and agree that the form and nature of the Services which 
Google provides may change from time to time without 
prior notice to you. 
4.3 As part of this continuing innovation, you 
acknowledge and agree that Google may stop (permanently 
or temporarily) providing the Services (or any features within 
the Services) to you or to users generally at Google’s sole 
discretion, without prior notice to you . . . . 
4.4 You acknowledge and agree that if Google disables 
access to your account, you may be prevented from 
accessing the Services, your account details or any files or 
other content which is contained in your account.”278 
The significance of these provisions can readily be understood 
by simply substituting for “any files” the words “any files containing 
client related or client confidential information.”  Instead of 
assessing the probability of temporary loss of access due to a 
random disruption of cloud services, law firms should infer from 
the quoted provisions a near certainty that there will be temporary 
or permanent losses of access “or any features within the services” 
such as, for example, recovery of certain purportedly “saved” 
documents.  Such provisions may make the ethical risks foreseeable 
(rather than speculative) and the need to address them, before 
consenting to terms of service, much more compelling. 
In addition, lawyers and firms should negotiate specifically 
with the cloud provider over rights upon termination of their 
relationship.  Will the lawyer or firm be assured that all electronic 
 
 278. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, §§ 4.2–4.4 (emphasis added).  
These terms are identical in text and formatting to the 2009 version.  2009 Google 
Terms of Service, supra note 270, §§ 4.2–4.4. 
2011] RED SKIES IN THE MORNING 205 
copies will not merely be “deleted” but irrecoverably purged from 
the cloud provider’s servers wherever located?  Will the law firm 
receive a certification that such purging of records has been 
completed?  Unlike the usual experience with an Internet service 
provider where continuation of service tends to be the norm, the 
Google Docs Terms of Service arguably make discontinuation or 
termination of service significantly more likely: 
13.3 Google may at any time, terminate its legal 
agreement with you if: . . . 
(C) the partner with whom Google offered the Services to 
you has terminated its relationship with Google . . . 
(D) Google is transitioning to no longer providing the 
Services to users in the country in which you are [a] 
resident or from which you use the service; or  
(E) the provision of the Services to you by Google is, in 
Google’s opinion, no longer commercially viable.279 
Without special provisions, there is no assurance of retrieval of 
documents stored in Google Docs at the time of termination, or 
any assurance regarding Google’s responsibility concerning the 
purge of records after termination. 
The City of Los Angeles negotiated a cloud service contract 
with Google.  An October 7, 2009 final draft is available.  The draft 
covers some of the contingencies discussed and negotiations 
suggested in this article.280  Thus, we conclude that, with the 
negotiating resources of a major city and possibly of other large 
enterprises, Google may make more favorable terms available to 
customers. 
Another cloud provider, Amazon, has made numerous 
changes to its terms of service on the subjects of post-termination 
services and the retrieval of electronic records in its  “Amazon Web 
Services™ Customer Agreement” (Amazon Agreement) that 
governs its “Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud” (Amazon EC 2).281  
 
 279. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, §13.3. 
 280. Memorandum from Miguel A. Santana, City Admin. Officer, City of Los 
Angeles, to Chair, Budget and Fin. Comm. 9 (Oct. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.infolawgroup.com/uploads/file/City%20of%20Los%20Angeles%20a
nd%20CSC-Google%20Contract%281%29.pdf. 
 281. Compare AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, §§ 6.2(d), 7.3(b), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110703131958/http://aws.amazon.com/agreeme
nt (last updated May 23, 2011) [hereinafter May 2011 AWS Customer Agreement] 
(stating that in the event of suspension, Amazon will “not erase any of Your 
Content . . . except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement”; and in the event of 
termination other than for cause, Amazon will not “erase any of Your Content” 
during the thirty days following termination, and undertakes to allow retrieval of 
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However, the Amazon Agreement only provides for preservation of 
data stored on Amazon EC 2 if the suspension or termination is 
“other than for cause.”282  The October 2010 Amazon Agreement 
provided, to those terminated other than for cause, that: 
(i) we will not take any action to intentionally erase any of 
your data stored on the Services for a period of thirty (30) 
days after the effective date of termination; and (ii) your 
post termination retrieval of data stored on the Services 
will be conditioned on your payment of Service data 
storage charges for the period following termination, 
payment in full of any other amounts due us, and your 
compliance with terms and conditions we may establish 
with respect to such data retrieval.283 
In the October 2010 version of the Amazon Agreement, customers 
suspended or terminated for cause could read a starker warning in 
section 3.7.3 that Amazon would “have no obligation to continue to 
store your data during any period of suspension or termination or 
to permit you to retrieve the same.”  That warning is omitted from 
the August 2011 version of the Agreement, which merely states: 
“[A]ll your rights under this Agreement immediately terminate.”284 
From the provisions of the October 2010 and later versions of 
the Amazon Agreement cited immediately above, the authors infer 
all of the following: 
• Amazon has changed its commitment from one promising that 
it will not “intentionally erase” a customer’s data after an 
other-than-for-cause termination, to one that more forcefully 
promises not to erase data.  In neither the October 2010 nor 
August 2011 versions of the Agreement does Amazon give 
assurance that it will take precautions to protect such data or to 
ensure that post-termination protection will be equal or in any 
way comparable to pre-termination protection. 
• Post-termination “retrieval of data stored” in the cloud is not 
 
content only on payment of charges for post-termination use and other amounts 
due and to provide “the same post termination data retrieval assistance that we 
generally make available to all customers”), with August 2011 AWS Customer 
Agreement, supra note 248, §§ 6.2(d), 7.3(b).  Implicit in the preamble to section 
7.3(a) and (b), respectively, is the fact that termination can be “immediately upon 
notice to you [the customer].”  May 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra. 
 282. AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES § 3.7.2, http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20101029051446/http:/aws.amazon.com/agreement (last 
updated Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement]; August 
2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 7.3(b). 
 283. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7.2. 
 284. August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 7.3(a)(i). 
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unconditional even in terminations other than for cause. It is 
conceivable in the October 2010 and August 2011 versions of 
the Agreement on payment of Service, data storage charges 
post-termination, as well as payment in full of any other 
amounts due before allowing retrieval of data by a customer 
who has not committed a breach.285 
• If Amazon elects to terminate the service, it makes no 
commitments to keeping stored data whatsoever or to allow 
any retrieval of data.  Customers might lose data while they 
attempt to cure the causes that led to the termination. 
• If a law firm customer urgently needed to retrieve client-
related data shortly following termination of the cloud service, 
even if the law firm was willing to pay for the release of the 
data (or for the right to attempt to retrieve it from Amazon’s 
“Elastic Computing Cloud”), any settlement could be “hung 
up” if Amazon itself has not assembled a comprehensive 
invoice at the hour that the law firm needs to retrieve the data. 
• The final condition, the customer’s compliance with “terms 
and conditions we may establish with respect to such data 
retrieval,” asks the customer to consent to terms and 
conditions that are not disclosed at the time of entry into the 
agreement and that may not be disclosed at the moment of 
termination (since the Amazon Agreement does not specify 
when such terms will be disclosed).286  A law firm should 
consider carefully whether it is a reasonable, and reasonably 
defensible, risk to entrust a client’s data to a public cloud with 
such uncertain conditions attaching to its retrieval in the event 
of a termination for convenience by Amazon. 
These are not speculative concerns even in the absence of 
intentional suspension or termination.  As revealed by the 2011 
interruption of service that Amazon suffered, some cloud 
customers were unable to access their data and others suffered a 
permanent loss of data.287  Moreover, whether a client’s data should 
be stored where the bailee could hold it a virtual hostage or imperil 
its recovery is a troubling proposition.  Lawyers and law firms may 
want to address these potential risks in order to avert the possibility 
of an ethical issue arising under the NYRPC requirements for 
 
 285. E.g., id. § 7.3(a)(ii); October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 
3.7.2. 
 286. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, §3.7.2. 
 287. Blodget, supra note 100 (describing how data loss resulting from reliance 
on cloud service providers is catastrophic for small firms). 
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competent representation and avoidance of damage to a client.  
Thus, some lawyers or law firms might find the failure to reach an 
agreement on the handling of such issues a deal breaker with the 
cloud vendor.  Furthermore, if a law firm accepts a cloud vendor’s 
standard service agreement, the firm needs to address the risk that 
vendors typically reserve the right to change the terms of their 
service agreements at any time without prior notice to the 
customer, which could leave a law firm dissatisfied with the 
protections as to its clients’ confidential data.288 
The potential ethical issues are sharper and more difficult to 
address in the event of termination allegedly for cause where the 
law firm customer disputes that it has breached the Amazon 
Agreement.  A termination for default releases Amazon of any 
responsibility for a customer’s data stored in Amazon’s cloud, 
which could imperil a contractually compliant law firm if its client’s 
data become indefinitely inaccessible: “In the Event of [a 
termination for cause, Amazon] shall have no obligation to 
continue to store your data during any period of suspension or 
termination or to permit you to retrieve the same.”289 
The Amazon Agreement uses control over the continued 
storage and retrieval of data as collateral to protect its interests 
without limitation.290  A law firm may endeavor to renegotiate such 
terms and should give consideration to disclosing the resulting 
arrangement with its clients so that the clients may decide whether 
they are willing to allow access to their documents by their counsel 
under these types of conditions.  Of course, if the law firm retained 
a copy of all client documents on its premises in its own computers 
or digital storage media, the ethical risks relating to competent 
representation would diminish substantially. 
On-premises backups do not address the other ethical issues 
inherent in the arrangement proposed by the Amazon Agreement.  
The agreement does not mention in the termination clauses any 
post-termination obligation to either prevent unauthorized access 
to data stored on its cloud by a terminated customer, or to purge 
all copies of such data if a customer requests it (for example, where 
destruction of previously disclosed litigation material is required by 
 
 288. See, e.g., August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, §§ 2.1–2.3, 
12. 
 289. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7.3.  The 
companion provision in the 2009 version was section 3.7.3.  See AWS Customer 
Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://web.archive.org/web/ 20090804041357 
/http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated July 9, 2009). 
 290. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7. 
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settlement agreement).291 
iii. Risks of Noncompliance with E-Discovery Obligations   
 Damage to or loss of client data and documents stored in a 
public cloud can pose an additional ethical risk where the client 
and his or her counsel reasonably anticipate that the client may be 
the subject of a federal government investigation or a party to 
litigation in federal courts, thereby possibly incurring a duty under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 to preserve all potentially 
relevant data and documents, including all electronically stored 
“records.”  Issuance of a “litigation hold” and supervision of its 
implementation has become an increasing concern for counsel as 
courts have, on occasion, viewed counsel as responsible for a 
client’s compliance.292  If such responsibilities are not properly 
handled by counsel or fall short of the standard applied by a court 
in a given case, and the court imposes sanctions for spoliation, 
serious damage to the client’s interests as well as those of the firm 
can result. 
To understand the risks involved, suppose an adversary raises a 
spoliation claim as to documents, stored in a public cloud, 
damaged or lost or belatedly produced because of the cloud 
provider’s failure to preserve the relevant data and documents post-
termination of the law firm’s relationship with the cloud provider.  
Suppose also the court ordered the client to permit an adversary, 
an adversary’s expert, or a government agent to make a “mirror 
image” of hard drives containing the potentially relevant data and 
documents, and such order arguably would apply to hard drives on 
the public cloud provider’s servers.  How would a law firm address 
such issues to ensure fulfillment of duties under Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 37 (Failure to Make Disclosures or to 
Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions), compliance with the court’s 
orders, and avoidance of potential disputes that might arise if other 
customers of the public cloud learned of the order and objected to 
having their client’s data and documents “swept up” and made 
 
 291. Id. § 3. 
 292. F. Brenden Coller, I’m Responsible to Do what? Counsel’s Affirmative Duty to 
Ensure Compliance with Litigation Holds, E-DISCOVERY L. REV. (Aug. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ediscoverylawreview.com/2011/08/articles/im-responsible-to-do-
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(“[C]ourts all over the country have emphasized the duty placed on counsel—
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obligations.”). 
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potentially accessible to third parties and government agents? 
There appears to be a reasonable possibility of other serious 
logistical problems—for counsel and their clients—when 
attempting to address duties to preserve data and documents where 
the electronic copies are stored not on the client’s controlled 
computers or on counsel’s controlled computers, but on servers 
controlled by the public cloud provider.293  Who would be 
responsible for determining the locations of all such servers?  
Cloud providers’ standard agreements typically do not explicitly 
provide for the maintenance of records of all locations of a 
customer’s data or specify the locations where such data will be 
stored or to which it might be transferred.  If a court orders that a 
party deliver a “mirror image” of records stored at a specific 
location, would the law firm customer be entitled to notice that such 
an image was going to be made to obtain data of another customer 
but that might also include the law firm’s client confidential 
information? 
If the law firm in such a scenario had client data stored with 
public cloud provider Soonr, during the first nine months of 2011, 
Soonr’s Terms of Service and End User License Agreement 
provision on termination arguably intensified these risks.  The 
relevant Soonr contract provisions stated: 
Upon cancellation by Soonr or at your direction, you may 
request a file of your data, which Soonr will make 
available for a fee.  You must make such request at the 
notification of cancellation to receive such file within 
thirty (30) days of termination.  Otherwise, ANY DATA 
YOU HAVE STORED ON SOONR’S SYSTEMS MAY 
NOT BE RETRIEVED, and Soonr shall have no 
obligation to maintain any data stored in your account or 
to forward any data to you or any third party.294 
Law firms might find it useful to consider such scenarios and 
 
 293. EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD COMPUTING: BENEFITS, 
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 294. Soonr Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, SOONR, § 10.3, 
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questions as well as the potential breakdowns of public cloud 
service in the context of a firm’s efforts to monitor and supervise a 
client’s compliance with “litigation hold” orders in order to avoid 
potential ethical issues arising under NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2)’s 
requirement to avoid prejudice or damage to the client.295  A lawyer 
or law firm also might want to include in such considerations a 
potential for an ethical issue arising under Rule 1.4(a)(2) that 
requires that a “lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the client 
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 
accomplished.”296 
Such discussions would benefit from a review of the cloud 
provider’s applicable terms of use.  It is reasonable to infer that 
incidents for which the cloud provider expressly disclaims 
responsibility are ones that it believes are reasonably likely to occur.  
For example, the Google Docs Terms of Service and the Amazon 
Agreement each address and, thus, highlight potential incidents 
involving loss of data.  The Google Docs Terms of Service provide 
that: 
YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT 
GOOGLE . . . SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR . . . 
ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE WHICH MAY BE INCURRED 
BY YOU, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OR 
DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF . . . THE DELETION OF, 
CORRUPTION OF, OR FAILURE TO STORE, ANY 
CONTENT AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS DATA 
MAINTAINED OR TRANSMITTED BY OR THROUGH 
YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES.297
 
 
The Amazon Agreement provides: 
We strive to keep Your Content secure, but cannot 
guarantee that we will be successful at doing so, given the 
nature of the Internet.  Accordingly, . . . you acknowledge 
that you bear sole responsibility for adequate security, 
protection and backup of Your Content . . . . We strongly 
encourage you, where available and appropriate, to . . . 
use encryption technology to protect Your Content from 
unauthorized access [and] routinely archive Your 
Content . . . . We will have no liability to you for any 
unauthorized access or use, corruption, deletion, 
destruction or loss of any of Your Content.298
  
 
 295. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(c)(2) (2011). 
 296. Id., § 1200 R. 1.4(a)(2). 
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In preparing for issuance of a “litigation hold” and in its 
implementation, counsel may find it necessary to learn how a 
client’s computers store, backup, and overwrite data and how such 
computers, if they “go on an excursion” or malfunction, could 
cause data to be corrupted, rendered inaccessible to electronic 
searches, or destroyed.  If the law firm or the client has stored 
relevant data and documents on a public cloud, the “litigation 
hold” preparations and discussions may be aided by considering 
the issues that could arise from efforts to preserve and to produce 
records on the public cloud.  Such ethical issues may persist, and 
we return to them later in the discussion of other security risks. 
d. Diminished Control over, and Knowledge of, New Software 
Code 
When a law firm buys a license to use a software product, it can 
decide before making the purchase whether the product has been 
adequately tested and can control the circumstances in which new 
code is added to its computer networks (provided that its defenses 
prevent malware from intruding into its networks).  Because new 
code may not have been tested with all of the code previously 
running on the law firm’s networks, the issue of installing software 
updates (“patches”) has been a difficult challenge for firms.  The 
patch may conflict with other code residing on the firm’s networks, 
causing degradation in performance, corruption of data, or system 
crashes. 
A cloud service provider, however, is not subject to the 
decisions of any one of its customers.  If it wants to load new code 
on its system and if the terms of service do not provide otherwise, it 
can do so without reporting to its customers that (1) such code will 
be installed, (2) certain problems are known to be likely to occur 
with certain existing programs, or (3) after installation certain 
problems have been found to have resulted.  Indeed, cloud 
providers and their supporters often present as a significant benefit 
of a public cloud that customers will all receive security patches 
simultaneously and will not need to involve their IT personnel in 
the process.299  However, the service level agreements of the major 
 
 299. Top Ten Advantages of Google’s Cloud, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com 
/apps/intl/en/business/cloud.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).  Microsoft, for 
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cloud vendors do not, at present, promise that all customers will 
receive each security patch simultaneously, and in the absence of 
such promise a vendor could issue patches gradually or 
incompletely in so-called “roving patches.”300  Of course, it is always 
possible that a buggy patch will affect all customers simultaneously.  
Since there may be no notice to customers that the patch has even 
been installed, the patch can introduce a glitch into a law firm’s 
networks or cause a cascading response of adverse consequences 
that reach beyond the cloud and back to the law firm’s networks.  
In another of its exclusions of warranties, the Google Docs Terms 
of Service disclaim any responsibility for problems introduced by 
such required downloads from the cloud: 
ANY MATERIAL DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE 
OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE SERVICES IS 
DONE AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION AND RISK AND 
THAT YOU WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY 
DAMAGE TO YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER 
DEVICE OR LOSS OF DATA THAT RESULTS FROM 
THE DOWNLOAD OF ANY SUCH MATERIAL.301
  
i. Ethical Issues 
The security risks that arise from the unannounced installation 
of new code are roughly the same as those that arise from cloud 
instability, but with one difference: the corruption or loss of data in 
the cloud, caused by the new code, can migrate back to the law 
firm’s customer and threaten the data stored on its Internet-linked 
computers and digital storage devices.302  If the law firm’s routine 
backup servers are linked directly or indirectly to the Internet, then 
those, too, could be put at risk by new code introduced by the 
cloud provider.  If a lawyer or law firm allows a client’s documents 
to be corrupted, lost, or destroyed, a lawyer or firm may find that 
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they have inadvertently breached their duty to preserve a client’s 
records and files.  The former New York Code of Professional 
Responsibility (Code) and its replacement, the NYRPC, do not 
expressly mandate record-retention requirements except with 
respect to “a small number of discrete documents, such as retainer 
agreements, bills to clients, bank statements, and records of 
transactions in escrow accounts.”303  However, as Opinion 2008-1 
observed (with respect to the Code and that applies with equal 
cogency to the NYRPC): 
The Code . . . contains several provisions that implicitly 
impose on lawyers an obligation to retain documents.  For 
instance, . . . a lawyer has an obligation to represent a 
client competently . . . . Similarly, . . . “[a] lawyer shall not 
intentionally . . . [p]rejudice or damage the client during 
the course of the professional relationship . . . .”  
. . . . 
 As is the case with paper documents, which e-mails 
and other electronic documents a lawyer has a duty to 
retain will depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
representation.  Many e-mails generated during a 
representation are formal, carefully drafted 
communications intended to transmit information, or 
other electronic documents, necessary to effectively 
represent a client, or are otherwise documents that the 
client may reasonably expect the lawyer to preserve.304
 
 
The MRPC do not contain a bookkeeping requirement similar 
to that contained in the NYRPC.  However, in Informal Opinion 
1384, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility stated that while “[a] lawyer does not have a general 
duty to preserve all of his files permanently,” clients have a 
reasonable expectation that valuable information from the lawyer’s 
files “will not be prematurely and carelessly destroyed, to the 
clients’ detriment.”305  Consequently, if a lawyer allows a client’s 
files to be lost or destroyed due to the installation of new code, the 
lawyer or law firm could be at risk of breaching MRPC Rule 1.1 or 
MRPC Rule 1.3.  By failing to account for the possibility of lost files, 
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the law firm has arguably demonstrated a lack of competence by 
not educating itself on the risks that its choice of technology poses 
to client files.  Additionally, in allowing client files to be lost or 
destroyed, the lawyer is subjecting the client to harm, which could 
arguably implicate MRPC Rule 1.3’s diligence standard.306 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
A lawyer and law firm’s chief concern should be to avert the 
loss of all copies of any document of importance to the client’s 
interests.  Opinion 2008-1 reiterated an earlier-expressed view that 
at the end of a representation and “before destroying any 
documents that belong to the client, the lawyer should contact the 
client and ask whether the client wants delivery of those 
documents.”307  It could be difficult for a lawyer or law firm to 
follow that recommendation if it failed to take available 
precautions to avert the destruction of the client’s documents by 
rogue code from a cloud provider. 
e. Diminished Control over, and Knowledge of, Network 
Defenses 
When a law firm sets up its internal network, it can control the 
defenses for that network and the monitoring and reporting of, 
and responses to, unauthorized access (from within the firm) and 
unauthorized intrusions (from outside the firm).  Unless provided 
by express terms in the cloud service agreement, however, such 
control and knowledge probably will be substantially diminished.  
Moreover, unless the cloud service agreement requires it, the law 
firm may be at risk of not receiving any timely reports of a breach 
in the defenses.  Furthermore, a firm may misunderstand the 
 
 306. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Alabama State Bar, 
Ethics Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www.alabar.org/ogc/PDF/2010-
02.pdf (discussing “Retention, Storage, Ownership, Production and Destruction of 
Client Files”); State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009), available at http:// 
www.myazbar.org/ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=704 (discussing “Confidentiality; 
Maintaining Client Files; Electronic Storage; Internet”); Prof’l Ethics of the 
Florida Bar, Op. 06-1 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin 
.nsf/43859e278a5ce05185256b51000b736b/9d8c4cf77b6a54278525718f005ab400?
OpenDocument (discussing electronic storage of client records); New York State 
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 680 (1996), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=49409&Te
mplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (discussing electronic storage of client 
records). 
 307. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 2. 
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defenses that exist in the cloud.  As Forrester analyst Chenxi Want 
noted, “‘[c]loud computing is optimized for performance, 
optimized for resource consumption, and optimized for scalability’. 
. . . ‘It’s not really optimized for security.’”308
  
One reported way in which cloud security has yet to be 
optimized is encryption.  Although many cloud service providers 
offer encryption in transit (while data is moving up to the cloud or 
from the cloud to the customer), the encryption of data at rest 
within the cloud service provider’s servers has prompted questions 
and serious doubts, such as the following: 
• “Data at rest is more complex, and you may have to rely on 
your own resources to encrypt it.”309
 
 
• “[A] request for encryption of stored data goes beyond the 
[cloud service provider] industry standard and may, because of 
technological constraints, degrade the service.”310
 
 
• “Encryption is less reassuring if the [cloud service] provider 
controls the keys.  It gets back to a question of trust and 
verification that the provider is following strict policies 




• There is a fundamental problem with cloud computing that 
uses “virtualization software to partition servers into ‘images’ . . 
. . Although packing those virtual machines into cloud 
providers’ data centers provides a more flexible and efficient 
setup[,] . . . virtual machines suffer from a rarely discussed 
flaw: They don’t always have enough access to the random 
numbers needed to properly encrypt data.”312 
i. Ethical Issues 
Where a security incident involves intrusion into a law firm’s 
networks leading to the loss or damage of a client’s data and 
documents, the ethical issues raised by diminished control over a 
 
 308. Neil Roiter, How to Secure Cloud Computing, SEARCHSECURITY.COM (Mar. 
2009), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineContent/How-to-Secure-
Cloud-Computing (quoting Forrester analyst Chenxi Want). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Barry Reingold & Ryan Mrazik, Cloud Computing: The Intersection of Massive 
Scalability, Data Security and Privacy (Part I), 14 No. 5 CYBERSPACE L. 1, 2 (June 
2009). 
 311. See Roiter, supra note 308. 
 312. Andy Greenberg, Why Cloud Computing Needs More Chaos, FORBES.COM (July 
30, 2009, 7:00 PM EDT), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/30/cloud-computing-
security-technology-cio-network-cloud-computing.html. 
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firm’s network defenses are much the same as those discussed in 
the earlier sections of this essay concerning the risks of inadvertent 
disclosure of client confidential information through the use of 
new technologies313—troublesome information that could be 
embarrassing to the client, and information the client asked to be 
kept confidential.  Access to client confidential information could 
compromise the protection required for each kind of such 
information. 
The primary ethical issue raised by such security incidents 
would be the requirements of NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) that states a 
“lawyer shall not knowingly reveal confidential information.”314  A 
law firm is better able to know and assess the sufficiency of the 
safeguards for its clients’ data and documents before entrusting 
them to a public cloud.  If a law firm has knowingly relinquished 
such control and arguably diminished its ability to safeguard its 
clients’ data and documents, is the firm at greater risk of an ethical 
violation in the event of a breach of its network defenses and access 
to its client’s confidential information? 
Breaches in a law firm’s network defenses raise similar ethical 
issues under MRPC Rule 1.6(a), which states that lawyers are not 
permitted to reveal client information unless the client either gives 
informed consent or the disclosure is “impliedly authorized” to 
carry out the representation.315  Outsourcing data control is not 
“impliedly authorized” within the meaning of Rule 1.6(a).316  Even 
sophisticated clients are unlikely to understand the network 
defenses that a law firm has in place to protect its information.  For 
this reason, it is possible that law firms have an obligation to 
disclose to a client any proposed use of cloud services and to obtain 
the client’s informed consent due to the potential for security 
breaches in cloud defenses.  The ABA’s 2008 opinion on 
outsourcing services seems to support this assertion.  The opinion 
notes that particularly where the relationship between the firm and 
the service provider is “attenuated,” no information that is 
otherwise protected under MRPC Rule 1.6 can be revealed without 
the client’s informed consent.317 
 
 313. See supra Part III.B. 
 314. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
 315. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)(2) (2007). 
 316. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94, at 5 (stating that the implied 
authorization of Rule 1.6(a) and Comment 5 do not extend to outside entities 
over whom the firm lacks effective supervision and control). 
 317. Id. 
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Ultimately, lawyers are prohibited from actually revealing 
information relating to the representation of a client and they must 
prevent disclosures that could lead to the discovery of confidential 
information.  If relinquishing control over network defenses might 
heighten the probability of unauthorized access to client 
information, the decision to transfer control to a cloud service 
provider would seemingly fall within the scope of MRPC Rule 1.6.  
As a result, lawyers have an affirmative obligation to attempt to 
minimize the risks that the cybersecurity defenses maintained by 
outside service providers will not keep pace with rapidly evolving 
threats.  In that event, counsel might be at risk of failing to take or 
ensuring that third parties take reasonable precautions to present 
disclosure of client confidential information. 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
The answer to the question above probably would depend on 
the other precautions taken by counsel, the sensitivity of the 
client’s information, whether safeguards would have averted the 
breach, and the manner in which such unauthorized access was 
achieved.  Nevertheless, the question could prove troubling for a 
law firm, making it prudent to consider the issue before agreeing to 
entrust clients’ confidential information to a public cloud.  It also 
would be prudent for law firms to make routine assessments of the 
vulnerability of their computer networks to the most recently 
reported and anticipated threats (from insiders and outsiders), and 
to make a focused assessment of the probable change in such 
vulnerabilities that might result from outsourcing storage or 
processing of client data and documents to a public cloud.  Doing 
so arguably would improve the chances that the counsel will 
become aware of security flaws that they may want to address before 
outsourcing storage of client data to a public cloud. 
By increasing the probable protection of client confidential 
information, counsel will, in most instances, be increasing their 
own protection against the risks of an ethical breach.  If a breach 
occurs despite reasonable precautions, those precautions may 
provide important evidence with which to defend counsel from 
allegations of a violation of the counsel’s ethical obligations under 
the NYRPC. 
f. Diminished and Delayed Knowledge of Data Breaches 
When a law firm has exclusive control over the storage of its 
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electronic records, it should be in a reasonably good position to 
monitor cybersecurity, security incidents, and data breaches.  
Unless the cloud service agreement requires it, however, the cloud 
service provider may claim it is entitled to withhold information of 
security incidents.  For example, the authors have yet to find a 
cloud service agreement that promises to alert the customer when 
the provider learns of a security breach. Regardless of the precise 
origins of the breach, counsel need to know and to inform their 
clients of the breach and to help them recover from it.  If the cloud 
service provider is located in one of the few jurisdictions that has 
not enacted a data breach reporting law,318 the cloud service 
provider might decide it is entitled to issue no report on the 
incident or on the data affected by the breach. 
i. Ethical Issues 
A data breach involving the potential release of or access to 
client confidential information implicates a lawyer and law firm’s 
ethical obligation under NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) to “not knowingly 
reveal confidential information.”319  If a cloud provider’s policy is 
not to report data breaches to its customers, those customers 
cannot assess on an ongoing basis the security of their data and the 
reliability of the cloud provider’s safeguards for their data.  A cloud 
provider might take the position that commercial customers must 
accept the risks and have no compelling need to monitor the 
modulations of those risks in the cloud.  However, lawyers and law 
firms are not ordinary customers in that they have an ethical 
obligation under NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) to “exercise reasonable care 
to prevent the lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose 
services are utilized by the lawyer from disclosing or using confidential 
information of a client . . . .”320
  
Public cloud providers, if engaged by a lawyer or law firm, 
would appear to come within the category of persons “whose 
services are utilized” by such lawyer or law firm.  If a lawyer or law 
firm has not ensured that the public cloud provider will report data 
breaches that may involve the lawyer’s or law firm’s client data, how 
 
 318. See supra Part III.  As of October 12, 2010, only four states did not have 
data security breach notification laws.  Those states were Alabama, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, and South Dakota.  State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last updated Oct. 
12, 2011).  For a listing of the data security breach laws, see id. 
 319. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
 320. Id. § 1200 R. 1.6(c) (emphasis added). 
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well can they fulfill the ethical obligation to “exercise reasonable 
care” to prevent a cloud provider from “disclosing” client 
confidential information?  Can “reasonable care” be sufficiently 
exercised if the law firm contractually relinquishes its ability to 
supervise or even to monitor or receive timely reports on the 
performance of a public cloud provider’s protection of client data?  
The answers may change substantially if, instead of an isolated 
incident (an accident that occurs despite good precautions), the 
pubic cloud experiences a succession of data breaches (a systemic 
failure of safeguards or uncorrected vulnerabilities). 
The prospect of successive service interruptions and data 
breaches looms larger after occurrences of both safeguards and 
uncorrected vulnerabilities in 2011.  Sony,321 Amazon,322 and 
Google323 all have suffered from these types of events in recent 
years.  For example, public concerns about Sony’s vulnerabilities 
rose after Sony reported its second 2011 episode.324 
The proposed changes to Model Rule 1.6 build upon the New 
York provision and support the assertion that public cloud 
providers would fall within the category of persons “whose services 
are utilized” by the lawyer or law firm.  The ABA Commission notes 
that there is currently an implicit duty to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure in MRPC Rule 1.6.325  However, the proposed MRPC 
Rule 1.6(c) states, “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
prevent the inadvertent disclosure of or unauthorized access to, 
information relating to the representation of a client,”326 which 
includes unauthorized access by third parties whose services the 
lawyer utilizes.  Although the Commission did not propose any 
specific security procedures due to the rate at which technology 
changes, it was the Commission’s belief that “lawyers should have 
an obligation to act reasonably when using technology” and that 
the rule should clearly state the obligation to do so.327 
 
 321. Matt Peckham, PlayStation Network Outage a Disaster for Sony, TIME (Apr. 21, 
2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/04/21/playstation-network-outage-a-
disaster-for-sony. 
 322. Blodget, supra note 100. 
 323. Claudine Beaumont, Google Gmail Crash Which Hit Millions Now ‘Fixed,’ THE 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 24, 2009, 6:47 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology 
/google/4799758/Google-Gmail-crash-which-hit-millions-now-fixed.html. 
 324. See Jared Newman, Playstation Network Breach: It’s Really, Really Bad, 
TECHNOLOGIZER (Apr. 26, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://technologizer.com/2011 
/04/26/playstation-network-breach-data-stolen. 
 325. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 9. 
 326. Id. at 6. 
 327. Id. at 4. 
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It is, therefore, questionable whether a lawyer or law firm who 
relinquishes control over the storage of its data would be acting 
reasonably when it has little to no control over security breaches.  
The Commission provides some guidance on the meaning of 
“reasonableness” in Comment 16 to proposed MRPC Rule 1.6(c).  
The Commission identifies several factors that lawyers should 
consider in determining whether their efforts to protect a client’s 
confidential information are reasonable.  These factors include 
considering the “sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of 
disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, and the cost 
of employing additional safeguards.”328  Based on these factors, it is 
possible that the “reasonableness” of a lawyer’s action will vary 
based on the circumstances.  However, where the lawyer or the law 
firm are aware that breaches have already occurred, it is arguably 
unreasonable, based on these factors, to fail to implement additional 
safeguards as the likelihood of disclosure would now be apparent. 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
Use of a communications technology implies an ethical 
responsibility to evaluate the degree to which its use may put client 
confidential information at an increased, and perhaps 
unreasonable, risk.  As the NYSBA Ethics Committee noted in the 
context of an opinion on precautions needed to protect client 
confidential information from disclosure via metadata, “a lawyer 
who uses technology to communicate with clients must use 
reasonable care with respect to such communication, and therefore 
must assess the risks attendant to the use of that technology and 
determine if the mode of transmission is appropriate under the 
circumstances.”329
 
The same duty to “assess the risks attendant to the use” of 
technology would appear to apply to communication of client data 
to and from a public cloud.  Such assessments may need to be 
made not only before entering into an agreement with a public 
cloud provider but continually in order for counsel to stay abreast 
of changes in the operation of the cloud, changes in the terms of 
use, and changes in the rapidly evolving security threats to web-
based services and services that provide wireless access.  Modes of 
 
 328. Id. 
 329. New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782, 2 (Dec. 8, 
2004), http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions 
/Opinions751825/Opn782.pdf. 
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storage and of transmission can be affected by such threats and 
may therefore deserve continual reassessment.  As the NYSBA 
Ethics Committee has observed (in the context of transmittals by e-
mail), “[r]easonable care may, in some circumstances, call for the 
lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and the potential 
risks in transmission in order to make an appropriate decision with 
respect to the mode of transmission.”330
 
The ABA made a similar assessment in its opinion on the use 
of unencrypted e-mail.  Its opinion compared various forms of 
communication from “direct” e-mail to services provided by third 
parties.  Although the ABA ultimately concluded that lawyers have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy when using e-mail to transmit 
information, it noted that “[t]he reasonableness of a lawyer’s use of 
any medium to communicate with or about clients depends both 
on the objective level of security it affords and the existence of laws 
intended to protect the privacy of the information 
communicated.”331  The ABA evaluated four different e-mail systems 
before reaching its conclusion, thereby reflecting the view that the 
“reasonableness” of an expectation of privacy depends, at least in 
part, on the particular third-party provider’s security measures for 
ensuring the confidentiality of user e-mail.332  Furthermore, “when 
the lawyer reasonably believes that confidential client information 
being transmitted is so highly sensitive that extraordinary measures 
to protect the transmission are warranted, the lawyer should 
consult” with the client as to what method is appropriate for the 
transmission of that information.333 
The digital era ultimately puts counsel in the uncomfortable 
position of being responsible for protection of client confidential 
information during a period when the technologies that facilitate 
competent representation also threaten to undermine counsel’s 
efforts to protect that same confidential information.  The growing 
recognition that security breaches are frequent occurrences 
approaching near certainty makes this situation even more difficult 
to resolve, particularly when the likelihood of such breaches is 
expressed in a cloud provider’s terms of service or, as in the case of 
Soonr, in its privacy policy and in the August 30, 2011 changes to 
its policy as shown in the version below: 
No method of transmission over the Internet, or method 
 
 330. Id. at 2–3. 
 331. ABA Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 133. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
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of electronic storage, is 100% secure, however.  
Therefore, we cannot guarantee its absolute security. 
 Sharing access to your files may create additional 
risks to privacy and to the confidentiality of the 
information within your files.  We provide certain 
safeguards from our end, for example, the ability for you 
to view who has accessed the files you’ve decided to share.  
But some of the responsibility to prevent unauthorized 
access remains with you.334
 
In addition, cloud providers do not usually provide much 
information about their security measures or security standards in 
their terms of use or the related privacy policies.  For example, 
Google Docs’ Terms of Use offers no comment on those issues, and 
its privacy policy offers little insight into what Google actually does 
or the standards to which it attempts to adhere: 
We take appropriate security measures to protect against 
unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration, 
disclosure or destruction of data.  These include internal 
reviews of our data collection, storage and processing 
practices and security measures, including appropriate 
encryption and physical security measures to guard 
against unauthorized access to systems where we store 
personal data.335
 
We are not suggesting that a cloud provider should publish 
details of its security precautions and risk releasing such 
information to people intent on defeating such safeguards.  
However, a law firm client may need more information than is 
provided by the assurances typically found in a standard 
nondisclosure agreement.  Thus, a law firm may well find it 
prudent to conduct due diligence under appropriate conditions of 
confidentiality to satisfy itself that client confidential information is 
receiving the standard of care that is consistent with the law firm’s 
ethical obligations to exercise reasonable care to ensure the cloud 
provider is not permitting the disclosure of client confidential 
information. 
 
 334. Privacy, SOONR, http://www.soonr.com/security/privacy.php (last 
updated Aug. 30, 2011). 
 335. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last 
modified Oct. 3, 2010). 
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g. Diminished Control over and Knowledge of the Location(s) 
and Movement of Personal Information and Client Confidential 
Information 
Under most standard terms of service, such as the license that 
had been offered by Soonr until late August, 2011, a cloud service 
provider either claims the right to move, store, and process a 
customer’s data in any location at the provider’s sole discretion, or 
expresses no position on the issue and thereby makes no promise 
to limit the data’s storage to locations identified to the customer or 
subject to the customer’s approval.336  The agreement gives the 
 
 336. Soonr Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, supra note 294, § 9.2.  
On occasion a customer has sufficient leverage to negotiate location limitations, as 
can be seen in the City of Los Angeles’ Google Apps contract which contains the 
following provision: 
1.7 Data Transfer.  Google agrees to store and process Customer’s email 
and Google Message Discovery (GMD) data only in the continental 
United States.  As soon as it shall become commercially feasible, Google 
shall store and process all other Customer Data, from any other Google 
Apps applications, only in the continental United States. 
Information Technology Agency, Professional Services Contract, CITY OF L.A., 75 (Nov. 
20, 2009), http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2009/C-116359_c_11-20-
09.pdf.  Thomas Trappler identifies additional issues relating to the location (and 
change in location) of a customer’s data stored in a cloud vendor’s servers: 
A variety of legal issues can arise if an institution’s data resides in a cloud 
computing provider’s data center in another country.  Different 
countries, and in some cases even different states, have different laws 
pertaining to data.  One of the key questions with cloud computing is, 
which law applies to my institution’s data, the law where I’m located, or 
the law where my data’s located?  Additionally, there are questions about 
export control: Does saving controlled data on a cloud computing service 
with a data center located outside the United States constitute a violation 
of export control laws?  For these reasons, it can be important for the 
contract to identify the geographic region within which the data center 
hosting your institution’s data may be located. 
Thomas J. Trappler, If it’s in the Cloud, Get it on Paper: Cloud Computing Contract 
Issues, EDUCAUSE Q. (2010), http://www.educause.edu/EDUCAUSE+Quarterly 
/EDUCAUSEQuarterlyMagazineVolum/IfItsintheCloudGetItonPaperClo/206532.  
In addition, there are environmental risks that may be elevated by entrusting data 
to a cloud computing provider that may elect to store the data in a vulnerable 
offshore location, as highlighted in a recent U.K. Government study: 
The Foresight Programme from the UK’s Government Office for Science 
produces in-depth studies looking at major issues 20–80 years in the 
future.  It recently published a report on the International Dimensions of 
Climate Change that identifies a significant vulnerability from cloud 
computing.  As more data centres are needed, and with the UK a 
relatively expensive location, more will be going offshore, but that makes 
them potentially more vulnerable to climate change impacts. 
  The report points out that data storage facilities have already 
suffered from flooding and cites the Vodafone data centre in Ikitelli, 
Turkey, which was affected by flash flooding in 2009, putting a quarter of 
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customer no right to receive reports on the exact locations where 
their data are stored or the number of “copies” made of such data 
that may exist.  Moreover, some cloud service providers require 
customer consent to blanket permissions for transfers of data into 
and out of the European Union, without any assurance that such 
transfers will comply with applicable data protection laws and 
regulations of the E.U. or its member states.337  Such appeared to 
be the case for transfers covered by the Soonr Terms of Service and 
End User License Agreement, which prior to an August 2011 
change to Soonr’s privacy policy made no promise to store U.S. 
persons’ data on U.S.-located servers: 
SOONR STORES AND PROCESSES THE 
INFORMATION WHICH SOONR COLLECTS FROM 
YOU ON COMPUTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
OTHER COUNTRIES IN WHICH SOONR OR ITS 
AGENTS HAVE FACILITIES. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF 
THESE TERMS AGREEMENT INCLUDES YOUR 
CONSENT TO TRANSFERS OF SUCH INFORMATION 
OUTSIDE YOUR COUNTRY.338 
Some cloud service providers offer features that promise 
advantages to the user with an undisclosed reduction in security.  
For example, Gmail and Google Docs provide an automatic draft 
saving feature by which the service periodically “saves” and uploads 
the contents of e-mail or documents to Google’s servers where they 
are saved as “drafts”.339  However, researchers report that the same 
 
the local network at risk.  Similarly, in August 2009 the rainfall from 
Typhoon Morakot caused rivers to flood in Taiwan flushing large 
volumes of sediment into the ocean.  This led to several submarine 
landslides which broke at least nine communications cables 4000m down.  
It disrupted the Internet and telecommunications between Taiwan, 
China, Hong Kong and other parts of Southeast Asia. 
  The study also makes the point that over 95% of global 
communications traffic is handled by just one million kilometres of 
undersea fibre-optic cable.  Rising sea levels increase the risk of flooding 
of coastal cable facilities and may also affect the stability of the seabed, 
making cables more vulnerable. 
Pete Foster, Cloud Computing—A Green Opportunity or Climate Change Risk?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business 
/cloud-computing-climate-change. 
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 339. See Roxana Geambasu, Tadayoshi Kohno, Amit A. Levy & Henry M. Levy, 
Vanish: Increasing Data Privacy with Self-Destructing Data, UNIV. OF WASH., 
http://vanish.cs.washington.edu/pubs/usenixsec09-geambasu.pdf (last visited 
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feature may cause confidential data to be uploaded “in-clear” to 
Google even as the user is composing the document, thus making it 
susceptible to interception.340  Moreover, to the extent that Google 
retains these early drafts in its system, the drafts qualify as 
electronic records that must be preserved and produced in e-
discovery.  Thus, the drafts feature seems to impose new challenges 
for lawyers and law firms.
 
i. Ethical Issues 
Data protection laws are complex and change frequently, and 
compliance often requires close attention to each jurisdiction in 
which data is stored or passes through. Because such laws often 
differ in significant but subtle ways, a blanket consent given with 
the breadth required by some cloud providers’ terms of service 
could result in a violation of applicable data protection laws in 
multiple jurisdictions. 
Similarly, export control regimes such as the U.S. Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR)341 and the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR)342 require a license for certain kinds of 
data to be exported from the United States and make it 
impermissible to export or re-export certain kinds of data to 
prohibited destinations.343  If a client places such data in records 
they entrust to a lawyer or law firm, and counsel then entrust such 
data to a cloud, such data could be moved in violation of the EAR 
or ITAR as part of the service provider’s routine relocation of such 
data to servers in other jurisdictions.  The risks of such occurrences 
raise potential ethical issues for a law firm if it entered into such an 
 
Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Geambasu et al.]. 
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agreement.  Although a review of such issues is beyond the scope of 
this article, they are likely to become matters of ethical concern as a 
direct result of cloud providers’ use of servers located in and 
transferring data between multiple jurisdictions with possibly 
conflicting requirements for data protection. 
Although a cloud provider may intend to apply its security 
measures consistently throughout its enterprise, such consistency 
may decline as the locations of servers and staff multiply and as the 
number of jurisdictions and cultures increases.  A law firm and its 
clients might reasonably object to storage of client data in certain 
jurisdictions due to concerns for local security standards, reported 
incidents, or political instabilities. 
Law firms whose clients include governments and government 
entities may need to know the exact locations of such clients’ data 
within the cloud provider’s storage system, since a failure to know 
such information could incur risks of violating the client’s own 
security requirements and instructions to the law firm regarding 
adherence to such requirements.344  The firm may be under express 
instructions from that client to avoid storing data in servers within 
the jurisdiction of a known adversary.  For such firms there could 
be ethical issues under the NYRPC or MRPC Rule 1.4(a)(2) to 
“reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the 
client’s objectives are to be accomplished”345 and under the NYRPC 
or MRPC Rule 1.3 requirements to “act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client.”346 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
Law firms representing clients who have special security 
concerns based on political and geographic considerations and 
who insist on heightened measures and restrictions regarding the 
storage and transfer of their data may find that a public cloud 
provider’s standard terms of service do not accommodate such 
concerns.  On this subject, counsel may find helpful general 
guidance in a 2006 New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional 
Ethics opinion on electronic storage and access of client files: 
 
 344. See COMPUTER SEC. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS PUB. 200, MINIMUM 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, at 3 
(Mar. 2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS-200-
final-march.pdf; BURKE T. WARD & JANICE SIPIOR, THE INTERNET JURISDICTION RISK 
OF CLOUD COMPUTING, 27 INFO. SYS. MGMT. 334, 334–37 (2010). 
 345. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2007). 
 346. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007). 
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[T]he benefit of digitizing documents in electronic form 
is that they “can be retrieved by me at any time from any 
location in the world.”  This raises the possibility, however, 
that they could also be retrieved by other persons as well, 
and the problems of unauthorized access to electronic 
platforms and media (i.e. the problems posed by 
“hackers”) are matters of common knowledge.  The 
availability of sensitive client documents in an electronic 
medium that could be accessed or intercepted by 
unauthorized users therefore raises issues of 
confidentiality under RPC 1.6.   
 The obligation to preserve client confidences extends 
beyond merely prohibiting an attorney from himself 
making disclosure of confidential information without 
client consent (except under such circumstances 
described in RPC 1.6).  It also requires that the attorney 
take reasonable affirmative steps to guard against the risk 
of inadvertent disclosure. 
. . . . 
 The critical requirement under RPC 1.6, therefore, is 
that the attorney “exercise reasonable care” against the 
possibility of unauthorized access to client information.  A 
lawyer is required to exercise sound professional 
judgment on the steps necessary to secure client 
confidences against foreseeable attempts at unauthorized 
access.  “Reasonable care,” however, does not mean that 
the lawyer absolutely and strictly guarantees that the 
information will be utterly invulnerable against all 
unauthorized access.  Such a guarantee is impossible, and 
a lawyer can no more guarantee against unauthorized 
access to electronic information than he can guarantee 
that a burglar will not break into his file room, or that 




Such concerns suggest that a law firm give serious 
consideration to enhanced due diligence of any public cloud 
provider as a condition for entering into a service agreement with 
such provider.  There may be many client-specific checks that need 
to be made of a public cloud provider in order to ensure that the 
law firm has exercised “reasonable care” to prevent such service 
provider from “disclosing or using confidential information 
 
 347. New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 701 (2006), available at 
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/ethics/acpe/acp701_1.html. 
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relating to the representation of a client . . . .”348  In addition to 
client-specific checks, it is possible that in ensuring compliance 
with NYRPC and Model Rule 1.4(a)(1), “reasonable care” would 
include informing the client of the circumstances surrounding the 
use of the cloud service provider.  Both rules provide that a lawyer 
shall “promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required 
by these Rules . . . .”349  Only by informing the client of the 
proposed course of conduct and use of the cloud service can the 
client provide any specialized instruction regarding additional 
security measures. 
Also, it would be prudent for a law firm to develop policies and 
procedures to be invoked in case of a data breach involving the 
client’s data and documents stored in the public cloud.  These 
should not be limited to the requirements of the applicable 
jurisdiction’s data breach statutes, as there may be an ethical duty 
to disclose such breach to the affected or potentially affected 
clients under both the NYRPC and the MRPC Rule 1.4(a)(3) 
requirement to “keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter.”350  Moreover, if there is a reasonable 
possibility that such a breach could result in damage to the client, 
which the client could mitigate if it knew the breach had occurred, 
then failure to report the incident to the client could risk a breach 
of the NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2) requirement that the lawyer shall not 
intentionally “prejudice or damage the client during the course of 
the representation . . . .”351 
In 2009, the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA) reviewed the 
issues that may arise if a law firm elects to have its computer 
network managed by an offsite third-party vendor.  The ISBA noted 
that in looking at the same scenario, the ABA concluded that if the 
third-party vendor breaches the confidentiality of the firm’s client 
files, a lawyer may be obligated to disclose this breach to its client if 
it is likely to affect the position of the client or the outcome of the 
client’s case.352  Such disclosure may be required under MRPC 
 
 348. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007); see also N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
 349. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(1) (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.4(a)(1) (2011). 
 350. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3) (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.4(a)(3) (2011). 
 351. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(c)(2) (2011). 
 352. ISBA Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 10-01 (2009), available 
at http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/10-01.pdf. 
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1.4(b), pursuant to which a “lawyer shall explain a matter to the 
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation.”353
  
An additional concern is the type of warranties or 
indemnification that a cloud provider may offer to the lawyers and 
law firms with which it contracts.  Lawyers and law firms may wish 
to consider the availability of indemnification for damages 
sustained by outages and data security breaches.  In the event that 
lawyers or firms find the warranty or indemnification provisions 
lacking in any respect, they may wish to procure separate coverage 
for actual, incidental, and consequential damages that outages or 
breaches may cause them directly, and clients indirectly. 
h. Diminished Ability to Protect Data from Government 
Surveillance or Seizure 
Data transmitted wirelessly can be intercepted more easily than 
data sent through telephone wires.354  Encryption may reduce the 
potential number of persons who can intercept transmitted data, 
unless they are government agents or government-sponsored 
entities.355  Moreover, the amount of data that can be intercepted 
 
 353. Id. at 3 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 95-398 (1995)). 
 354. A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report highlighted the 
increased risks of wireless communications, noting:  “Wireless technologies use 
radio waves instead of direct physical connections to transmit data between 
networks and devices.  As a result, without proper security precautions, these data 
can be more easily intercepted and altered than if being transmitted through 
physical connections.”  The GAO further observed that: 
Wireless networks also face challenges that are unique to their 
environment.  A significant difference between wireless and wired 
networks is the relative ease of intercepting WLAN transmissions.  For 
WLANs, attackers only need to be in range of wireless transmissions and 
do not have to gain physical access to the network or remotely 
compromise systems on the network.   
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-43, INFORMATION SECURITY: FEDERAL 
AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO SECURE WIRELESS NETWORKS, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS 
CAN MITIGATE RISKS 1, 8 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d1143.pdf. 
 355. PARLIMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., POSTNOTE 270: DATA ENCRYPTION 
(2006) (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post 
/postpn270.pdf.  If Congress passes certain legislation requested by the 
Administration, Government agencies would have access to such encrypted 
communications.  As reported in The New York Times: 
Essentially, officials want Congress to require all services that enable 
communications—including encrypted e-mail transmitters like 
BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that 
allows direct “peer to peer” messaging like Skype—to be technically 
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will usually be less than the data that can be seized if government 
agents gain access to the cloud provider’s servers.356 
Although the use of national security letters (NSL) by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can result in the government 
gaining access to data on virtually any computer in the United 
States,357 the authors expect that law firms likely will put up far 
more resolute and vigorous defenses of client confidential 
information than will cloud providers.  The latter may find it 
advantageous to cooperate with the government, offer token 
resistance, and/or be barred by the terms of an NSL from even 
informing the law firm customer that its client confidential 
information has been requested by, or surrendered to, federal 
agents.358 
In addition, there are reported instances in which the FBI has 
received overproduction of records sought from an Internet service 
provider.  For example, the FBI, when conducting a national 
security investigation and having obtained a court order to an 
Internet service provider to produce e-mails sent to a single e-mail 
address, received instead all of the e-mails from the entire domain 
because the Internet service provider improperly set filtering 
controls and collected data on the domain instead of the single e-
 
capable of complying if served with a wiretap order. The mandate would 
include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages. 
Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap 
.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp. 
 356. THE HARVARD LAW NATIONAL SEC. GRP., CLOUD COMPUTING & NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW 21 (2010), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs 
/nsrc/Cloud.pdf. 
 357. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(d)(1), 1681v(c)(1) 
(2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006); 50 U.S.C. §436(b)(1) (2006).  For more 
discussion of the nondisclosure requirements of these national security letter 
statutes, see DAVID P. FIDLER & SARAH JANE HUGHES, RESPONDING TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS–A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE, ch. 3 (2011) and text accompanying 
notes 15–23, supra. 
 358. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, LulzSec, Anonymous: Feds Most Wanted, 
TECHWEB (June 21, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://www.techweb.com/news/231000131 
/lulzsec-anonymous-feds-most-wanted.html (“[F]ederal investigators routinely seek 
access to the server logs of ISPs as part of their investigations. ‘Most U.S.-based 
ISPs these days don’t even report law enforcement requests to the public[.]’” 
(quoting Chester Wisniewiski, senior security advisor at Sophos)); Mike Masnick, 
So the FBI Can just Take a Copy of All Instapaper User Data with No Recourse?, TECHDIRT 
(June 24, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110624 
/15282814850/so-fbi-can-just-take-copy-all-instapaper-user-data-with-no-
recourse.shtml (describing FBI seizure of backup server for popular service known 
as Instapaper, which individuals use to save web pages and other information). 
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mail address.359
  
While it is troubling that these types of errors can 
occur, the greater concern for law firms and lawyers intent on 
protecting a client’s confidential information should be that these 
occurrences are not rare.  As the New York Times reported: 
[A]n intelligence official, who spoke on condition of 
anonymity because surveillance operations are classified, 
said: “It’s inevitable that these things will happen. It’s not 
weekly, but it’s common.” 
 A report in 2006 by the Justice Department inspector 
general found more than 100 violations of federal wiretap 
law in the two prior years by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, many of them considered technical and 
inadvertent.360
  
Providers of web-based e-mail may represent that they offer 
security against any intrusion (including by government agencies), 
but then fail to provide it when faced with a court order.  For 
example, Hush Communications, Inc., a Canadian company and 
operator of the web-based e-mail service Hushmail.com, reportedly 
represented that “not even a Hushmail employee with access to our 
servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is 
uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer.”361
  
However, as 
the result of a mutual legal assistance treaty between Canada and 
the United States, Hush released to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents 
three CDs containing e-mails from three Hushmail accounts.362
  
Although supposedly Hushmail could release only encrypted e-
mails that could not be read by government agents, users 
reportedly had found it too burdensome to use Hushmail’s most 
secure services, which required installing Java and loading and 
running the Java applet, and elected instead to use a more 
traditional form of web-mail offered by Hushmail in which the user 
stores a passphrase with Hushmail.363  The court order required 
Hushmail to use such stored passphrases to decrypt the e-mails 
 
 359. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Gained Unauthorized Access to E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
17, 2008, at A1, A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/ 
washington/17fisa.html. 
 360. Id. at A1. 
 361. Ryan Singel, Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds, WIRED.COM 
(Nov. 7, 2007, 3:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-
e-mai. 
 362. Criminal Complaint, Statement of Probable Cause at 4, United States v. 
Stumbo, No. 5:07-mj-00034-TAG (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/steroids.source.prod_affili
ate.25.pdf. 
 363. Singel, supra note 361. 
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before releasing them to government agents.364
 
 
i. Ethical Issues 
National security letters (NSLs) present unique and unusually 
sensitive ethical issues for counsel in fulfilling the NYRPC Rule 
1.6(c) duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons “whose 
services are utilized by the lawyer” from disclosing client 
confidential information. NSLs also implicate the implicit duty 
under MRPC Rule 1.6(a) to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of 
client information.  If a law firm receives an NSL, it is on notice of 
the risks and can respond accordingly if it has adopted policies and 
procedures for handling NSLs.  Such policies likely will place a 
priority on protecting client confidential information from 
disclosure and may include measures to be taken in an initial 
review of the NSL. 
There is likely to be a very different set of priorities where the 
recipient of an NSL is a public cloud provider, however, especially 
if the provider is a major enterprise that has received many NSLs 
already and has a pre-established protocol for responding to NSLs.  
It is important for a law firm to be aware of the challenges that 
NSLs present to a public cloud provider and to the likelihood that 
the public cloud provider may find it in its own interests to do little 
to limit the intrusion of the government into files that contain a law 
firm’s client’s confidential information.  A good summary of those 
challenges is presented in Responding to National Security Letters: A 
Practitioner’s Guide, which observes that such challenges include the 
following: 
The company [recipient] must be able to review the 
national security letter, but the federal agents may not 
permit the company to keep the [hard copy] letter or a 
copy of it. If the agents indicate that the company may not 
keep the letter or make a copy, company representatives 
who review the document should take notes in order to 
evaluate its legality and content.  
. . . . 
 In all likelihood, federal agents will deliver a national 
security letter that certifies that disclosure of the letter or 
its contents to persons beyond those to whom disclosure is 
permitted (e.g., legal counsel) may result in a danger to 
U.S. national security; interference with a criminal, 
 
 364. Id. 
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counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation; 
interference with diplomatic relations; or danger to the 
life or physical safety of any person. Although federal 
courts have held that this nondisclosure requirement 
violates the First Amendment [footnote omitted], 




Once client data and documents are stored in a public cloud, they 
not only reside in a location whose custodian will have little, if any, 
incentive to protect them from government intrusion under the 
authority of an NSL, but also will be a more likely target for 
government requests for information under an NSL.  Entrusting 
client data and documents to a public cloud would appear to 
increase the risks of disclosure to the federal government and of 
such disclosure occurring without the law firm’s or its client’s 
awareness.  Such risks may be significantly greater for some clients 
because of their nature of their businesses 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
Law firm customers of a public cloud provider should not 
expect notice from the provider that it has received an NSL that 
would cover data and documents of the law firm or its clients.  
Notice would violate the gag order provisions of national security 
letter laws.  Indeed, the recipient of the NSL may not decide to 
notify its own lawyers of receipt unless the lawyers’ involvement is 
necessary to the recipient’s response to the NSL or the recipient 
has a question about its duties under the NSL.  Thus, counsels’ 
decision of whether to store in a public cloud the documents and 
data of clients whose businesses make them more likely to receive 
NSLs may require additional careful consideration in order to 
comply with both the NYRPC and MRPC requirements to avoid 
damaging a client and to exercise reasonable care to prevent the 
cloud provider from disclosing client confidential information.  
Such considerations also may deserve to be discussed with the 
client to ensure compliance with the NYRPC and MRPC 
requirement to reasonably consult with the client about the means 
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.366 
 
 
 365. FIDLER & HUGHES, supra note 357, at 42, 44. 
 366. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.2 (2011). 
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i. Diminished Ability to Monitor and Ensure Secure Purging of 
Archived Records 
Sometimes the concern regarding client confidential 
information centers not on preservation, access, or production of 
data but on the need to ensure its destruction, as when a protective 
order or settlement agreement requires the destruction of 
confidential materials after litigation.  In such cases, it is not 
enough to shred hard copy pages or delete a digital file from a 
hard disk.  Even after a matter ends, the confidentiality of 
information concerning that matter remains an imperative until 
such information can no longer be accessed in whole or in 
multitudinous parts. 
Hard copy information can be eradicated by fairly standard 
practices, including careful shredding and incineration.  
Unfortunately, data stored on digital media cannot be eradicated as 
straight-forwardly and reliably as data in hard copy.  For example, 
as noted by NIST in the “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,” 
published in 2006, digital media “may require special disposition in 
order to mitigate the risk of unauthorized disclosure of 
information and to ensure its confidentiality.”367
  
The chief 
challenge is that deletion of digital files may not delete the data 
contained in the files, which can remain intact and recoverable on 
the digital media.  The reasons for the data’s persistence despite 
purportedly being “deleted” are inherent in the design of digital 
storage.  As one report observed: 
A cardinal rule for product design of computers, disks, 
and tapes is to protect user data from accidental deletion.  
Computer operating systems erase disk files into recycle or 
trash folders to prevent accidental deletion of user data, 
and have file recovery commands.  File deletion erases 
only file block pointers, links that let a file system 
reassemble a file.368
  
In 1985, the Department of Defense (DoD) established its 
standard for eradicating digital data.  Document DoD 5220 
 
 367. RICHARD KISSEL, ET AL., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF SCI. AND TECH., 
SPECIAL PUB. 800-88, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA SANITIZATION 7 (2006) [hereinafter 
NIST 800-88], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
88/NISTSP800-88_rev1.pdf. 
 368. Gordon F. Hughes, Daniel M. Cummins & Tom Coughlin, Disposal of Disk 
and Tape Data by Secure Sanitization, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jul.-Aug. 2009, at 29, 
available at http://66.14.166.45/whitepapers/compforensics/datarecovery 
/scrubbing-sanitization/Disposal%20of%20Disk%20and%20Tape%20Data 
%20by%20Secure%20Sanitization.pdf. 
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required “two fixed-character overwrites and one random-character 
overwrite, followed by a verify read.”369 This standard eventually 
ceased to be capable of eradicating data from disk drives, because 
design of the disk drives made the first two overwrites ineffective: 
All drives today use partial response-recording channels, a 
technology that randomizes user data before recording, so 
the first two writes of DoD 5220 no longer function as 
intended. The US Defense Security Service today requires 
that federal agencies using overwrite utilities have an 
authorized DoD laboratory evaluate them for proper 
functionality.  NIST 800-88 replaces DoD 5220 for disk 
sanitization.370
  
NIST 800-88 recommends that organizations store confidential 
information on media labeled in accordance with internal 
operating classifications and associate such media with the kind of 
data sanitization that will eradicate it to the extent necessary to 
prevent its recovery.371
  
The federal government has cited NIST 800-88 as the 
applicable standard in regulations concerning data security.  For 
example, in the HITECH Act: “Organizations should label these 
media with their internal operating classifications and associate a 
type of sanitization described in this publication.”372
 
 
If the files stored include personally identifiable information 
about consumers, whether direct customers of the firm or 
customers of the firm’s client, additional “safe disposal” regulations 
implementing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003373 may be required.  Even if not required, the Act and federal 
regulations implementing it,374 may suggest suitable means for the 
firm to implement. 
The Ethics Essays concluded that many law firms or lawyers 
were not familiar with NIST 800-88 and its standards.375  They also 
questioned whether law firms and lawyers or their clients had their 
confidential information so well organized that it is stored on 
media labeled by the level of confidentiality as recommended by 
 
 369. Id. at 30. 
 370. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 371. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 
216, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006)). 
 374. E.g., Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 69 Fed. Reg. 
68690 (Nov. 24, 2004) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 682). 
 375. See sources cited supra note 53. 
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NIST 800-88.376 
NIST 800-88 encourages that plans for data sanitization be 
made based on the media and the level of risk to confidentiality.  It 
explains that the planning process should “categorize the 
information, assess the nature of the medium on which it is 
recorded, assess the risk to confidentiality, and determine the 
future plans for the media.  Then decide on the appropriate type 
of sanitization.”377
  
Ideally such plans would be made before or at 
the same time that the data is stored, but in most cases such plans 
will likely be made much later.  But in any event, plans need to be 
made carefully before entrusting data to storage media that are not 
controlled by the law firm or its lawyers, because there is little or no 
evidence at present that cloud service providers have made secure 
sanitization of data a high priority or included it in their plans for 
customers. 
For example, in Google Docs’ Terms of Service there is no 
mention of “data sanitization” or any provision that addresses 
Google’s responsibilities for eradicating confidential data entrusted 
to its cloud or even a covenant to verify eradication of data if 
requested by a customer.378  If plans for secure data sanitization 
were a priority for a cloud service provider, one would think that 
the service provider would add that to the list of excluded or 
disclaimed warranties and/or limits of liability, but there is no 
provision on the subject in, for example, Google Docs’ Terms of 
Service.379  Similarly, in the Amazon Web Services Customer 
Agreement, the provisions on “Data Preservation in the Event of 
Suspension or Termination” and on “Post-Termination Assistance” 
mention possible preservation or retrieval, but say nothing about 
secure data sanitization or customer-authorized eradication of data 
from the hard drives of Amazon’s cloud servers.380  
NIST 800-88 identifies three methods of data sanitization 
suitable for eradicating confidential information from digital 
media—clearing, purging, and destroying—and the level and kinds 
of risk that each is best at protecting against.381  There is no 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7. 
 378. Compare 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, with 2009 Google Terms 
of Service, supra note 270. 
 379. See, e.g., 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268. 
 380. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, §§ 3.7–.8. 
 381. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7–9.  Note that NIST identifies a fourth 
method of sanitization, “disposal,” but that does not involve eradication of the 
data, and would incur risks of unauthorized access in an era where “dumpster 
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established standard for what level of data eradication needs to be 
achieved by lawyers or law firms to fulfill the objective of protecting 
client confidential information stored in digital media.  
Nonetheless, there are federal and state standards that can be used 
as guidance that would help a lawyer or law firm document and 
demonstrate that reasonable measures had been taken to protect 
the confidentiality of such information.382  For example, the 
HITECH Act defines “unsecured PHR identifiable health 
information” to mean such information that is not secured by a 
technology or methodology identified by the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).383 
The DHHS, in April 2009, issued guidance for security of such 
information, and explained that “protected personal health 
information” would be deemed “unusable, unreadable, or 
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” only if certain 
measures had been taken, and explained that such information 
when stored or recorded on electronic media would eventually 
need to be “cleared, purged or destroyed consistent with” NIST 
800-80.384 
 
diving” is not an uncommon practice.  Id. at 5. 
 382. Examples of federal data sanitization standards include the HITECH Act 
and the Safeguards Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  Note that the FTC 
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Rule, should consider disposing of “customer information in a secure way and, 
where applicable, consistent with the FTC’s Disposal Rule.”  BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
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information-complying-safeguards-rule; see 16 C.F.R. § 682.3 (2005); Disposal of 
Consumer Report Information Records, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/os 
/2004/11/041118disposalfrn.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).  According to one 
report, “at least 10 states have enacted laws that require destruction of ‘personal 
information’ that is no longer needed for business.” Guidelines for Data Sanitization 
and Disposal, CARNEGIE MELLON, 3 (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.cmu.edu 
/iso/governance/guidelines/docs/DataSanitizationDisposalGuidelines_ 
FINALv1.2.pdf. 
 383. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
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of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for 
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2011] RED SKIES IN THE MORNING 239 
Lawyers and law firms should give serious consideration to 
adopting a standard similar to, or using, NIST 800-80, i.e., when 
eradicating client confidential information, any such information 
in digital media should be rendered “unusable, unreadable, or 
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals.” 
i. Ethical Issues 
Entrusting client confidential data to a cloud service provider 
means moving a copy of such records outside of counsel’s 
immediate control and placing it on digital media under the 
control of at least one third party—the service provider—and 
potentially multiple third parties, depending on the extent to 
which the service provider itself outsources or subcontracts the 
management of its cloud servers.  Moreover, information that can 
be reconstructed into an incomplete and partially identifiable 
record is doubly dangerous.  To the extent that fragments of 
confidential information can be extracted, pieced together in a 
semblance of their original structure, and rendered coherent and 
interpretable, confidentiality and the client’s interests may become 
compromised, risking a breach of counsel’s ethical duty to protect 
a client’s confidential information from disclosure.  To the extent 
that extracts of confidential information can be read but remain 
incomplete, there is the added risk that the information may be 
taken out of context and seriously misinterpreted, distorting the 
content and its purpose.  In some situations, the lawyer or firm 
could only defend against the publication of such mangled 
fragments by a further disclosure of client confidential information. 
With such data located offsite on a third party’s digital media, 
we suggest that some of the following types of data sanitization 
issues may arise: 
• Re-location of Data.  Will the cloud service provider relocate the 
data to other servers in the same site or to servers in other 
sites?  If so, there is the risk that the cloud service provider will 
not eradicate the data from the original server(s).  Any party 
gaining unauthorized access to such servers, either from onsite 
or wirelessly via the Internet, might thereby gain access to 
residual confidential data of the client. 
• Retirement of Servers.  Will the cloud service provider replace the 
server during the storage period?  If so, there is the risk that 
the cloud service provider will not eradicate the data when 
disposing of (or selling) the server.  Any party gaining 
possession of the discarded server might gain access to the 
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residual confidential data of the client. 
• Backup Media.  Will the cloud service provider be making 
backup copies of the data?  If so, there is the risk that upon 
replacement of such media, the client’s confidential data will 
remain on the discarded media, and thus be potentially 
accessible by unauthorized persons. 
• Custody of E-Discovery Records.  When a firm produces client 
electronic records in fulfillment of e-discovery obligations, is 
the recipient firm entitled to store such records in the cloud 
without an express commitment to take “reasonable 
precautions” to ensure that such records are not thereby put at 
heightened risk of disclosure to unauthorized parties?  When 
the litigation concludes, will the firm be obligated to ensure 
that any such records entrusted to a cloud service provider 
have been securely sanitized (in accordance with NIST 800-
88)?  If not, the client’s confidential information could be at 
continuous risk for years thereafter. If clients believe that their 
data will be put at such heightened risks, counsel may find it 
increasingly difficult to persuade clients to fulfill their e-
discovery obligations. 
• Expiration of Preservation Order.  If a court issues a protective 
order that requires destruction of confidential information at 
the conclusion of a trial, will the court include (and should 
counsel propose) a detailed statement of the measures to be 
taken to ensure that such data, if entrusted to a cloud, will be 
securely sanitized in all media used to store it by the cloud 
service provider?  Would failure to propose such measures risk 
an ethical violation? 
• Failure of a Cloud Server’s Storage Media.  If hard drives or other 
storage media of the cloud service provider fail while still 
under warranty by the original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM), will the cloud service provider send the drive back to 
the OEM for a warranty repair or replacement?  If so, it is 
unlikely that an effort will be made to eradicate the 
confidential data contained on such media before releasing 
them to the OEM.  In that event, either the OEM and its 
repair personnel will have access to the confidential data (and 
may not be under any confidentiality agreement concerning 
accessing such data), or if the OEM elects to replace the media 
and discards the failed media there is the risk that the OEM 
will invest no effort to eradicate the confidential data 
contained on the media and will thereby place such data at 
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risk by failing to sanitize it.  It is important to note that in such 
instances, the cloud service provider will probably have 
relinquished all control over the failed media when it sends it 
back to the OEM for warranty repair or replacement. 
• Termination of a Cloud Relationship.  Will the cloud service 
provider eradicate all copies of client confidential data if 
requested by counsel upon termination of the relationship 
with the service provider?  If not, the risks of residual client 
data may be multiplied. 
• Termination of a Client Relationship.  Will the cloud service 
provider eradicate all copies of client confidential data if requested 
by counsel in the event of termination of the attorney-client 
relationship?  What if the client asks that the data be 
transferred from its former counsel’s cloud service provider to 
the cloud service provider of its new counsel?  Will the cloud 
service provider comply and, if so, will it then securely sanitize 
the client’s data from the media on which it had been stored?  
If not, the client may be at continuing risks of unauthorized 
access to its confidential data. 
In each of those instances, failure to ensure secure sanitization of 
every copy of client confidential information from each of the 
media on which the copies exist, have been recorded, or have been 
stored in the cloud vendor’s servers and back-up servers raises the 
possibility that counsel will fall short of the standard set by NYRPC 
Rule 1.6(c): "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent the 
lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by 
the lawyer from disclosing . . . confidential information of a 
client . . . .”385
 
 
As discussed previously, the requirement that counsel monitor 
“other persons” involved in the representation is currently 
embodied in Comment 16 to MRPC Rule 1.6.386  Although straying 
from the MRPC comments would not itself indicate a violation of 
the MRPC per se, Comment 16 nevertheless provides guidance on a 
lawyer’s responsibility to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential information.387  Furthermore, the ABA Commission’s 
proposed amendments to MRPC Rule 1.6 indicate the ABA 
Commission’s attempt to heighten a lawyer’s confidentiality 
obligations under the Rule; thus, a failure to protect client 
 
 385. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(c) (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 386. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007). 
 387. Id. 
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information after the termination of representation could 
ultimately still put the lawyer at odds with MRPC Rule 1.6.388 
If the client has terminated the relationship with counsel, 
there is also the risk of failing to meet the standard set by NYRPC 
Rule 1.9(c)(2): 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter 
or whose present or former firm has formerly represented 
a client in a matter shall not thereafter: . . .  
. . . . 
(2) reveal confidential information of the former client 
protected by Rule 1.6 except as these Rules would permit 
or require with respect to a current client.389
 
 
MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) imposes a similar requirement, but it 
omits the use of the word “confidential” with reference to revealing 
the former client’s information.  The MRPC rule, therefore, 
appears to have a broader reach than does the NYRPC, although 
the comments to the MRPC rule indicate that a lawyer may 
nevertheless use “generally known information” about a client 
when necessary for representing another client.390 
NYRPC Rule 1.6 requires that a lawyer exercise “reasonable 
care” to prevent service providers, including a cloud service 
provider, from disclosing a current client’s confidential 
information.  There is no similarly express requirement in either 
NYRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2)391 or MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2)392 regarding a 
former client’s confidential information. Perhaps the MRPC’s 
drafters did not have an opportunity to consider the ramifications 
of cloud computing, or perhaps they considered the ethical 
challenges of cloud computing but did not take into account the 
risks inherent in a former client’s confidential data continuing to 
reside on cloud servers.  Absent an ethical provision directly 
addressing the issue of a former client’s confidential data 
remaining on a third party’s servers, counsel will have to make their 
own evaluation of the risk under either the NYRPC or the MRPC. 
In this connection, the scope of client confidential 
information of concern includes all such information that a lawyer 
or law firm is not otherwise required to retain for seven years under 
NYRPC Rule 1.15(d), such as “copies of all retainer and 
 
 388. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 5–10. 
 389. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.9(c) (2011). 
 390. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 8 (2007). 
 391. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.9(c)(2) (2011). 
 392. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (C)(2) (2007). 
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compensation agreements with clients,”393 “copies of all bills 
rendered to clients,”394 and “copies of all records showing payments 
to lawyers, investigators or other persons, not in the lawyer’s regular 
employ, for services rendered or performed.”395 
Client confidential information not covered by the seven-year 
retention rule is put at risk when a lawyer or firm entrusts 
compliance with the retention rule to a cloud service provider and, 
thereafter, the attorney-client relationship terminates.  Counsel 
does not have an obligation to retain such records, but clearly 
counsel has not ceased to be responsible for the protection of 
client confidential information of a former client.  There is no 
analogous seven-year retention provision in the MRPC.  But under 
either the MRPC or the NYRPC, what precisely is counsel’s 
obligation for such information when it remains on a cloud service 
provider’s servers, even after its former counsel, at the client’s 
request, has arranged for digital copies of all such information to 
be transferred to the client’s new counsel?  Surprisingly, this issue is 
not addressed in either the NYRPC or the MRPC, although the 
former came into effect in April 2009.396 
Lawyers and law firms should not rely on cloud service 
providers to eradicate residual confidential data entrusted to them.  
As a result, they must deal with the significantly high risk that 
confidential data of a lawyer or law firm’s clients, if entrusted to a 
cloud, will remain on one or more cloud servers after termination 
of the client’s relationship with the lawyer or law firm.  Once that 
happens, the risks to the client’s confidential data, and the ethical 
risks to its counsel, start to multiply as the data increasingly become 
removed from the control of parties who have an interest in 
protecting its confidentiality. 
The first loss of control may occur when the relationship 
between the client and counsel terminates.  The client may instruct 
counsel to transfer the electronic records to a new counsel.  
However, copies of the client’s confidential data may remain on the 
cloud provider’s servers after a copy has been forwarded to the new 
counsel (or its cloud service provider), as requested.  The client’s 
original counsel may have lost effective control of the client’s 
 
 393. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.15(d)(1)(iii) (2011). 
 394. Id. R. 1.15(d)(1)(v). 
 395. Id. R. 1.15(d)(1)(vi) (emphasis added).  Here, the seven-year record 
retention rule would appear to apply to the “payments” to the cloud service 
provider as well as to the lawyer or law firm.  See id. 
 396. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2011). 
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confidential data, particularly if counsel is unaware that the data 
continues to reside on the cloud service provider’s servers.  
Counsel will not be aware of the continuing need to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent the cloud service provider from 
disclosing such data or keeping such data from being accessed by 
unauthorized third parties.  Quite simply, counsel may not realize 
the need to insist on secure sanitization of the residual confidential 
data. 
Loss of control also may occur if the original cloud service 
provider’s storage media fails and the service provider sends the 
media back to the OEM for warranty repair or replacement.  At 
that point, as noted by NIST 800-88, the party sending the media 
back to the OEM may be at risk of relinquishing control over that 
media (including confidential data contained on it), if the cloud 
service provider has not required in an agreement with the OEM 
that the cloud service provider retain effective control over the 
media and that the OEM preserve the data’s confidentiality 
throughout the warranty repair period.397  Unfortunately, there 
appears to be little incentive for a cloud service provider to 
negotiate (and pay) for such control and confidentiality safeguards, 
particularly if its own customers are not pressing it to demonstrate 
such precautions.  Thus, NIST 800-88 draws a clear distinction 
between circumstances in which control over the media and its 
data is retained and those in which control is relinquished: 
Media being turned over for maintenance are still 
considered under organization control if contractual 
agreements are in place with the organization and the 
maintenance provider specifically provides for the 
confidentiality of the information . . . . Media that are 
being exchanged for warranty, cost rebate, or other 
purposes and where the specific media will not be 
returned to the organization are considered to be out of 
organizational control.398
 
When an organization plans to take an action that will cause it 
to relinquish or lose control over media containing confidential 
information, NIST 800-88 recommends that the organization 
“purge” all confidential information on such media and verify that 
the “purge” eradicated the confidential information.399  NIST 800-
88 explains, “[a] representative sampling of media should be tested 
 
 397. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7. 
 398. See id. at 14. 
 399. Id. at 8. 
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for proper sanitization to assure the organization that proper 
protection is maintained. Verification of the process should be 
conducted by personnel without a stake in any part of the 
process.”400
 
If the cloud service provider relinquishes control over the 
storage media and a client’s confidential data stored on such 
media, the client’s former counsel will no longer have any way of 
exercising control over the media and security of the confidential 
data.  Counsel has no contractual relationship with the OEM, and 
its contractual relationship with the cloud service provider may 
have terminated or does not expressly apply to data of a former 
client, a copy of which has been forwarded to a new counsel or its 
cloud service provider.  The risk remains, however, that the client’s 
confidential data could be disclosed to, or accessed by, 
unauthorized third parties once the client-attorney relationship has 
terminated or once the storage media has been sent to the OEM 
for repair.  To the extent that one views such a risk as significant, 
there would appear to be a serious gap in the NYRPC. 
Until that gap is corrected by amendment of the NYRPC, we 
recommend that counsel interpret MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) and 
NYRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) as implying a duty to do more than avoid 
revealing confidential information of a former client protected by 
Rule 1.6.  Counsel also should take steps before losing control of 
such data to ensure that a former client’s confidential information 
will receive the same level of protection as it received when counsel 
represented the client.  
Put differently, in the explicit requirement of NYRPC Rule 
1.6(c) and in the implicit requirement of MRPC Rule 1.6, a lawyer 
or law firm must exercise reasonable care to ensure that others whose 
services are utilized by the lawyer will not disclose the client’s 
confidential information.401  Therefore, one could construe 
entrusting such information to a cloud service provider’s digital 
media as nullifying an underlying assumption of Rule 1.6, namely 
that the client’s confidential information will only be at risk from 
counsel’s service providers during the representation.402  In the pre-
digital era, that assumption was fundamentally sound: when the 
attorney-client relationship terminated, the attorney would usually 
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return or arrange for secure destruction of the hard copies 
containing client confidential information.  If counsel retained 
such information in a warehouse, counsel remained under an 
obligation to ensure that the warehouse did not reveal or grant 
access to the former client’s confidential information.  However, if 
counsel ordered the secure destruction of such records, there was 
little or no risk of confidential data persisting in the way it does on 
a cloud service provider’s digital storage media. 
It appears to be consistent with the spirit of NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) 
and MRPC Rule 1.6 that if counsel entrusts client confidential 
information to a cloud service provider and its digital media, 
counsel appears to have an ethical obligation to exercise 
reasonable care to ensure that the service provider does not reveal 
(or allow access to) that information from the time it receives it 
until such time as it securely sanitizes such data in accordance with 
the standards set forth in NIST 800-88.  Reading the NYRPC more 
narrowly and accepting the gap that appears to exist with respect to 
protection of a former client’s confidential information would 
appear to be inconsistent with the intent of the NYRPC, and would 
risk damage to counsel’s relationship with clients and its 
reputation. 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
If counsel discusses with a client the cybersecurity issues that 
may arise from entrusting the client’s confidential information to a 
cloud service provider and its digital media, it also would seem 
prudent for counsel to discuss carefully with the client the 
cybersecurity issues that may need to be addressed in order to 
ensure that data sanitization measures will be sufficient to protect 
such information in the circumstances we have reviewed.  It would 
be prudent for counsel also to review with the client the risks that 
data stored on the cloud, and not frequently accessed by the client, 
might eventually cease to be readable by a client’s equipment.403 
Before discussing such issues with a client, counsel will need to 
consider carefully whether its agreement with the cloud service 
provider covers the full range of risks of confidential data 
remaining on digital storage media and requires the 
 
 403. See Robert Plant, To Cloud, or Not to Cloud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2011, at R9 
(“[C]ompanies can’t just hand over data [to a cloud service provider] and forget 
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implementation of safeguards commensurate with such risks.  
Counsel should anticipate that cloud service providers may resist 
being required to provide such safeguards.  The omission from the 
cloud service providers’ terms of service of any discussion of the 
secure eradication of confidential data suggests that providers are 
not attending to this issue.  Counsel cannot safely ignore or 
postpone addressing such issues.  Once the lawyer or law firm 
entrusts a client’s confidential data to a cloud service provider, the 
problem of such data’s eventual eradication is inevitable.  Delaying 
addressing it will likely reduce counsel’s leverage in negotiating 
such issues with the cloud service provider, and risks having a data 
breach occur, with all of the attendant risks. 
In order to address such issues adequately, lawyers and law 
firms should confer with prospective cloud service providers and, at 
a minimum, map out in detail each digital storage or digital 
recording of client information that may occur once a copy of the 
data is transferred from counsel’s computer to the cloud’s servers.  
From that map, counsel can identify the probable circumstances 
under which the media will leave the cloud service provider’s 
control and require “purging” at the standard set by NIST 800-88.404 
Counsel’s ethical obligations cannot be fulfilled by accepting a 
vendor’s position that the required precautions are too 
burdensome, are too expensive, and would impose operational 
inefficiencies.  Cost and efficiency are not unimportant, but the 
ethical obligations to protect a client’s confidential information 
remain an imperative.  Protecting client confidences and client 
confidential information is essential for a client to trust its counsel.  
The promised benefits of cloud computing appear to be 
significant, but so far they also appear to have obscured the need to 
address how and when the cloud service provider must securely 
sanitize client confidential data in order to prevent its disclosure to 
unauthorized persons.  With so much attention focused on getting 
data onto the cloud and on the possible loss of data while in the 
cloud, the promoters of cloud computing and their customers risk 
overlooking the problem of data remaining on a cloud service 
provider’s servers long after data were supposedly “deleted,” 
transferred, or backed up.  The proliferation of storage sites 
multiplies the risks that such data may be disclosed to or accessed 
by unauthorized persons.  Because counsel appear to remain 
obligated to protect such data, even when the data relate to matters 
 
 404. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7–8. 
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of a former client, the increase in the risks to the data would 
appear to also increase the ethical risks for counsel. 
j. Increased Risk of Inadvertent Grant of Licenses to Client’s 
Intellectual Property 
It probably would appear farfetched to many clients and their 
counsel that the storage of data on a cloud vendor’s servers, or the 
use of the cloud vendor’s services and software, could result in the 
grant of any license to the client’s intellectual property rights in its 
data.  However, certain cloud computing vendors require such 
grants in their standard customer service agreements.  If a law firm, 
for example, is considering authorizing its lawyers to use Google 
Docs, as a cloud-based substitute for perhaps Microsoft Word, or 
fails to prohibit its lawyers from using such an application, the law 
firm would probably find it objectionable that Google’s Terms of 
Use for Google Docs include a grant to Google, by the data 
customer, of a so-called “content license” that states, in pertinent 
part: 
 11. Content license from you. 11.1 [B]y submitting, 
posting or displaying the content you give Google a 
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-
exclusive license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, 
publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute 
any Content which you submit, post or display on or 
through, the [Google Docs] Services . . . . 11.3 You 
understand that Google, in performing the required 
technical steps to provide the Services to our users, may 
(a) transmit or distribute your Content over various public 
networks . . . and (b) make such changes to your Content 
as are necessary to conform and adapt that Content to the 
technical requirements of connecting networks, devices, 
services or media. You agree that this license shall permit 
Google to take these actions.”405 
Google’s response, however, addresses issues only that arise 
under its Terms of Service, Section 11.1, and thus ignores those 
that arise under Section 11.2 and 11.3.  Moreover, the “content 
license” is far broader than what Google’s response describes it to 
be. If it were not, it would contain only the language set forth in 
the response, and not the far more extensive reach attained by the 
operative words “license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate, 
 
 405. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.google 
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publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute any 
Content which you submit, post or display.”  If all Google needs to 
do is have a license to ensure it has “permission to display,” it would 
not need to include in the “content license” an express grant of 
rights to “publicly perform,” “modify,” “translate,” and “adapt,” 
which arguably also grants Google by implication a right to create 
derivative works. 
To say the license is one thing, when it clearly says the opposite 
and reaches far beyond the explained scope is fundamentally 
misleading, as is the suggestion that ownership is the only issue and 
that only those “not familiar with legal agreements” would find the 
scope of the “content license” deeply troubling.  When one looks 
again at Sections 11.2 and 11.3, it becomes evident that those 
sections contradict the position taken in Google’s response.  A 
need to ensure “permission to display” is not required by, and is 
inconsistent with, a statement that the grant of a “content license” 
includes “a right for Google to make such Content available to 
other companies, organizations or individuals with whom Google 
has relationships for the provision of syndicated services.”  In short, 
Google’s response is lamentable and could mislead unwary readers 
into overlooking what they are really granting Google the rights to 
do with their content.  For that reason, Google’s requirement that 
users grant it a “content license” raises serious ethical risks for a law 
firm or lawyers that use, or allow their staff to use, Google Docs 
when generating or revising documents that contain client 
confidential data and content in which the client has intellectual 
property rights. 
i. Ethical Issues 
There are probably few, if any, clients that would be willing to 
agree to grant a cloud vendor a right to any content that the client 
may generate or that its attorneys may generate through the use of 
a cloud-based, word-processing program such as Google Docs.  A 
lawyer or law firm would certainly also be unwilling to agree to 
grant such a license.  There is, however, an ethical risk that could 
be inadvertently overlooked by a law firm’s failure to ensure that its 
lawyers, and the personnel that they are responsible for 
supervising, decide on their own to use a cloud-based service whose 
terms of use included a “content license” similar to that required 
for use of Google Docs.  The detrimental effects that the grant of 
such a license could have to a client’s copyrights and trade secrets 
would severely damage a law firm’s relationship with its client and 
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could put the firm at risk of having acted in violation of the NYRPC 
and MRPC, including Rules 1.1 (to provide “competent 
representation”) and 1.6(a) (to protect “confidentiality” of client 
information). 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
The primary precaution to avert the risk of inadvertent grants 
of licenses to cloud vendors is for law firms to ensure that, as part 
of their ongoing efforts to keep abreast of new technologies, they 
extend such efforts to include a review of a representative sample 
of vendors’ standard terms and conditions.  To the extent that such 
review identifies risks, such as the express grant of “content 
licenses” or other unacceptable terms, the firm will probably find it 
prudent to modify their policies for employees and third-party 
contractors to highlight such risks and to consider prohibiting such 
personnel from letting any client confidential information become 
subject to any third-party vendors’ services agreement without 
express authorization by the firm.  The attraction that new 
communications technologies tend to exert, however, over 
personnel makes such prohibitions unpopular and difficult to 
enforce consistently throughout an enterprise.  Partners, associates, 
and other personnel are each, for different reasons, probably going 
to find circumstances where they believe that an exception to such 
prohibitions is warranted in order to achieve a desired 
convenience, or to meet an urgent deadline, or to obtain access to 
data when other means have become inefficient or unavailable.  As 
with any data security policy, it is such discretionary actions that can 
create vulnerabilities in a system, or in this context, result in an 
inadvertent and potentially costly grant of a “content license.” 
k. Increased Risk of Noncompliance with New or Amended 
Laws and Regulations 
When lawyers and law firms remain in control of the client 
confidential information entrusted to them, they also remain in a 
position to be able to adjust promptly and with agility to any new or 
amended laws and regulations that might apply to the storage, use, 
movement, retention, or security of such data.  When control over 
client confidential information is relinquished to a cloud 
computing vendor, changes in the law can create obligations for 
compliance that may be difficult, costly, and potentially impossible 
to fulfill while the data remains in the control of the cloud 
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computing vendor.  Such changes in the law or regulations tend to 
emerge and apply in specific regulated industries or activities such 
as health care, finance, securities, and defense and aerospace.  As 
an illustration, we will review here the emergence of a rule 
proposed by the DoD: an amendment to the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).406  The proposed 
DFARS rule, if adopted, would add a new subpart and associated 
contract clauses that would establish, for the first time,407 
requirements applicable to DoD contractors and subcontractors for 
the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information and the 
reporting to the Government cyber intrusions that affect 
unclassified DoD information resident on or transiting a 
contractor’s unclassified information systems (the “Cybersecurity 
Rule”).  The Cybersecurity Rule was initially described in March 
2010 in the DoD’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, 
seeking public comment on the rule408 and setting forth in greater 
detail in the proposed rule published in the Federal Register on 
June 29, 2011, seeking public comment to be considered in the 
formation of the final rule.409  Neither the March 2010 nor the June 
2011 drafts of the Cybersecurity Rule refers to cloud computing 
systems or appear to have any provisions that specifically address 
contractors that outsource their information systems to a cloud 
computer service provider.410  However, the June 2011 draft 
provides a definition of “Contractor information system” in a 
proposed contract clause entitled “Enhanced Safeguarding of 
 
 406. DFARS is a set of rules designed to assist members of the DoD when 
procuring goods and services (e.g., ammunition for military personnel).  About 
Defense Acquisition Regulations System, DPAP, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars 
/about.html (last updated Sept. 29, 2011). 
 407. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding 
Unclassified DoD Information (DFARS Case 2011–D039), 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089, 
38,089 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter DFARS], available at http://www.gpo.gov 
/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-06-29/pdf/2011-16399.pdf (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 
204, 252). The proposed DFARS are identified alpha-numerically, e.g., with the 
letters such as XX or YY at the end of the numeric sequence to signal their 
relationship to provisions in the existing regulation.  The DFARS does not 
presently address the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within 
industry, nor does it address cyber intrusion reporting for that information.  Id. 
 408. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding 
Unclassified Information (DFARS Case 2008–D028), 75 Fed. Reg. 9563, 9565 
(Mar. 3, 2010),  available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-03-03/pdf 
/2010-4173.pdf (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 204, 252). 
 409. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38089. 
 410. See DFARS, supra note 407; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement; Safeguarding Unclassified Information, supra note 408, at 9563. 
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Unclassified DoD Information” which would appear to apply to an 
information system that relies at least in part on a cloud computing 
system.411 
A cloud computing system serving a DoD Contractor would 
probably qualify as an information system “operated . . . for”412 the 
Contractor  or a subcontractor, and there is no provision in the 
Cybersecurity Rule that appears to exclude it from the Rule’s 
scope.413 
The Cybersecurity Rule exemplifies a recent trend in 
amendments to the DFARS and Federal Acquisition Regulations: 
the setting of enhanced standards for contractor conduct 
combined with new requirements for self-reporting of violations by 
the contractor to the Government.414  The Cybersecurity Rule 
establishes standards for contractor and subcontractor provision of 
cybersecurity for unclassified DoD information, requires 
contractors to report cyber intrusions that affect such information, 
and sets forth criteria by which the DoD’s Contracting Officers will 
then evaluate whether such intrusions demonstrated whether the 
reporting contractor, if it complied with the reporting obligations, 
nonetheless failed to fulfill its contractor obligations under the 
Rule to protect the compromised information.  As explained in the 
Cybersecurity Rule’s policy statement: 
A cyber incident that is properly reported by the 
contractor shall not, by itself, be interpreted as evidence 
that the contractor has failed to provide adequate 
information safeguards for DoD unclassified information, 
or has otherwise failed to meet the requirements of the 
clause at 252.204–70YY . . . . A cyber incident will be 
evaluated in context, and such events may occur even in 
cases when it is determined that adequate safeguards are 
being used in view of the nature and sensitivity of the DoD 
unclassified information and the anticipated threats.  
However, the Government may consider any such cyber 
incident in the context of an overall assessment of the 
contractor’s compliance with the requirements of the 
 
 411. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38093 (“As used in this clause . . . Contractor 
information system means an information system belonging to, or operated by or for, 
the Contractor or a subcontractor.”) (emphasis added). 
 412. Id. 
 413. See id. 
 414. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulations; FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor 
Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg. 
67,064, 67,075 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 9, 42, 52). 
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clause at 252.204–70YY.415 
The Cybersecurity Rule, if adopted in or near to its current 
form, will set two levels of data security or information protection 
that DoD contractors must implement and maintain: “basic 
safeguarding” and “enhanced safeguarding”416 against cyber 
intrusions that might result in “exfiltration” of information (i.e., 
“any unauthorized release of [DoD information] from within an 
information system” includes “copying the data through covert 
network channels or the copying of data to unauthorized 
media”).417  Separate contract clauses set forth the requirements for 
“basic safeguarding” and “enhanced safeguarding” (respectively, 
DFARS 252.204-70XX and 252.204-70YY).418 
“Basic safeguarding” requires the contractor to provide 
“adequate security to safeguard unclassified Government 
information” from unauthorized access and disclosure.419  These 
requirements apply to a contractor’s unclassified information 
system, but do not appear to apply to any such system operated for 
the contractor, except that the Rule appears to prohibit the 
contractor from handling such information in certain ways and 
thus would appear to require the contractor to flow down such 
requirements to any third-party operator handling such 
information on its behalf.  There are seven basic safeguards that a 
contractor must implement, each of which amounts to a common 
sense precaution, or put differently, the avoidance of actions that 
would put Government information at an unnecessarily high risk of 
“exfiltration.”420  Examples include the following: 
(1) Protecting unclassified Government information on public 
computers or websites: Do not process unclassified 
Government information on public computers (e.g., those 
available for use by the general public in kiosks, hotel 
business centers) or computers that do not have access 
control . . . . 
(2) Transmitting electronic information.  Transmit email, text 
messages . . . using technology and processes that provide 
the best level of security and privacy available, given 
facilities, conditions, and environment. 
 
 415. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38091–92. 
 416. Id. at 38090. 
 417. Id. at 38092. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 38093. 
 420. Id. 
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. . . . 
(5) Sanitization.  At a minimum, clear information421 on 
media that has been used to process unclassified 
Government information before external release or 
disposal.422 
Each of the above-quoted “basic safeguarding” requirements 
would appear, to varying extents, to be difficult, if not impossible, 
to fulfill if the contractor or its outside legal counsel received 
unclassified Government information, in connection with a DoD 
contract that contained the “basic safeguarding” clause (DFARS 
252.204-70XX), and processed and stored such information in a 
cloud computing vendor’s servers subject to a typical standard 
service level agreement.  This would be particularly the case if such 
agreement contained clauses similar to those discussed above in 
Amazon’s Web Service Agreement (i.e., one that made the 
customer responsible for information security that omitted any 
requirement for the vendor to sanitize media that contained 
customer data, or that did not commit to using any specified or 
high standard of data security).  If the cloud service level 
agreement did not require the vendor to ensure that its servers had 
“access controls,” the contractor and its outside legal counsel would 
be barred by DFARS 252.204-70XX from having Government 
information processed on the cloud service provider’s servers.  If 
the service level agreement did not require the vendor to 
implement the “best level of security . . . available, given facilities, 
conditions, and environment” (a rather ambiguous standard), then 
the contractor and its outside legal counsel could not transmit 
electronic information to each other through their service vendor’s 
cloud.  And if the service level agreement contained no 
requirement that matched or incorporated by reference the 
DFARS 252.204-70XX requirement for clearing media that has 
been used to process unclassified Government information before 
disposal of such media, then the contractor and its outside legal 
counsel would be prohibited from allowing any such information 
 
 421. The Cybersecurity Rule’s proposed text for DFARS 252.204-70XX defines 
“clearing information” as: 
[A] level of media sanitization that would protect the confidentiality of 
information against a robust keyboard attack.  Simple deletion of items would 
not suffice for clearing.  For example, overwriting is an acceptable method 
for clearing media.  The security goal of the overwriting process is to 
replace written data with random data. 
Id. at 38092 (emphasis added). 
 422. Id. 
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to be uploaded to their service vendor’s cloud.  Simple deletion of 
the data would violate the “clearing” requirement—overwriting of 
the data, or a similarly rigorous method, would need to be required 
of the vendor.423  Thus, the current standard service level 
agreement for cloud computing is inconsistent with, and an 
impediment to, a contractor’s obligations to implement and 
maintain “basic safeguarding” for unclassified DoD information.  
Neither the contractor nor its outside legal counsel could permit 
any such information to be uploaded to a cloud if the governing 
agreement were the current standard service level agreement, 
without putting the contractor at risk of breaching its contractual 
obligations to the Government under DFARS 252.204-70XX.  It 
also would put its outside legal counsel at risk of violating 
professional ethical obligations, including to provide “competent 
representation” and to maintain “confidentiality” of the client’s 
information. 
The “enhanced safeguarding” requirements set significantly 
higher standards for security than the basic safeguarding 
requirements impose.  As a consequence, “enhanced safeguarding” 
creates commensurately greater obstacles for a contractor seeking 
to comply with the contractual requirements of the proposed 
DFARS clause 252.204-70YY and for its outside legal counsel 
seeking to fulfill applicable ethical obligations under NYRPC or the 
Model Code.  Proposed DFARS 252.204-70YY directly applies to a 
contractor’s information system “operated . . . for, the Contractor” 
and thus to any cloud computing system used by the contractor for 
processing or storage of unclassified DoD information.  Note that 
DoD contractors would be barred from processing or storing 
classified DoD information in the cloud, because doing so would 
almost certainly bring the contractor into noncompliance with the 
applicable requirements of National Industrial Security Program 
(NISP) Operating Manual (NISPOM), which establishes the 
requirements for all government contractors for the handling of 
classified information.424  The “enhanced safeguarding” 
requirements apply to seven categories of unclassified DoD 
information, including: 
• Information designated as “Critical Program Information,” 
 
 423. See id. (defining “clearing information”). 
 424. The currently applicable NISPOM is the February 2006 version.  U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM (NISP), DEF. SECURITY 
SERVICE, available at http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/download_nispom.html 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
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defined as elements of a “research, development, or 
acquisition program, that, if compromised, could cause 
significant degradation in mission effectiveness; shorten the 
expected combat-effective life of the system; reduce 
technological advantage; significantly alter program direction; 
or enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse 
engineer the technology or capability”;425 or as “critical 
information”;426 
• Information subject to export controls under the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR);427 
• Information designated for controlled access and 
dissemination (e.g., “For Official Use Only,” “Sensitive But 
Unclassified,” “Proprietary”); 
• Technical data, computer software, and certain other technical 
information designated by DoD directives;428 and 
• Personally identifiable information, including information 
protected pursuant to the Privacy Act and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).429 
Because those categories include information covered by the 
ITAR, EAR, HIPAA, as well as information that qualifies as 
“Proprietary” or as technical data and computer software, virtually 
all DoD contractors and subcontractors would have such 
information on their systems.  If awarded a contract containing the 
Cybersecurity Rule’s proposed clause 252.204-70YY, such 
contractors would need to implement policies and procedures to 
ensure fulfillment of the “enhanced safeguarding” requirements.  
There are, however, several of the “enhanced safeguarding” 
requirements that would be difficult, if not impossible, for a 
contractor to fulfill if it allowed such information to be processed 
or stored on the cloud under cloud vendors’ current, standard 
service-level or customer agreements.  The contractor must 
• Implement, at a minimum, the security controls identified in 
 
 425. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38093.  Such information is designated in 
accordance with DoD Instruction 5200.39.  Id. 
 426. Id.  Such information is designated in accordance with DoD Directive 
5205.02.  Id. 
 427. Id. at 38093. 
 428. The applicable directives are DoD Directive 5230.24, Distribution 
Statements on Technical Documents (D.O.D 1987), and DoD Directive 5230.25 
(D.O.D. 1984), Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public 
Disclosure.  DFARS, supra note 407, at 38092–94. 
 429. Id. at 38094. 
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NIST Special Publication (“SP”) 800-53, set forth in a table in 
the Enhanced Safeguarding clause of DFARS 252.204-70YY;430 
• Procure and use only DoD-approved identity authentication 
credentials for authentication to DoD information systems;431 
• Report to the DoD “within 72 hours of discovery of any cyber 
incident . . . that affects DoD information resident on or 
transiting through the Contractor’s unclassified information 
systems”;432 and 
• Take specific actions in response to a reported cyber incident.  
The contractor must 
 “Conduct an immediate review of its unclassified network 
for evidence of intrusion . . .”; 
 Identify specific DoD information accessed by the 
intrusion; 
 Preserve and protect “images of known affected 
information systems and all relevant monitoring/packet 
capture data until DoD has received the image and 
completes its analysis, or declines interest”; and 
 Cooperate with the DoD Damage Assessment 
Management Office to identify systems compromised.433 
Cloud vendors’ current standard-service-level or customer 
agreements would not enable a contractor and the contractor’s 
outside legal counsel to fulfill such requirements.  Since such 
agreements omit any obligation for the cloud vendor to report to 
the customer any data breach or intrusion or to allow for post-
intrusion investigations by the customer, the contractor and its 
outside legal counsel could not fulfill the cyber intrusion reporting 
obligations of the Cybersecurity Rule’s “enhanced safeguarding” 
clause.  Furthermore, the cloud vendor service-level agreements 
would, in their current form, not enable a contractor and its 
outside legal counsel to implement the required security controls 
and identity authentication credentials. 
It may be that the Cybersecurity Rule will be further revised in 
response to comments to address the possibility of contractors 
allowing the covered information to be processed and stored in the 
 
 430. Id. at 38094 tbl.1. 
 431. Id. at 38094. 
 432. Id.  The clause specifies that reportable cyber incidents include those 
“involving possible data exfiltration or manipulation or other loss or compromise 
of DoD information resident on or transiting through its, or its subcontractors’, 
unclassified information systems.”  Id. 
 433. Id. at 30895. 
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cloud, but unless such permissions are explicitly expressed in the 
rule, it would not appear possible for a contractor to fulfill its 
obligations under either the “basic safeguarding” or the “enhanced 
safeguarding” contract clauses.  For the same reasons, a DoD 
contractor’s outside counsel could not allow information from the 
contractor, subject to the Cybersecurity Rule, to be processed or 
stored in the cloud without putting its client at risk of breaching 
the Cybersecurity Rule’s contract clauses, and, by doing so, putting 
counsel at risk of failing to fulfill its professional ethical obligations.  
As a result, a lawyer or law firm whose clients include, or might 
come to include, a DoD contractor or subcontractor would need to 
take extraordinary precautions to avoid allowing such client 
information from being included, processed, or stored in the 
cloud, if counsel had decided to use cloud computing services.  
Although we have drawn this illustration from the DoD, because of 
its apparent commitment to implementing a final version of the 
Cybersecurity Rule in the near future, similar regulatory obligations 
could be imposed by other federal or state agencies.  Such 
obligations could make it difficult and costly for a lawyer or law 
firm if they belatedly reconsider whether it was prudent to use 
cloud computing for processing and storing client confidential 
information. 
l. Potential Ethical Risks from Emerging Technology that 
Causes Digital Data to Self-Destruct  
Computer scientists at the University of Washington developed 
a research prototype version of a technology, referred to as 
“Vanish,” which encrypts digital records (including documents and 
e-mails), but also enables the author to set a time after which the 
digital data self-destructs.434  Some web services reportedly already 
offer to perform a similar function, and “electronic devices like 
FLASH memory chips have added this capability for protecting 
stored data by automatically erasing it after a specified period of 
time.”435  With the Vanish technology, the digital data would have a 
fairly precise time frame within which the data would cease to exist.  
The subject digital data, such as a file, an e-mail, or an instant 
message, is “encapsulated” in what the researchers termed a 
 
 434.  Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 1. 
 435. See John Markoff, New Technology to Make Digital Data Disappear on Purpose, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2009, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07 
/21/science/21crypto.html. 
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“vanishing data object” or “VDO.”  This VDO prevents the data 
contents from persisting beyond a specified time, causing it to self-
destruct, thus averting it from becoming “a source of retroactive 
information leakage.”436
  
The researchers claim that the self-
destruction prevents an “attacker” from accessing the data once it 
has been “encapsulated” in a VDO.  Regardless of whether the 
VDO is copied, transmitted, or stored in the Internet, it becomes 
unreadable after a predefined period of time even if an attacker 
retroactively obtains both a pristine copy of the VDO from before its 
expiration and all of the user’s past persistent cryptographic keys 
and passwords.437
  
The specified period of the digital data’s persistence, once 
encapsulated in a VDO, is quite limited—between eight and nine 
hours: 
By default, the data will be available with high probability 
for 8 hours after its encapsulation and will become 
unavailable with high probability after 9 hours. During the 
one hour between 8 and 9 hours, the data’s state is 
undetermined: it could be available or unavailable, 
although it typically remains available for close to 9 
hours.438
  
Once that time expires, the digital data become irretrievable from 
“all Web sites, inboxes, outboxes, backup sites and home 
computers. Not even the sender could retrieve them.”439
  
The 
process by which the digital data is encrypted and timed to self-
destruct is as follows: 
The Vanish prototype washes away data using the natural 
turnover, called “churn,” on large file-sharing systems 
known as peer-to-peer networks. For each message that it 
sends, Vanish creates a secret key, which it never reveals to 
the user, and then encrypts the message with that key. It 
then divides the key into dozens of pieces and sprinkles 
those pieces on random computers that belong to 
worldwide file-sharing networks, the same ones often used 
to share music or movie files. The file-sharing system 
constantly changes as computers join or leave the 
 
 436. Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 4. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Jared Moya, “Vanish” Uses BitTorrent to Make Data Disappear, ZEROPAID 
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/86800/vanish-uses-bittorrent-to-
make-data-disappear. 
 439. See Press Release, Hannah Hickey, Univ. of Wash., This Article Will Self-
Destruct: A Tool to Make Online Personal Data Vanish (July 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2009-07/uow-taw072109.php. 
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network, meaning that over time parts of the key become 
permanently inaccessible. Once enough key parts are lost, 
the original message can no longer be deciphered.440
  
Because the researchers developed Vanish to avoid the risks 
arising from the fact that “users’ sensitive data can persist ‘in the 
cloud’ indefinitely . . . sometimes even after the user’s account 
termination,”441
  the main requirement for use of the technology is 








The Vanish prototype deployed exists in three applications, 
each posing different ethical challenges to lawyers and law firms 
who are asked by clients to advise on the adoption and use of the 
technology.  In one application, “FireVanish,” the technology is 
implemented in a Firefox browser plugin for Gmail and enables 
the sender to encapsulate Gmail-based e-mails that could be 
“decapsulated” by the recipient, provided the recipient does so 
before the VDO times out and causes the e-mail to self-destruct. 
In a second application, “FireVanish Extension for the Web,” 
the technology is implemented through a Firefox browser plugin 
that enables the user to “select text in any Web page input box, 
right click on that selected text, and cause FireVanish to replace 
that text in-line with an encapsulated VDO.”444  By that process, a 
user can cause “messages on Facebook, documents on Google docs, 
or instant messages on Google Talk” to self-destruct when the VDO 
time limit expires.445 
In the third, and probably the most ethically problematic 
application, “Vanishing Files,” the technology could create a “self-
destructing trash bin” or self-destructing Microsoft Word 
autosave.446  Files moved to a computer’s “trash bin” or that have 
been backed up using Word’s autosave would be collectively or 
individually wrapped in a VDO, and when the VDO expires, the 
cleartext of each file would be deleted from the storage disk and 
the VDO would be stored in place of the files.447  Apparently, a very 
important arena for concern, a subsequent mirror image made of 
 
 440. Id. 
 441. Moya, supra note 438. 
 442. Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 10. 
 443. Id. at 7 (explaining decapsulation as recovering cleartext back from a 
VDO). 
 444. Id. at 10. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
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the disk as part of a court-supervised e-discovery or a government 
investigation would be unable to recover the cleartext of the files, 
for as the researchers explain (referring to the party seeking the 
data as an “attacker”): 
This ensures that, even if an attacker copies the raw bits 
from the laptop’s disks after the timeout, the data within 
the VDO will be unavailable. Like traditional file 
encryption, Vanishing Files relies upon existing 
techniques for securely shredding data stored on disks or 
memory.448
 
Although the researchers claim that, with their technology, 
“users can regain control over the lifetimes of their Web objects, 
such as private messages on Facebook, documents on Google Docs, 
or private photos on Flickr,” their paper on the subject shows 
seemingly subversive interest in helping litigants evade the reach of 
lawyers and e-discovery processes.449  For example, their paper 
provides the following text to a figure depicting the operation of 
the technology: 
Ann wants to discuss her marital relationship with her 
friend, Carla, but does not want copies stored by 
intermediate services to be used in a potential child 
dispute trial in the future . . . . The screenshot shows how 
Carla reads a vanishing email that Ann has already sent to 
her using our Vanish Email Firefox plugin for Gmail.450
 
The accompanying figure shows Ann and Carla linked by Hotmail 
and Gmail servers that are surrounded by a “cloud” outside of 
which is a frowning emoticon labeled “Husband’s lawyer” and 
above which are the words “Future subpoena,” suggesting that the 
technology could enable the sender to evade or circumvent court 
ordered discovery processes.451  Moreover, in a section entitled 
“Avoiding Retroactive Privacy Attacks,” the researchers reveal that 
undermining the legal discovery process is actually one of their 
primary motivations for development of Vanish.452  They do not 
appear to have a high opinion of lawyers and judges’ efforts to 
develop ways to manage e-discovery, or of the salient importance to 
fair trials or the access to, and admissibility of, contemporaneously 
generated written records.  As they explain: 
 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. at 1. 
 450. Id. at 2. 
 451. Id. 
 452. See id. at 11. 
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Attackers. Our motivation is to protect against retroactive 
data disclosures, e.g., in response to a subpoena, court 
order, malicious compromise of archived data, or 
accidental leakage. For some of these cases, such as the 
subpoena, the party initiating the subpoena is the obvious 
“attacker.” The final attacker could be a user’s ex-
husband’s lawyer, an insurance company, or a prosecutor. 
But executing a subpoena is a complex process involving 
many other actors . . . . For our purposes, we define all the 
involved actors as the “adversary.” 
. . . . 
 Deployment Decisions . . . . Vanish is oriented 
towards personal users concerned that old emails, 
Facebook messages, text messages, or files might come 
back to “bite” them . . . .453 
The researchers acknowledge that lawyers have advised them that, 
as they express it, 
‘Vanish is ahead of the law.’  Specifically, Vanish in some 
commercial or government settings may raise interesting 
issues related to eDiscovery and public record laws.   
. . . . 
. . . [I]t is not absolutely clear what the legal implications 
of using Vanish might be. 
. . . . 
 To the best of our knowledge, however, it is OK to 
use Vanish for personal purposes in the U.S. assuming 
that the user is not involved in a legal proceeding nor is 
expecting to be involved in a legal proceeding . . . . Some 
legal scholars have, however, observed that – because of 
their ephemeral nature – VDOs by design are more like 
‘conversations’ than ‘documents.’ Data retention laws may 
therefore not apply to Vanish. However, we stress again 
that we are not lawyers.454 
 
 453. Id. at 11–12. 
 454. Frequently Asked Questions, VANISH [hereinafter Old_vanish_faq.html] 
(previously published copies of the Vanish FAQ on file with the authors).  The 
authors would like to thank Professor Geambasu for providing us with a copy of 
the “old_vanish_faq.html” file and for re-posting the paper she and her University 
of Washington colleagues wrote in 2009 after our inquiry to her about its 
whereabouts. For some additional analysis of Vanish, see Self Destructing Digital 
Data, P2PNET, http://www.p2pnet.net/story/26730 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
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i. Analysis of Ethical Issues 
The developers of the new self-destructing digital data 
technology are clearly aware that use of such technology might 
cause the destruction of electronic records during a legal 
proceeding, or in anticipation of a lawsuit, or during investigation, 
and would raise serious ethical issues for any lawyer advising a 
client, because such actions would likely result in a judicial finding 
of spoliation and possibly severe sanctions.  It is troubling that the 
researchers do not appear to recognize the value of 
contemporaneously generated records, and the greater accuracy 
and credibility that such records have when compared to a witness 
testifying on the basis of limited (and potentially biased) memory 
months or years after an event as to what may or may not have been 
communicated between parties on matters at issue in the litigation 
or investigation.  Given the widespread reportage of parties 
suffering adversely from introduction into evidence of their 
electronic communications,455 it should be anticipated that self-
destructing digital data technology could come into popular use 
rather rapidly.  Since the technology is already available, it is 
prudent to consider the potential ethical issues before clients 
become tempted to use it without consulting legal counsel. 
If a lawyer is representing a client in a lawsuit or government 
investigation, or a client who reasonably anticipates the start of a 
lawsuit or government investigation, the lawyer should not advise 
the client to use any technology that would cause a communication 
of potential relevance to the lawsuit or investigation to self-destruct.  
Doing so would have the effect of suppressing evidence that the 
client is required to preserve and may be required to produce in 
the lawsuit or investigation.  To assist in such conduct would likely 
violate NYRPC Rule 3.4(a)(1), which mandates that a lawyer shall 
not “suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the client has a legal 
obligation to reveal or produce.”456
 
MRPC Rule 3.4(a) contains a slightly different mandate.  The 
 
 455. See Tracey Tyler, Email Evidence is Changing the Law, TORONTO STAR (June 
9, 2007), http://www.thestar.com/news/article/223386, for a non-comprehensive 
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MRPC states that a lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another 
party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”457  
MRPC Rule 3.4(a) clearly encompasses the preservation of 
evidence based on the anticipation of litigation.  The stated 
purpose of the rule is to maintain fair competition in litigation.458  
VDOs, clearly undermine the purpose of MRPC Rule 3.4(a). 
There would appear to be little or no genuine support for the 
researchers’ claim that written communications that have been 
“encapsulated” as VDOs are “more like ‘conversations’ than 
‘documents.’”459  A lawyer who relied on that argument as the basis 
for his or her advice that such records were not subject to data 
retention duties under the applicable federal rules would be in 
violation of the prohibitions against suppressing evidence that the 
client has a legal obligation to produce contained in NYRPC Rule 
3.4(a)(1) and MRPC Rule 3.4(a).  
If the lawyer was aware that such an argument was without 
merit, then in advising a client to use a digital record self-destruct 
technology during a “litigation hold,” for example, the lawyer also 
would be at risk of violating either NYRPC Rule 3.2 or MRPC Rule 
3.2 on delay of litigation.  NYRPC Rule 3.2 states: “In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause 
needless expense.” 460  MRPC Rule 3.2 contains a broader 
requirement that a “lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to 
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”461  
MRPC Rule 3.2 was intended to encompass tactics used for the sole 
purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to seek redress, 
even where the conduct would otherwise not bring the lawyer into 
conflict with the rules of the court.462  In defending a client’s use of 
vanishing data objects, a lawyer must therefore be aware of the 
boundaries of the lawyer’s own ethical requirement in court. 
More problematic are the potential ethical issues that might 
arise in the context of a corporate client asking whether it should 
adopt a digital data self-destruct technology for use in sending 
confidential communications, whether those are internal or with 
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strategic allies in ongoing transactions.  In the era before clients 
generated electronic records when they sent written 
communications, counsel would sometimes advise that clients not 
make any notes on such documents and that they place their notes 
instead on Post-Its that the client could remove a few days or weeks 
later.  However, the new digital data self-destruct technology would 
affect the durability of the basic communication itself, not merely 
notes concerning it.  And since the durability is limited to a mere 
eight or nine hours, the technology may make a poor choice for 
the kind of corporate communications needed for transactions and 
negotiations.463  There would be many situations in which a client is 
far better served by creating a durable communication, because it 
may need such a record as evidence to support its position in the 
event of litigation. 
However, what if the client has started to become 
apprehensive about a transaction that could turn into a legal 
dispute, but has not developed so clearly in that direction as to 
require the issuance of a “litigation hold”?  The client wants to 
communicate internally about what it describes as “litigation 
avoidance” strategies, but which also contain elements of strategies 
to position the client in the event that litigation breaks out.  
Clients, of course, can be advised to communicate orally, but not in 
writing, in order to avoid creating a written record that could be 
misinterpreted or adverse to the client and that might have to be 
produced during an ensuing discovery.  In such circumstances 
could counsel advise the client to make selective use of a digital 
data’s self-destruct technology to ensure that any written 
communications that might otherwise be discoverable would 
destruct within eight or nine hours and, thus, not even exist by the 
time a litigation hold would be issued? 
Advising a client to avoid making a written record does not 
promote a course of action that results in spoliation of evidence.  
Similarly, advising a client to implement and adhere to a 
“document retention” policy with routine destruction of 
documents in accordance with an established timetable (such as 
purging all records that are older than a set number of years) does 
not constitute spoliation of evidence, unless the lawyer fails to 
ensure that when a litigation hold is issued the document retention 
 
 463. See Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at ¶ 5.1 (“Nodes further remove from 
their caches all values whose store timestamp is more than 8 hours old. This 
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policy is suspended promptly and throughout the client’s 
enterprise.  Those are quite different from a hypothetical in which 
the client asks for its lawyer’s approval of the use of a digital data 
self-destruct technology for written communications that may 
become relevant to a law suit whose potential is the subject of such 
communications.  Here the conduct, while perhaps not illegal, 
appears to cross the line into the unethical.  To recommend the 
use of such technology (which is precisely the situation in which 
the researchers appear to recommend that customers use their 
technology) would pose a serious risk of violating both MRPC Rule 
8.4(c) and (d) as well as NYRPC Rule 8.4 (c) and (d), both of 
which mandate that a lawyer or law firm shall not “engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” 
or “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”464 
The ethical issues become potentially more perilous if the 
digital data self-destruct technology is used to eradicate and remove 
all traces of files moved to a computer’s “trash bin.” Clients facing a 
government investigation or a lawsuit and harboring doubts about 
the use that might be made by the government or adversaries of 
certain files might give serious consideration to making a “last 
minute” sweep of such files into a computer’s “trash bin” that has 
been equipped with a “Vanishing Files” feature.  The most likely 
ethical risk here for the client’s lawyer(s) and law firm is not that 
the lawyers or law firm would have advised the client to take such 
action, but that the lawyers or law firm, aware of the technology 
and of the client’s adoption of it, failed to oversee the “litigation 
hold” with sufficient vigilance to prevent any personnel of the 
client from causing such files to be encapsulated in a VDO and 
letting them to self-destruct when that VDO expires a few hours 
later.  Because a client’s litigation or trial counsel have a duty to 
oversee, and not merely to help issue, a “litigation hold” notice 
through the client’s enterprise, and since counsel are also 
responsible for familiarizing themselves with the client’s 
information technologies, such as those that perform back-ups and 
overwrites of electronic records (and to avert inadvertent 
destruction of potentially relevant records), such duties would 
appear to extend also to knowing of the existence, operation, and 
use of a digital data self-destruction technology. 
Failing to develop that knowledge and to avert the misuse of it 
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to circumvent electronic discovery obligations would create 
grounds for a finding of spoliation, but could constitute a violation 
of NYRPC Rules 3.4(a)(1) (suppressing evidence), 8.4(c) (conduct 
involving deceit), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  Such conduct also would implicate the 
corresponding MRPC rules. 
ii. Considerations and Precautions 
In light of the potentially disruptive effect that digital data self-
destruction technology could have on a client’s fulfillment of its 
electronic discovery duties and the adverse consequences that 
could result, it would be prudent for lawyers and law firms to 
familiarize themselves with the technology and to monitor closely 
its development and use.  Clients that may be considering adopting 
the technology should be encouraged to develop clear policies for 
the use and cessation of use of the technology in order to avoid the 
risk of spoliation.  Similarly, it would be prudent for law firms to 
develop internal policies that would educate associates who might 
fail to appreciate the risks of advising that a client use such 
technology when doing so might potentially be a disservice to the 
client, but might create ethical risks for the associate, the partner 
supervising the associate, and the law firm.  Moreover, although the 
researchers use highly persuasive metaphors to tout the technology 
(e.g., using Vanish is like “writing a message in the sand at low tide, 
where it can be read for only a few hours before the tide comes in 
and permanently washes it away”),465 it is important to notice that 
such metaphors can mislead as well as persuade, and that to the 
extent that they suggest that use of the technology is simply a 
“conversation” and not the creation of a “document” it is seriously 
misleading and ethically hazardous for lawyers and law firms who 
might not closely scrutinize the technology in the context of 
electronic discovery obligations. 
Most importantly, the emergence of digital data self-
destruction technology brings with it an implicit duty for lawyers 
and law firms (especially litigation counsel but also others who may 
advise during a pre-litigation phase) to familiarize themselves with 
the technology, the ways in which its touted capabilities may 
encourage a client to use the technology to the client’s serious 
disadvantage (since spoliation often turns out to be a form of self-
sabotage), and the extent to which the client may have made such 
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technology available to its personnel.  The risks of misuse of such 
technology arise directly from the kinds of claims that the 
researchers make for their technology: that it can spare the user 
from getting “bitten” by correspondence and documents authored 
by the user.  That view is not only short-sighted, but it also seriously 
misperceives and distorts the legal obligations that many corporate 
clients have to preserve records of transactions and to preserve 
potentially relevant evidence in anticipation of litigation or 
government investigation.  Part of understanding a new 
communications technology is becoming aware of its potential 
appeal.  Counsel also needs to understand that clients may be 
tempted to adopt the new technology in the mistaken belief that 
they are thereby going to escape the consequences of 
communications that may harm them in litigation. 
V. WAVES OF RECENT CYBER-ATTACKS HAVE CHANGED THE 
INFORMATION SECURITY LANDSCAPE 
Prior to submitting this article, several high-profile security 
incidents occurred.466  The rapidity and intensity of such incidents 
suggests that cyber service vendors and subscribers of their services 
may be underestimating the vulnerabilities of, threats to, and risks 
for a company’s digital assets (1) stored on its premises (but that 
remain accessible by attackers through the Internet because the 
storage media of such assets are not “air gapped” from it) and (2) 
stored in the cloud.  These reported incidents and the trends that 
they suggest make it increasingly difficult for an organization to 
make a definitive risk assessment for its digital assets, because such 
incidents may provide evidence of assumptions and analyses that 
have obsolesced much earlier than anticipated and may need to be 
updated before making a major decision that relies upon them.  As 
some commentators noted in mid-June 2011: 
The roster of hack victims over the last two weeks has 
been spectacular: the International Monetary Fund, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, Sony, the Turkish 
government, Citibank and the US Senate inter alia.  If it 
wasn’t obvious before, events in cyberspace have made it 
abundantly clear there are only two types of company in 
the world—those that know they’ve been hacked and those that 
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don’t . . . . It is axiomatic that companies should have the 
security of their electronic networks at the top of their 
agenda . . . . [Notwithstanding the latest governmental 
and military safeguards] networked computer systems 
have never been more vulnerable.467 
These attacks should dispel remaining doubts that enterprises are 
vulnerable to cyberattacks. The attacks also reveal that public 
clouds add to the vulnerability of enterprises that migrate data to 
the cloud. As another commentator observed: 
Recent high-profile hacking attacks, such as the theft of 
more than 100m customers’ details from Sony and a four-
day outage at Amazon that took down thousands of 
websites, have done nothing to reassure companies about 
the security of cloud computing . . . . Ryan Rubin, U.K. 
head of security and privacy at Protiviti, an IT security 
company says: ‘There aren’t many people putting mission-
critical data in the cloud.  The crown jewels—customer 
records, for example—are still very much embedded in 
the organization.’  A director at one London investment 
bank says: ‘We use the cloud for things such as e-mail.  We 
would never put our client services on it.’468 
As a result, decisions involving transactions based on due 
diligence assessments of the short- and long-term security of digital 
assets now appear increasingly to resemble decisions in corporate 
transactions where the findings of due diligence investigations 
completed before the signing of definitive contractual agreements 
are updated and reviewed to verify compliance with conditions for 
closing the deal.  Similarly, because the addition of an information 
technology capability (whether it be in the form of a new web page, 
mobile app, or cloud-based feature) creates the potential for 
numerous new routes for attackers, it may be increasingly 
important for negotiators of corporate transactions to include 
consideration of a freeze on such additions or a closely monitored 
and evaluated reporting of such additions between the signing and 
the closing of major transactions.  A recent observation by the chief 
executive of Korea's Hyundai Capital further acknowledges the 
growing risks of cyber attacks and the importance of technology 
risk assessment in corporate planning.469 
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VI. MOST RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NIST 
When boards of directors and their legal counsel try to 
understand and assess the significance of security incidents at other 
organizations and the ethical challenges such incidents may add to 
an enterprise’s decisions concerning the use of web-based and 
cloud-based communications, data processing, and storage, it 
would be prudent for them to include in such a review the 
comments and recommendations contained in NIST’s “Cloud 
Computing Synopsis and Recommendations”, Special Publication 
800-146 (the “Cloud Synopsis”).  The Cloud Synopsis was published 
in May 2011 as we were revising this article.  Since time and space 
constraints preclude a full discussion of the Cloud Synopsis, in this 
part of the article, we summarize some of its most significant 
observations and recommendations. 
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis endeavors to describe the current types 
of cloud computing and to discuss their strengths and weaknesses.  
In doing so, the draft’s most significant contribution may be its 
highlighting of certain problematic views of the cloud, starting with 
NIST’s own earlier proposed definition of cloud computing.  
“Attempts to describe cloud computing in general terms . . . have 
been problematic because cloud computing is not a single kind of 
system, but instead spans a spectrum of underlying technologies, 
configuration possibilities, service models, and deployment 
models.”470 
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis identifies the following security 
considerations that businesses would be prudent to consider 
carefully when deciding whether to move part or all of their digital 
assets and digital processing into the hands of a cloud computing 
service provider. 
• Aggregated data: “Clouds . . . have potential to aggregate an 
unprecedented quantity and variety of customer data in cloud 
data centers.  This potential vulnerability requires a high 
degree of confidence and transparency that cloud providers 
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can keep customer data isolated and protected.”471 
• Reliance on web browsers: “Cloud users and administrators rely 
heavily on Web browsers, so browser security failures can lead 
to cloud security breaches.”472  The security risks may begin at 
the handshake.  The subscriber’s browser and cloud provider’s 
server start by negotiating a shared key and then use that key 
to encrypt communications between the subscriber and the 
cloud.  However, this reliance on encryption offers only 
limited protection, “because past implementation errors or 
protocol flaws have enabled man-in-the-middle attacks that 
could allow an attacker to hijack a subscriber’s cloud 
resources.473  Moreover, strong encryption is susceptible to 
weakening by implementation errors, making “brute force 
guessing attacks” more likely to succeed.474 
• Importance of access boundaries: The NIST Cloud Synopsis adopts 
the concept of “access boundaries to organize and characterize 
the different cloud deployment models.”475  NIST uses the 
term to refer to both an external boundary (such as enforced, 
in part, by firewalls) and more generically to boundaries 
“between different privilege levels of running software, e.g., 
between applications and operating systems.”  NIST 
emphasizes the need to avoid uncontrolled access paths—
those without sufficient access boundaries: 
When uncontrolled paths to computing resources 
exist, a security perimeter is weakened or may not 
even exist.  Pervasive wireless communications, e.g., 
are a threat to security perimeters since there may be 
no reliable way to interpose a boundary controller 
between external and internal entities.  Similarly, 
many organizations use mobile devices that are 
sometimes connected within an organization’s 
security perimeter, and sometimes exposed directly, 
e.g., when on travel.476 
• Superior security of physical separation over logistical separation: In 
U.S.-based nuclear power plants, sensitive data such as that 
related to the “design basis threat” and a plant’s counter-
measures and safeguards are secured by ensuring that they are 
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“air gapped” from the Internet and not allowed to be on 
systems that communicate wirelessly.  Such practices 
demonstrate the reliability of physical separation.  Cloud 
computing services, however, rely instead on logistical 
separation for security, which is inherently less reliable.  As 
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis explains,  “One aspect that is pervasive 
in cloud systems, however, is reliance on ‘logistical separation’, 
as opposed to ‘physical separation’ of user workloads, and the 
use of logical mechanisms to protect subscriber resources . . . 
[A]nd logical separation has not been shown to be as reliable 
as physical separation . . . .”477 
• Software and missions that are unsuitable for SaaS: Decisions 
concerning use of cloud computing should consider the 
potential for a mismatch between the limits of cloud 
computing and the needs of the user.  As the NIST Cloud 
Synopsis explains, “Different types of applications require 
differing levels of system performance.  For example, email is 
generally tolerant of short service interruptions, but industrial 
automation and real-time processing generally requires both 
high performance and a high degree of predictability.”478  The 
authors observe, however, that even e-mail is not always 
tolerant of seemingly short delays.  Certain company managers 
in high tech enterprises are known to expect immediate 
replies to their internal e-mail, which may become an 
impossible to meet expectation for subordinates whose receipt 
of replies are held up in a cloud computing message traffic 
bottleneck.  Moreover, a manager will have no reliable way of 
verifying whether the delay was due to the subordinate or to 
the cloud.  As the NIST Cloud Synopsis also noted, 
“Subscribers may lack visibility into how clouds operate.  If so, 
they will likely be unable to tell if their services are being 
undertaken and delivered in a secure manner.”479 
 NIST’s Cloud Synopsis points out three key examples of 
mismatches involving potential migration to public SaaS.  First, are 
operations required in real-time, such as flight control systems or 
factory robot controls.  Because such operations require precise 
timing and coordination to complete tasks on reliable, recurrent 
times, they are unsuitable for SaaS, which can offer only variable 
response times.  Moreover, additional delays and mis-timings can 
occur as a result of “unavoidable round trip delays for messages to 
be exchanged between SaaS subscribers and cloud providers.”480  
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Imagine a combat pilot or submarine executive officer looking at a 
data display screen and suddenly realizing that the updates or 
refresh rates have ceased to be predictable, rapid, and that they are 
no longer making decisions based on real-time updates to the 
tactical picture.  Increasingly businesses operate in a similar 
environment and such businesses should be cautious in placing 
themselves and their decision makers in a position where they 
believe they are acting upon real-time information when it is, in 
fact, being significantly delayed in updates, is being refreshed at 
irregular intervals, and may be obsolete at the time a critical 
decision needs to be made based on such data. 
 Second, are bulk-subscriber operations, such as monitoring of 
medical devices.  These can generate suddenly high volumes of 
data that become infeasible for transfers in real-time over wide area 
networks to a SaaS provider.  Businesses that need to be responsive 
to developments in economic or political crises, such as the trading 
of shares on a public exchange, might similarly find that the delays 
in response time would prove so costly as to outweigh the 
anticipated cost savings of migration to cloud computing.481 
 Third, are mission critical operations where a failure would 
impose intolerable consequences.  Because avoidance of 
complexity is a key engineering strategy for reducing software 
failures, such a strategy is ill-suited for SaaS applications, which 
“depend on proper operation of a large and complex software 
stack that includes a network” and there are “no guarantees” that 
can be given that the “network will continue to provide acceptable 
levels of service.”482 
• Cloud complexities increase vulnerabilities: Cloud computing 
systems, by structure and operation, tend to be complex, and, 
as a result “prone to failure and security compromise.”483  The 
marketing promises of cloud service providers can be tested by 
comparing them to the disclaimers for reliability and security 
that the same providers insist upon in their standard Service 
Level Agreement, suggesting that the tendency of such systems 
to fail and to be breached by attackers is too high for the 
vendors themselves to accept and be financially responsible 
for.  Potential subscribers need to be aware of the inherent 
weaknesses of cloud computing, which include the fact that: 
[S]oftware that must accommodate complex 
requirements such as concurrency, dynamic 
configuration, and large scale computations, may 
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exhibit higher defect densities than typical 
commercial grade software.  With this in mind, it is 
important to understand that cloud systems, like all 
complex computing systems, will contain flaws, 
experience failures, and experience security 
compromises. . . . [Therefore] techniques for 
detecting failures, understanding their consequences, 
isolating their effects, and remediating them, are 
central to the wide-scale adoption of clouds . . . .  The 
technical means of providing the quality of service 
promised are usually not disclosed to the subscriber, 
thus raising questions about how subscribers can 
verify that the promised quality of service level has 
been provided.484 
• Difficulty of measuring a cloud’s reliability: Any decision 
concerning the migration to a cloud computing service should 
be based, in part, on an evaluation of the reliability needed 
and the reliability that the cloud computing service can be 
depended on to provide.  Negotiating a Service Level 
Agreement on that issue for a customer can be compromised 
by the difficulties of measuring a cloud’s reliability, both 
historically prior to the negotiations and during contract 
performance.  The sources of the difficulties, as the NIST 
Cloud Synopsis explains, are as follows: 
Reliability refers to the probability that a system will 
offer failure-free service for a specified period of time 
within the bounds of a specified environment. . . . 
       Note that measuring the reliability of a specific 
cloud by the provider or subscriber will be difficult 
for two reasons.  First, a cloud may be a composition 
of various components, each inheriting a particular 
degree of reliability when it was measured as a 
standalone entity.  When these components are 
combined the resulting reliability is difficult to 
predict and may wind up being too course-grained 
[sic].  Secondly, reliability measurement is a function 
of an environment in which a cloud operates. . . . For 
clouds, and most systems of significant scale, each 
component has a specific reliability given a specific 
context, and therefore understanding the union of 
the contexts is complex and possibly intractable.485 
The authors recommend that Boards ask their counsel to test 
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the marketing promises of cloud service providers by comparing 
them to the disclaimers of reliability and security that the same 
providers insist upon in their standard Service Level Agreements.  
Where disclaimers of cloud performance undercut a promised level 
of performance, it is reasonable to infer that the vendor anticipates 
that the tendency of such systems to fail and be breached by 
attackers is too high for the vendors themselves to afford and they, 
therefore, shift this risk to customers.  The customer's negotiation 
of a Service Level Agreement should include a careful comparison 
of the cloud vendor's performance promises and the cloud 
vendor's disclaimers in order to ensure that the customer is not 
tempted to believe it will be receiving performance promised by 
one section that another section gives the vendor a basis for 
denying.  Where such inconsistencies exist they create the kind of 
ambiguity that can deprive a customer of the benefits of its bargain 
and increase the likelihood of serious disagreements with the 
vendor that could lead to costly litigation.  A customer should insist 
on such inconsistencies being removed, and should be careful that 
the price of the vendor's services are re-evaluated in light of the 
results of the negotiation of such inconsistencies, since the benefits 
may have been diminished to the point where the price needs 
to be adjusted downward accordingly.  If those terms are   
intractable, the assumptions on which the negotiations are based 
are not verifiable.  If a cloud’s performance levels cannot be 
measured and verified, the customer may be paying for rights to 
performance it will not be able to enforce. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Web 2.0 communications technologies, cloud-based 
applications, and cloud computing deserve careful review by 
lawyers and law firms.  Their rapid adoption may occur without a 
full awareness of the potential ethical risks or without adequate 
safeguards having been put in place to mitigate the likelihood that 
the vulnerabilities may give rise to security risks and ethical 
problems.  The potential problems include: 
• A lawyer’s use of Twitter to advertise the lawyer’s firm or 
practice without including, as required under the NYRPC, 
“attorney advertising.” 
• A lawyer’s use of Twitter to make extrajudicial comments 
concerning an ongoing trial in which the lawyer is 
participating and that may have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
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matter. 
• A law firm associate receives a “tweet” announcing a political 
rally and believes that she will be participating in a political 
demonstration, but it turns into a “flash mob” (like those that 
recently occurred in the U.K.) and she is arrested for having 
re-tweeted the invitation and contributing to the ensuing riot, 
injuries, and property damage. 
• A lawyer’s posting on a LinkedIn page a description of the 
lawyer as a “specialist” in a particular field or as “specializing” 
in such field without meeting the stringent conditions for such 
terms under the NYRPC. 
• A lawyer’s private Facebook page used in a manner that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s character.486 
• A lawyer’s use of Facebook to communicate with a party 
represented by counsel without that counsel’s consent.  
• A lawyer’s posting of an entry in a blog noting that a particular 
defendant has been charged with a crime, but failing to add a 
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation 
and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless 
proven guilty. 
These situations and numerous others have the potential to cause 
easily overlooked ethical issues under applicable rules of 
professional conduct. 
Counsel will need to monitor the ever-changing security 
environment of social networking sites.  One method for such 
monitoring is to observe how the security environment is perceived 
by security experts engaged in efforts to test the cloud platforms for 
vulnerabilities.  Other organizations treat the security of the data 
they possess as among the highest of priorities.  Reports by such 
experts can provide the basis for due diligence examinations of 
prospective vendors of cloud services under consideration by a law 
firm.487
  
A second method for monitoring the security environment 
 
 486. Material that may reflect adversely on a lawyer’s character or involve 
disclosure of confidential information can be posted even without a lawyer’s direct 
involvement, such as by a member of the lawyer’s family who has access and 
authorization to place information on a Facebook page.  See, e.g., MI6 Boss in 
Facebook Entry Row, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2009, 10:34 GMT), http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/8134807.stm (noting that a British diplomat’s personal life details, 
including information about his children and the location of the family’s flat, were 
posted on Facebook by spouse). 
 487. Such reports could include those from security conferences where 
findings of security deficiencies are announced and explained.  See, e.g., Joseph 
Menn, Data Security Services Under a Cloud, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5aa4f33e-7fc4-11de-85dc-00144feabdc0.html 
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is to observe the extent that such organizations have assessed the 
risks of social networking sites as unacceptably high.  Despite the 
security precautions, such assessments should alert law firms and 
lawyers of the need to audit the security of the use of such sites by 
their personnel to ensure that the safeguards in place are 
reasonable in light of the risks recognized by organizations that 
have concerns for the safety of their data.  There is, unfortunately, 
no existing single standard or one organization that sets a “gold 
standard” for risk assessments of social networking sites, cloud-
based applications, or cloud computing.  Moreover, organizations 
that have a high regard for the safety of their data and personnel 
are currently drawing conflicting conclusions with respect to 
whether such risks are tolerable or intolerable.  For example, on 
August 9, 2009, the Marine Corps issued a one-year ban on use by 
its personnel of social networking sites (SNS) (even if access was 
through a virtual private network), citing the unacceptably high 
risks that such sites introduce: 
THESE INTERNET SITES IN GENERAL ARE A PROVEN 
HAVEN FOR MALICIOUS ACTORS AND CONTENT 
AND ARE PARTICULARLY HIGH RISK DUE TO 
INFORMATION EXPOSURE, USER GENERATED 
CONTENT AND TARGETING BY ADVERSARIES.  THE 
VERY NATURE OF SNS CREATES A LARGER ATTACK 
AND EXPLOITATION WINDOW, EXPOSES 
UNNECESSARY INFORMATION TO ADVERSARIES 
AND PROVIDES AN EASY CONDUIT FOR 
INFORMATION LEAKAGE THAT PUTS OPSEC, 
COMSEC, PERSONNEL AND THE MCEN AT AN 
ELEVATED RISK OF COMPROMISE.  EXAMPLES OF 
INTERNET SNS SITES INCLUDE FACEBOOK, 
MYSPACE, AND TWITTER.488
  
Four days earlier, on August 5, 2009, the U.K. Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) announced a policy that, contrary to that which 
was issued by the Pentagon, encouraged its personnel to “make full 
 
(discussing security problems presented at the Black Hat USA security 
conference). 
 488. Immediate Ban of Internet Social Networking Sites (SNS) on Marine Corps 
Enterprise Network (MCEN) NIPRNET, MARINES (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www 
.marines.mil/news/messages/pages/maradmin0458-09.aspx.  See generally David 
Gelles, Marines Ban Social Networking Sites, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www 
.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6bc60434-812f-11de-92e700144feabdc0.html 
#axzz1XaLHYSKt (reporting on the Pentagon’s concerns with the use of social 
networking sites, including incautious use by members of Congress when making 
confidential visits to U.S. military installations). 
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use of online presences” available through SNS, “but within certain 
limits to protect security, reputation and privacy.”489  In order to 
promote that policy, the MoD published “Online Engagement 
Guidelines” for such activities.490
 
 
As Web 2.0 technology becomes more deeply entrenched in 
commercial and corporate enterprises, lawyers and law firms need 
to keep abreast of the changes in the legal rules and their 
interpretation as applied to such technology.  For example, the 
E.U.’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (“Working Party”) 
in June 2009 issued an opinion on “online social networking” that 
noted, among other points, that the Data Protection Directive 
(“Directive”) applies to social network sites, even if its headquarters 
are located outside the European Economic Administration.491
  
Moreover, a law firm’s associates who use an online social 
networking site can become responsible for fulfilling data 
controller responsibilities under the Directive if such an associate, 
as a user of the social network, “takes an informed decision to 
extend access beyond self-selected ‘friends’ [then] data controller 
responsibilities come into force.”492
  
U.S. law firms with offices in 
Europe, and European law firms with offices in the United States, 
may find that the Working Party’s opinion on that issue may 
necessitate a review of the policies such firms have adopted for use 
of social networks by their associates.  Additionally, it is prudent to 
counsel clients to make similar reviews of their policies for 
employees’ use of online social networks. 
In addition, the increased use of Web 2.0 communications 
raises the risks that clients, their counsel, or both, will find that 
their activities have unexpectedly come within the jurisdictional 
reach of foreign jurisdictions, subjecting them to potentially 
adverse consequences. If a law firm or lawyer fails to apprise a 
client of such risks in circumstances where counsel knew of the 
facts that made those risks apparent, ethical issues might arise 
 
 489. Online Engagement Guidelines, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 1–2 (Aug. 5, 2009), 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D2AC8314-3B15-4DEB-A769-
6C85AF4BDA80/0/20090805UMODOnlineEngagementGuidelinesVersion10.pdf. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, Article 29 Data Prot. Working 
Party (June 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies 
/privacy/news/docs/pr_25_06_09_en.pdf (rendering an opinion on online social 
networking). 
 492. Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking, Article 29 Data Prot. 
Working Party, at 6 (June 12, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice 
/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf (discussing access to profile 
information). 
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concerning the competency of the representation.  Although there 
may be instances in which the electronic communications at issue 
may not have originated with the person alleged to have sent them, 
instant messages and text messages have been deemed admissible 
by appellate courts when the appropriate foundation has been laid 
(e.g., through circumstantial evidence).493
  
Examples of parties 
surprised by the jurisdictional consequences of their use of 
electronic communications technologies include the following: 
• A senior investment officer of the Montana Board of 
Investments (MBOI) negotiated through a series of instant 
messaging exchanges an agreement for a $15 million sale of its 
client’s holdings of Pennzoil bonds to Deutsche Bank 
Securities, Inc. (“DB”) in New York.494  When MBOI 
subsequently cancelled the sale, DB sued for breach of 
contract in New York Supreme Court.495  MBOI moved for 
dismissal, contending that New York’s “long-arm statute” did 
not reach MBOI in Montana for these activities.496  The 
supreme court granted the motion and dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.497
  
The appellate division reversed.498  On 
MBOI’s appeal, the court of appeals noted that New York’s 
“‘long-arm statute” was a “single act statute” and emphasized 
that “proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to 
invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters 
New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were 
purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the 
transaction and the claim asserted.’”499
 
 
• A California client who communicated with her New York 
lawyer via telephone, faxes, and e-mails created a continuing 
relationship with that lawyer and thereby projected herself 
into New York’s legal services market; this was sufficient to 
 
 493. See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting challenges to admission of instant messages); People v. Pierre, 838 
N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that trial court properly admitted text 
message authenticated by circumstantial evidence); In the Interest of F.P., 878 
A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that instant messages were admissible 
and properly authenticated through the use of circumstantial evidence). 
 494. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1141–
42 (N.Y. 2006). 
 495. Id. at 1142. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 
1988)). 
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support long-arm jurisdiction over the client when she was 
sued by her New York lawyer for unjust enrichment and 




• A law firm with more than 600 lawyers that maintained a 
practice on a “coast-to-coast” platform and one of its partners 
who worked in the firm’s Columbus, Ohio office were sued in 
a Delaware chancery court for allegedly aiding and abetting a 
breach of fiduciary duty by top managers of a publicly-held 
company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in 
Ohio.501  The law firm and its partner challenged the 
complaint on the ground that they were not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Delaware because the partner had 
never entered Delaware in connection with the representation 
and did not file any documents with any court or agency in 
Delaware in connection with the representation.502  However, 
the plaintiff presented evidence that the client’s Certificate 
Amendment was drafted by a paralegal under the partner’s 
supervision and sent to the Corporation Service Company in 
Delaware for filling.503  The defendants argued that they could 
not be sued simply for performing services for a client since 
they only received fees in exchange for those services.504  The 
Vice Chancellor rejected their arguments, emphasizing that 
the law firm represented on its website that it had a “unique 
[ten office] coast-to-coast platform,” and advertised itself as 
“being able to handle the full range of any corporation’s legal 
needs, regardless of its location in the United States.”505  The 
Vice Chancellor observed that: 
 For sophisticated counsel to argue that they did not 
realize that acting as the de facto outside general counsel 
to a Delaware corporation and regularly providing advice 
about Delaware law about matters important to that 
 
 500. Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 2007); see also Stone v. Patchett, 
No. 08 CV 5171(RPP), 2009 WL 1108596, at *4, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2009) 
(finding that New York had jurisdiction over defendant in case involving 
communications by fax, e-mail, and telephone); Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet 
Commc’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463(CM)(GWG), 2009 WL 1059647, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 17, 2009) (finding defendant created a relationship with a New York 
corporation, and, thus, New York had jurisdiction). 
 501. Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1048, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 502. Id. at 1054–55. 
 503. Id. at 1054. 
 504. Id. at 1060–61. 
 505. Id. at 1053, 1063. 
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corporation and its stockholders might expose it to this 
court’s jurisdiction fails the straight-face test.  The moving 
defendants knew that the propriety of the corporate 
action taken in reliance upon its advice and through its 
services would be determined under Delaware corporate 
law, and likely in a Delaware court.506
  
The Vice Chancellor held that the arranging for the filing of a 
corporate instrument in Delaware that facilitated transactions 
under challenge in litigation and the advising on Delaware law to a 
Delaware corporation that resulted in injury in Delaware were 
sufficient to constitute the transaction of business and to provide a 
basis for jurisdiction.507  New communications technologies and the 
practices that coalesce around their use tend to raise novel issues 
under ethical rules. By routinely reviewing such rules counsel can 
mitigate, if not eliminate, the risk of misremembering the 
mandates or departing inadvertently from their spirit. 
Routinely keeping abreast of new communications 
technologies is an increasingly important part of the practice of 
law.  Doing so reduces the probability of being surprised by the 
misuse of such new technologies or failing to provide the requisite 
degree of supervision for associates, staff, and service providers. 
Fulfilling the implicit ethical obligation to keep abreast of new 
communications technologies involves several tasks, including the 
basic ones of identifying new technologies that seem to be gaining 
widespread acceptance and learning of risks that may arise from 
their use and misuse, particularly by clients, lawyers, and law firms.  
Sometimes the risks will come from new technologies that are not 
widespread, not the subject of multiple reports in the media, and 
yet are important for counsel to be aware of.  For example, there 
has been little reporting of the risks from “side-channel attacks,” 
but they pose a severe risk to enterprises.  These attacks exploit 
vulnerabilities in the reflective surfaces (such as eyeglasses and 
 
 506. Id. at 1065. 
 507. Id. at 1057, 1063.  The Vice Chancellor also noted public policy reasons in 
support of the decision, stating that: 
Delaware has no public policy interest in shielding corporate advisors 
from responsibility for consciously assisting the managers of Delaware 
corporations in breaching their fiduciary duties.  If well-pled facts can be 
pled that support the inference that a corporate advisor knowingly 
assisted corporate directors in breaching their fiduciary duties, Delaware 
has a public policy interest in ensuring that its courts are available to 
derivative plaintiffs who wish to hold that advisor accountable to the 
corporation. 
Id. at 1065. 
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computer screens) throughout offices and capture them on the 
latest photographic and video recording devices. As explained in 
an article in the May 2009 issue of Scientific American:  
[A]n alarmingly wide range of objects can bounce secrets 
right off our screens and into an eavesdropper’s camera.  
Spectacles work just fine, as do coffee cups, plastic bottles, 
metal jewelry —even . . . the eyeballs of the computer 
user.  The mere act of viewing information can give it 
away. 
 The reflection of screen images is only one of the 
many ways in which our computers leak information 
through so-called side channels, security holes that bypass 
the normal encryption and operating-system restrictions 
we rely on to protect sensitive data. 
. . . .  
 “Side-channel” attacks exploit the unprotected area 
where the computer meets the real world . . . at a stage 
before the information is encrypted or after it has been 
translated into human-readable form. Such attacks also 
leave no anomalous log entries or corrupted files to signal 
that a theft has occurred, no traces that would allow 
security researchers to piece together how frequently they 
happen. The experts are sure of only one thing: whenever 
information is vulnerable and has significant monetary or 
intelligence value, it is only a matter of time until 
someone tries to steal it.508
 
 
In closing, we believe it is important to identify one other step 
that counsel may find prudent and valuable in fulfilling ethical 
obligations related to the emergence and use of new 
communications technologies.  Integral to the ethical duty to keep 
abreast of technology, but easily overlooked in efforts to fulfill it, is 
the need to be alert to the use of words that create the appearance 
of an objective assessment of a new communications technology 
when, in fact, the words work to coax the reader to trust an 
assertion, when the reader should be examining, testing, and 
challenging it.  In his 1946 essay, Politics and the English Language, 
George Orwell cautioned against uses of language that can cause 
readers to concede points that they should be examining; instead, 
words that “are used to dress up a simple statement and give an air 
of scientific impartiality to biased judgments” and that are used for 
 
 508. W. Wayt Gibbs, How to Steal Secrets Without a Network, SCI. AM., May 2009, at 
58. 
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“the defense of the indefensible.”509  
As lawyers, we continuously train ourselves to be vigilant and 
critical of the use of words in contracts, board resolutions, replies 
to interrogatories, and other documents where what is written will 
be taken seriously, where it will be understood to be the expression 
of what was meant, and where inaccuracy or any effort to mislead 
may harm others and ultimately may harm the author and the 
author’s legal counsel.  In order to keep abreast of new 
communications technology, it is valuable to train ourselves to be 
equally critical of the uses of words that developers, vendors, and 
promoters use to describe such technologies and their capabilities 
and benefits.  When the description of capabilities seems to omit a 
serious assessment of shortcomings or of ways in which 
performance may fall short of specifications or representations, or 
disclaims in one provision promises made in others, it should be 
seen as a red flag that important information is missing.  When the 
description of benefits purports to address potential weaknesses, 
deficiencies, or risks, but does so in a manner that, on close 
examination, proves to have been written to persuade the reader 
that the risks do not exist or have been dealt with in ways not really 
disclosed, this too should be seen as a red flag.  For example, when 
a web page document, entitled 10 Reasons to use Azure for Your Cloud 
Apps, discusses the important topic of “Security,” there should be a 
discussion of the vulnerabilities before there is an assertion that 
they have been minimized, mitigated, averted, or rendered 
nonexistent.510  Instead, such document offers the following 
assurance designed to make the reader complacent, less vigilant, 
more trusting, and ultimately unquestioning of the assurances and 
the risks it obscures: “Knowing that security is one of the biggest 
concerns for companies considering a move to the cloud, Microsoft 
designed Azure with security in mind. . . . Microsoft has designed 
its compliance framework to meet regulatory requirements.”511 
A contract for the design and development of a computer-
based system would provide the customer little protection of its 
interests if the specifications stated merely that the vendor must 
“design[] . . . [the system] with security in mind” and that it must 
 
 509. GEORGE ORWELL, POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1946), available at 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm. 
 510. Debra Littlejohn Shinder, 10 Reasons to Use Azure for Your Cloud Apps, 
TECHREPUBLIC § 9 (Jan. 6, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com 
/blog/10things/10-reasons-to-use-azure-for-your-cloud-apps/1282. 
 511. Id. 
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be “designed . . . to meet regulatory requirements.”512  Competent 
counsel would challenge such vacuous specifications.  It is 
important for counsel to alert themselves, their law firms, and their 
firm’s clients when a new communications technology contains 
risks that are being obscured, trivialized, or otherwise de-
emphasized by the language the vendors have used not only in 
marketing literature, but in the service level agreements, white 
papers, and other documents that a client and its counsel should 
consider adding to their due diligence list.  As in any due diligence 
exercise, where documents authored by a party to the transaction 
contain statements or omissions that should be clear red flags, it is 
prudent to ask questions in order to understand whether the red 
flag is evidence of a risk, and, if so, whether the risk can be 
mitigated—and whether the client can accept the risk to the extent 
mitigated. 
Just as counsel often asks a client to explain its business, its 
manufacturing methods, and its technologies, and will compare 
those descriptions to the client’s published statements to see where 
they match and where they might diverge, counsel in fulfillment of 
professional ethical obligations will often benefit from comparing 
what can be learned of a new communications technology to what 
the technologies’ developers, vendors, and supporters say, write, 
and publish.  As we have noted in this essay, there are many places 
where the cloud vendors’ statements to promote their technology 
seem to diverge from what the vendors put in their standard service 
level agreements and seem also to diverge from the risks disclaimed 
or that one discovers in the reports of problems that the vendors’ 
published statements did not hint at or seem uninterested in 
pointing out to potential customers. 
Because the client’s confidential information and interests are 
at stake, as is counsel’s reputation and the ability to fulfill 
professional ethical obligations, it is worth learning and keeping 
abreast of the changes in technology and of the changes in the 
mismatches between the language vendors use to describe and 
emphasize and the language they use to de-emphasize.  That is an 
important part of keeping abreast of new technologies.  Failure to 
do so can lead counsel to underestimate the promises in a service 
level agreement to a client’s detriment.  For example, promises 
such as those that typically appear in the agreement’s specification 
of “uptime” service level can be complex. When probed, the 
 
 512. Id. 
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specifications prove to be difficult for the customer to verify 
because key facts required for the computation of “uptime” are not 
accessible to the customer.513 
Such failure can also cause counsel to be distracted by the 
drum beat of promotional discourse.  As a result, counsel may 
become so accustomed to reading the praises of a new 
communications technology and the exhortations to “adopt it or be 
left in its wake” that counsel may come to believe that the new 
technology really performs as well its promoters promise it will and 
that the risks, whatever they might have been, have ceased to exist 
or never did or must have been exaggerated.  Add to that the 
tendency for experienced lawyers to want to avoid appearing either 
ill at ease with new technology or not as technologically adept as 
younger colleagues, and it can be difficult for such counsel to 
remain vigilant and keenly observant for undisclosed defects and 
risks in a new, widely popular communications technology.  To 
counteract the dulling of a lawyer’s skeptical questioning of new 
technologies and the loss of a healthy wariness that should 
accompany the use of new communication devices there are some 
antidotes, one of which is for counsel to be presented with 
contemporaneous and sharply contrasting reports of the same 
technology with one praising it and one revealing an unsuspected 
 
 513. For example, Microsoft’s Service Level Agreement for its Azure Storage 
Service Level Agreement, promises an “uptime” of “99.9%,” but that is expressed 
as a “monthly uptime percentage.”  Windows Azure Storage SLA-English.doc, 
MICROSOFT § 4, http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?id=6656 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011).  Such percentage is to be “calculated by subtracting 
from 100% the average Error Rate for the billing month for the customer’s 
storage transactions . . . .”  Id.  The “Error Rate,” in turn, is defined as the “total 
number of Failed Storage Transactions divided by the Total Storage Transactions” 
that occur during an hour.  Id. § 3.  To know if the “uptime” has not been 
achieved, a customer would have to be able to compute a value for the “Error 
Rate” denominator; and, to do that, the customer has to first know its own “Total 
Storage Transactions” for a month.  Id.  Few, if any, customers are likely to be 
keeping, or to be able to keep, an accurate count of such transactions, making the 
“Error Rate” incomputable.  Furthermore, the customer would also need to be 
able to compute a value for the “Error Rate” numerator; and, to do that, the 
customer has to have access to the records of incidents of “Failed Storage 
Transactions.”  Id.  The Service Level Agreement defines that as any of certain 
occasions when a request exceeds the specified “Maximum Processing Time,” but 
it qualifies that by stating that “the amount of time spent processing a request . . . 
does not include the time it takes to transfer the request to/from the Windows 
Azure Storage service” and “only includes the time spent processing the request,” 
neither of which a customer will be able to access.  Id. § 2.  Thus, both the 
numerator and the denominator of the “Error Rate” prove to be incomputable by 
a customer, making the “uptime” of “99.9%” an undeterminable and thus 
unenforceable term for a cloud customer. 
286 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
risk and its damaging consequences. 
An example of two such contrasting reports appeared in the 
morning newspapers on August 31, 2011, on the eve of the 
submission of this article for publication.  The bright side of cloud 
computing received expression in an op-ed piece published in The 
New York Times, and in reading it one would be tempted to believe 
that any security risks inherent in the cloud had either been 
disarmed or never had existed.  For the author cheerfully writes: 
The State Department, for instance, has raised concerns 
about whether the cloud approach introduces security 
risks, since data is stored off site by private contractors.  
But cloud computing is often far more secure than 
traditional computing, because companies like Google 
and Amazon can attract and retain cyber-security 
personnel of a higher quality than many governmental 
agencies.  And government employees are so accustomed 
to using cloud services like Dropbox and Gmail in their 
personal lives that, even if their agencies don’t formally 
permit cloud computing, they use it for work purposes 
anyway, creating a “shadow I.T.” that leads to a more 
vulnerable organization than would a properly overseen 
cloud computing system. 
 The United States cannot afford to be left behind in 
the cloud computing revolution.514 
The dark side of cloud computing came to light in the 
Financial Times, which reported an incident that the author 
apparently found both alarming and discomforting: 
The worst breach to date in the dominant system for 
securing websites has raised fears that thousands of 
Iranians have had their Google e-mail read by government 
authorities.  A Dutch company called DigiNotar . . . 
[which sells] certificates to authenticate sensitive sites, 
said on Tuesday that it discovered that it had been hacked 
on July 19, allowing unknown attackers to fake certificates 
and impersonate websites beginning with the letters 
“https” and displaying a padlock to visitors.  Known 
formally as Secure Sockets Layer, the system is used 
worldwide by banks and communications providers, 
including Google mail or Gmail . . . . [Some makers of 
web browsers] decided to ban all DigiNotar certificates 
. . . . [DigiNotar] said it did not expect material harm to 
 
 514. Vivek Kundra, Op-Ed., Tight Budget? Look to the ‘Cloud,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2011, at A27. 
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its business, but shares in the company fell 6 per cent.515 
Whether counsel believes in the bright or the dark side of 
cloud computing, seeing two such reports juxtaposed should 
sharpen and reinvigorate the questions that counsel might find 
prudent to ask of the technology and its vendors before venturing 
to store client confidential information in the cloud with the 
attendant risks to reputation, client trust, and professional ethical 
obligations.  Among those questions, counsel will probably find 
several that lawyers, law firms, and state bar ethics committees 
asked of earlier communications technologies that appeared 
attractive and nonetheless created brave new worlds of digital 
capabilities and digital risks. 
Boards of directors also may need to reckon with cybersecurity 
threats and reported attacks.  As they do so, priorities and the 
weights assigned to cybersecurity risks will change. Risks thought to 
be remote may be recalibrated as imminent threats.  Having 
measured technologies for their probable benefits, boards may 
require that technologies be measured also for their vulnerabilities 
and the potential for damage to the enterprise. As the CEO of 
Hyundai Capital suggested, boards may ask if the enterprise can 
afford the total of adoption and management of the new 
cybersecurity technology.  
New technologies in the last ten years have increased a lay 
person’s ability to report—to publish and broadcast written 
utterance as well as photographs and videos that express each 
individual’s account of events that they have witnessed or to which 
they are reacting.516  And yet, ironically, the rush to adopt and 
adapt these technologies to benefit a corporate enterprise, eager to 
extract value from the use of social media externally and internally 
to the enterprise, has not led to greater care in the use of words to 
describe such technologies, but instead has led to a prolific use of 
vague terms that obscure from counsel and their clients the precise 
 
 515. Joseph Mann, E-mail Breach in Iran Raises Surveillance Fears, FIN. TIMES Aug. 
30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6bb480b4-d327-11e0-9ba8 
-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Y3gVT1p7. 
 516. As David Friend recently observed, “[o]n Sept. 11, 2001, there was no 
such thing as a YouTube video. Or a Facebook page.  Or a Twitter feed.  Cell 
phone cameras did not exist.”  David Friend, Seeing 9/11 Through a Digital Prism, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424053111903461304576524781716173962.html.  However, since then, 
as he also notes, “the documentation of conflict—in the form of still photographs 
and moving pictures, often by civilians carrying camera—equipped mobile 
phones, whose footage can be viewed almost instantaneously across the globe—
actually takes precedent [sic] in the public mind over context and analysis.”  Id.  
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nature and risks of such technologies.   
It has become far easier today than a decade ago to release 
incautiously considered expressions that once posted remain 
sempiternally attached to and accessible on the Web, and thus on 
view for all the world to see.  Before a letter was posted, it was often 
reread.  There was time to reconsider its phrasing and content.  
And many times reconsideration of a handwritten or typewritten 
letter led to a decision to rewrite it or not to send it.  Before an e-
mail was transmitted, there tended to be much less time to 
reconsider the text, because e-mails were (and continue to be) 
often quick responses to other e-mails sent with the expectation of, 
if not the insistence on, a quick reply.  As a result, lawyers often 
learned that pressing the SEND key prematurely could lead to 
unfortunate results: text that sorely needed revision, or a message 
that went to REPLY ALL when it was written for only one of the 
addressees, sometimes raising the risk of waiving the privilege 
concerning certain communications.  The move towards brevity 
that has accompanied the adoption of communicating by texting, 
social network postings, and tweets should alert lawyers that 
learning each new communications technology brings with it a 
professional responsibility for using the technology in a manner 
consistent with counsel’s ethical obligations, however inconvenient 
and contrary to our culture’s social customs such caution may 
appear to be when observed by digital natives, laymen, and 
corporate executives. 
Two of the most unsuspected risks from each new 
communications technology appear to be the increasingly 
incautious use of the media, which counsel must avoid while 
nonetheless learning and using such media, and the increasingly 
obscure use of words to describe the workings, benefits, and risks of 
such media, which counsel must diligently discern and highlight 
for clients.  The measure of success or failure in averting such risks 
is not, and probably should not be, found in the precepts of a state 
bar association’s code of professional responsibility.  The practice 
of law is difficult to do well, and will not be improved by adding 
ethical liability as an incentive for using good judgment and 
common sense, especially when the rules in their current form 
supply adequate reminders of the need to use good judgment and 
common sense when communicating with old, as well as with new, 
technologies.  Having new equipment to communicate sadly may 
make it harder to capture what we really need to say, and to avoid 
saying it in client-sensitive communications.  And our efforts to 
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express our thoughts are already dependent on words and 
expressions that tend to deteriorate in ways that often escape our 
notice, as the poet T.S. Eliot recognized when he wrote: 
And so each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, 
Undisciplined squads of emotion . . . . 
For us, there is only the trying.  The rest is not our business.517 
 
 517. T.S. ELIOT, East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909–1950, at 
123, 128 (1962). 
